

diogenes


HELD FOR BINDING

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An International Review of Philosophy and Humanistic Studies • \$1.25

Fleming was a great investigator of nature. He knew that work is necessary and he worked in view of great designs. But his real greatness was in his discernment, in his skill in fixing on the unusual observation at a moment when its true significance had not become at all apparent to an ordinary mortal—in a word, in uncovering fundamental phenomena. He knew how to mark the unaccustomed rather than to pass it by.

PROFESSOR HADDOW
Director of the Institute of Cancer



diogenes

a quarterly publication of

THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR
PHILOSOPHY AND HUMANISTIC STUDIES

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The English-language edition of *Diogenes* is published quarterly in December, March, June, and September by the University of Chicago Press, 5750 Ellis Avenue, Chicago 37, Illinois. Entered as second-class matter at the Post Office at Chicago, Illinois. Editorial correspondence for the English edition should be addressed to Richard McKeon, Editor, English Edition, 5632 Blackstone Avenue, Chicago 37, Illinois.

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Five parallel editions of the review are published simultaneously:

English: Published and distributed in the United States by the University of Chicago Press. Subscription rates for U.S.A. and possessions: 1 year, \$4.00; 2 years, \$7.50; 3 years, \$10.50. Canada and Pan American Postal Union: 1 year, \$4.50; 2 years, \$8.50; 3 years, \$12.00. All other countries: 1 year, \$5.00; 2 years, \$9.50; 3 years, \$13.50. Single copies: \$1.25.

French: Published by Librairie Gallimard, Paris.

Spanish: Published by Editorial Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

German: Published by Kiepenheuer und Witsch, Cologne.

Arabian: Published by the Librairie Misr, Cairo, Egypt.

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Printed in the U.S.A. at the University of Chicago Press, Chicago 37, Illinois.

DIOGENES

Number 26

Summer 1959

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AFTER SIX YEARS OF A DOUBTFUL COMBAT*

The progress of knowledge consists in part of avoiding superficial analogies and discovering profound kinships, less apparent perhaps, but far more important and significant. In the eighteenth century there still appeared zoölogical works which classed animals according to the number of their paws, grouping, for example, the lizard with the bat. Today the adder appears under the same rubric—a creature that has no paws at all but that, like the others, is oviparous and covered with scales. These characteristics have appeared, rightly, to be of more consequence than that which was singled out in the beginning—the number of paws. In the same fashion, it is well known that, despite its appearance, the whale is not a fish, nor is the bat a bird.

I have purposely chosen an elementary and incontestable example.

Translated by Muriel McKeon.

* This study constitutes a sort of bringing-into-focus, clearer and more ambitious than preceding formulations, of the editor's interpretations of the aims of *Diogenes*. The occasion is the seventh anniversary of the review, and the article appears at the same time under the title "Sciences diagonales" in *La Nouvelle revue française*, April, 1959.

After Six Years of a Doubtful Combat

But, as soon as one studies, even superficially, the history of the constitution of the sciences, he perceives an almost infinite number of pitfalls that scholars have had to avoid consistently in the interests of identifying the useful distinctions—those which delimit the field of each discipline. These pitfalls, these misleading resemblances, are no more than simple shams: properly speaking, not even resemblances. They are realities to which is finally affixed a lower coefficient of importance than that accorded to other realities. It is correct that the lizard and the tortoise have four paws, like other mammals—although they are not mammals—and that the bat, which is not a bird, has wings.

To classify, then, is to make the best possible choice among distinctive characteristics. The characteristics eliminated cannot be called false; they correspond only to classifications which lead quickly, or more quickly, to difficulties, incoherencies, or contradictions. It is still possible that, according to the point of view, these classifications which are subsidiary or are set aside can suddenly become once again essential. If it is my intention to study the functioning of wings, it is clear that I must now reclassify the bat with the bird and even with the butterfly and enumerate all the winged tribes whatever are the reasons (decisive, I recognize) which have led to the distribution of the members into different species: invertebrate Lepidoptera, vertebrate birds, and so on. Supposing I wish to examine a particular aspect of the functioning of the wings, for example, the flight at a fixed point; that is to say, the maintenance of the body motionless, suspended in the air at a fixed point by means of vibrating beats. I cannot do otherwise than to have recourse to examples that do not belong to the neighboring species: the hummingbird and the long-tongued hawk moth, which apparently suspend themselves over a flower to feed from a distance by means of a proboscis or of a long, slim beak.

Everyone admits the legitimacy, even the necessity, of this device. Examining it more closely, however, I observe that it is only tolerated if it remains within the limits of the same science or of the same domain. The sciences, in effect, correspond to the domains, and their system forms the best pattern of the fundamental divisions of nature. Thus the tacit interdiction against bringing together phenomena which belong to different domains and which, to that extent, belong to different sciences. The scholar tends, by a kind of reflex, to hold as sacrilegious, as scandalous, and as mad a comparison, for example, of the vivisection of living tissues and those of the crystal. However, it is a fact that crystals,

like organisms, reconstitute their mutilated parts adventitiously and that the injured region benefits by an increase of regenerative activity which tends to compensate for the injury, the disequilibrium, and the dissymetry created by the wound.¹ Is this nothing but deceptive analogy—nothing but pure and simple metaphor? It is always the case that intensive work re-establishes regularity—in the mineral as well as in the animal. I know, as everyone knows, the abyss which separates inert matter from living matter. But I also imagine that both have common properties tending to re-establish the integrity of their structure, whether it is a question of inert matter or of living matter. Nor am I ignorant of the fact that a nebula comprised of thousands of worlds and the shell secreted by certain marine mollusks defy the least attempt at rapprochement. Nevertheless, I see them both subsumed under the same law of spiral development. What is more, this does not astonish me, because the spire constitutes par excellence the synthesis of the two fundamental laws of the universe, symmetry and growth; it combines order with expansion. It is almost inevitable that the living, the vegetative, and the star should find themselves equally subsumed.

The opposition of the right and the left is found in all domains, from quartz and tartaric acid to the shell of the snail, always spiraling clockwise (with extremely rare exceptions), and finally to the pre-eminence of the right hand in man. Pasteur, in 1874, thought he could explain this invariant contrast, which appears both in the intimate structure of matter and in the anatomy of living beings, by some cosmic influence or by the movement of the earth. The enigma has remained unsolved. It is, after all, reasonable to conjecture that the solution, be it what it may, is the same for all these disparate cases that interest chemistry, crystallography, zoölogy, and sociology, the history of religions, of art, and of

1. Cf. "Mémoire de Pasteur in 1857," *Annales de chimie et de physique*, XLIX, 5-31: "Il résulte de l'ensemble de ces observations (accroissement des cristaux de bimalate d'ammoniaque) que quand un cristal a été brisé sur l'une quelconque de ses parties, et qu'on le replace dans son eau-mère, en même temps qu'il s'agrandit dans tous les sens par un dépôt de particules cristallines, un travail très actif à lieu sur la partie brisée ou déformée; et en quelques heures il a satisfait non seulement à la régularité du travail général sur toutes les parties du cristal, mais au rétablissement de la régularité dans la partie mutilée.' De façon très significative, Pasteur aperçoit le rapprochement possible avec la cicatrisation des plaies, mais sa prudence le conduit à noter le fait, sans prendre parti: 'Beaucoup de personnes aimeront à rapprocher ces faits curieux de ceux que présentent les êtres vivants lorsqu'en leur a fait une blessure plus ou moins profonde. La partie endommagée reprend peu à peu sa forme primitive, mais le travail de réformation des tissus est, en cet endroit, bien plus actif que dans les conditions normales ordinaires.' " (Cited by J. Nicolle, *La Symétrie dans la nature et les travaux des hommes* [Paris, 1955], p. 75.)

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the theater, since on the stage and in a picture right and left are once more not equivalent. In an analogous fashion, an identical law of economy should explain the radial symmetry of sea urchins, of starfish, and of flowers. Thus, in the whole keyboard of nature, these multiple analogies appear, and it would be rash to affirm that they signify nothing and are capable of gratifying only daydreams without being able to inspire rigorous research.

Man, at the price of one thousand triumphs, one thousand victories over the most specious ambushes, has without doubt distributed the facts of the universe according to the most fecund, coherent, and pertinent classificatory system. But this perspective certainly does not exhaust the diverse combinations that are possible. It leaves to one side the transverse steps of nature, of which one establishes the empire in the most distant domains, and of which I have just given some poor examples. Such steps cut across the established classifications. Science can all the less restrain these, since they are, by definition, interdisciplinary. In order to appear, however, they require the bringing-together of distant facts, whose study is conducted by specialists who live necessarily in mutual ignorance of each other's work. Nevertheless, it would not be possible to exclude the fact that these transversal cuts fulfil an indispensable role for clarifying phenomena which, in isolation, appear each time as aberrant, but whose significance would be better perceived if one dared to bring these exceptions into a single line and to encompass their mechanisms in a single perspective—possibly fraternal.

Everyone recognizes and deplores the fact that science is diversified to the extreme, taking into account, nevertheless, that this is for science the prime condition—and the price—of its progress. It is useless to complain about a state of fact, the recognition of which is today the inevitable point of departure of every attempt at revolution. Those inquirers who labor to extend knowledge no longer have communications among themselves and sometimes do not even have at their command a sufficient latitude in their own research to replace the detail which puts them off the track into a desirable context. The pathways of science always were and should be centrifugal. The time has come to try to join through necessary abbreviations the numerous points of a periphery immeasurably extended, without internal lines, and where the risk constantly grows that each worker may end by simply digging a sector of his own, like a mole, blind and obstinate. In certain cases it seems that I should add—obstinate, because blind.

The facts to be reconciled are not obvious. It is clear that it cannot be a question of returning to the superficial and qualitative analogies, from which the sciences have had to free themselves in order to institute a system of methodical, controlled, and perfectible knowledge. From this point of view the ambitions of the philosophers of the Middle Ages and of the scholars of the Renaissance constitute a lure which is the more formidable because it corresponds to a permanent need of the spirit, particularly binding today, and seems, therefore, to offer a quick solution that is fascinating to minds seduced in advance. The tables of concordances, in which a Paracelsus distributes the qualities of the phenomena, are no longer admissible, nor is even the analogical, essentially visual science of which Leonardo dreamed when he drew a head of hair like a river, a mountain like drapery. "He did not wish," notes a commentator, "to establish relations between the measured magnitudes, but, as he has said, *transmutarsi nelledmente di natura*, to put himself in the place of nature in order to know how she proceeds."² The result is that he conceives a new model of biological organs in the manner in which a technician would invent a machine. However, insects alone, obeying precisely the laws of another domain, have been able to insert in their bodies organs equivalent to machines. Mechanism and life are set off by opposed principles between which no give and take is possible but in which correlations ought normally to appear, since tool and organ are destined to perform the same work. All the genius of Leonardo—whether it be for this reason or for some other—was not able to create a single machine capable of functioning: his airplanes were too much like birds, and his submarines all but had gills. He had not thought of replacing the wing, the organ, by the helix, the engine. Leonardo sought out the archetypes of the phenomena, as did Goethe at a later date. He was wrong to seek them with the senses, and particularly with sight, the sense most easily victimized by appearances. That was the work of the painter and the poet, not of the scholar, since for the latter the real task consists, on the contrary, to determine the hidden correspondences—invisible and unimaginable to the profane. They will very rarely be those which seem evident, logical, and probable. These hidden relationships articulate, rather, phenomena which seem at first to have nothing in common. They unite the unexpected

2. Robert Klein, Postscript to *La Civilisation de la Renaissance en Italie*, by Jacob Burckhardt (Paris, 1958), p. 30.

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aspects which take on, in the orders of things which have little compatibility among one another, the effects of a single law, the consequences of a single principle, and the responses to a single challenge. Heterogeneous solutions dissimulate efficaciously to naïve investigation the disparate development of a profound economy, the principle of which, nonetheless, remains everywhere identical with itself. It is this principle which it is important to discover.

The erudite, who know a great deal in a restricted domain, rarely find themselves in a position to perceive a class of relations which a polyvalent knowledge alone is suited to establish. Most of the time it is only chance, combined with a certain boldness of imagination, which opens the way to that kind of discovery. The conferences of scholars belonging to diverse disciplines, but uneasy about the development of others, anxious to confront their results, their methods, and their stumbling blocks, ought equally to multiply the occasions on which they come upon the connivances which permit the clarification of what I have just called the transverse steps of nature. Finally, it is probable that a small number of inquirers, spontaneously attached to the study of phenomena which project over the traditional frames of the diverse sciences, find themselves in the best possible position to mark out the neglected correlations destined to complete the system of established relations.

It is time to try the luck of the "diagonal sciences."

A PREHISTORIC BUREAUCRACY

Homer, the first and greatest of Greek poets, depicts a society which may be loosely described as feudal. Power is in the hands of kings, who are bound to each other by ties of marriage and traditional friendship. Their nobles are men of equally good blood and high repute; the common people appear to have no function but to serve their lords and masters. The operation of the government is but sketchily indicated. The kings and princes meet in council, decisions are taken and are reported verbally by messengers. There is not the slightest hint that administration involves paper work, nor is there anything that can be called a "civil service."

It was a passionate belief in the historicity of the Homeric poems which led the German, Heinrich Schliemann, to seek the material remains of the cities in which the Homeric heroes are described as having lived. His success in uncovering the prehistoric cities of Troy and

A Prehistoric Bureaucracy

Mycenae did not, however, merely prove the existence of some kernel of truth in the Homeric legends; it also opened the way to the scientific investigation of Greek prehistory. Three-quarters of a century of work by archeologists of many nationalities has given us the basis for a much more detailed reconstruction of the world in which the Homeric heroes are supposed to have lived; and it has gradually become clear that Homer knew relatively little about what he purports to describe.

One of the most exciting discoveries regarding this prehistoric society was that it was literate. With one minor exception, Homer's characters knew nothing of writing. Schliemann, too, died in ignorance of this cardinal fact. It was not until 1900 that the Englishman, Arthur Evans, later knighted, showed that writing existed in at least one palace of Bronze-Age Greece. A trail of inscribed seal-stones led Evans to Crete, and he discovered there a new civilization which he called Minoan, flourishing between about 2000 and 1400 B.C. This civilization was fully literate, their records on tablets and bars of clay and their dedicatory inscriptions on sacred objects showing that reading and writing were widely known. There were, however, significant differences between the culture of Crete and that of the adjacent mainland. Development on the mainland began later (about 1650 B.C.) and lasted down to at least 1200 B.C. It was soon apparent that Crete was in some degree responsible for the growth of civilization on the mainland, though experts differed in the extent or nature of the contacts this supposed.

The exploration of the Palace of Knossos in Crete, destroyed around 1400 B.C., allowed some conclusions to be drawn about the type of society which had constructed and lived in it. It was a vast complex of buildings, on several floors, one part built on to another and all connected by passages and staircases. The principal apartments, and many of the corridors and porticoes, too, were decorated by fresco painting in vivid colors, applied with extraordinary taste and skill. The outer limits of the palace in several directions were formed by series of magazines for the storage of produce. There were workshops too in the same building. One was apparently the atelier of a master potter; another was occupied by a lapidary. These facts we know because of the imperishable nature of their materials; we can only infer the existence of workshops concerned in the manufacture of perishable goods, textiles, leather goods, woodwork, etc. The main block of the palace measures about 100 yards (or meters) square. It was clearly not the home of an illiterate Homeric warrior but of an intelligent and cultivated monarch, who

had organized in his own hands and within his own walls the economy of his kingdom. The total number of people living or employed in the Palace of Knossos cannot have been much less than five hundred. Outside the main palace stretched a considerable town, only partially tested and delimited by excavation but, so far as we know, arguing again a high standard of civilization. A number of tombs of the same period in the neighborhood show that the wealthier inhabitants were often buried with full armor and warlike equipment; this may suggest a military aristocracy but one certainly not unappreciative of works of art.

The management of such a household as the palace was obviously not a small task, and it is difficult to see how it could have been efficiently carried out without some measure of bookkeeping. Accounts are necessary to insure that precious materials are not embezzled by workmen, that extra rations are not drawn, and that the household is run with suitable economy. It is not then surprising that many such documents were found, though they remained unintelligible for fifty years after discovery. We now know that these tablets of clay, inscribed with a complicated script, are in fact the day-to-day records of the working of a vast administrative machine.

I have told elsewhere the story of their decipherment by the late Michael Ventris.¹ Here I want to discuss only the society which they reveal to us. But first we must turn from Crete, the great island which had been the cradle of Aegean civilization, where writing and book-keeping had long been known, to the more recent culture of mainland Greece.

The written documents from Knossos belong to the last phase in the occupation of this site, at least on the grand scale; its later history is obscure, but it never again achieved such eminence. The destruction of this huge palace is dated by archeologists to about 1400 B.C., and the tablets must belong to this period, since they are clearly not a permanent archive but rather day-to-day notes. The principal site on the mainland of Greece which has yielded its archives is that of Pylos, a Mycenaean palace situated in undulating country not far from the sea, in the southwest corner of the Peloponnese. The site is a few miles north of the bay of Navarino and is not to be confused with the modern town of Pylos on the southern shore of that bay. Here Professor C. W. Blegen of Cincinnati discovered in 1939 a large archive of some six hundred

1. *The Decipherment of Linear B* (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1958).

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clay tablets, a number which has been doubled by finds made during more recent work on the site. It was immediately apparent that these tablets were in the same script and the same language as the Linear B of Knossos; not only the forms of the signs but also many groups of signs, or words, were identical at both places. This was a severe blow to the archeologists who had regarded the latest phase at Knossos as alien to the Greek mainland; but perhaps more striking was the chronological difference. Professor Blegen dates the palace of Pylos to about 1200 B.C., and there has naturally been a temptation to narrow this gap of 200 years in order to account for the similarity of script and language. Although it may be possible to lower one date a little and raise the other, there seems to be no chance of reducing the gap much below 150 years. Thus we have to do with a script and dialect which could maintain itself virtually unchanged over a period of perhaps five generations.² It is not sufficiently appreciated that this in turn implies the existence of a stable and well-organized society in which the tradition of writing could be passed down from father to son or from teacher to pupil. It bespeaks a rigidity in the system which is familiar to us today, where every language has its correct orthography, but contrasts strongly with the freedom of the Greek inscriptions of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., where each man wrote as he spoke, with little regard for uniformity or convention. Only in the Hellenistic period does a standard orthography for the Greek language emerge; only in an age of schoolmasters and pedants, if not of literary scholarship, do we find standard spellings—often, alas, fossilized and no longer in step with the phonetic developments of the language.

Further discoveries at Mycenae confirm the uniformity of script and language in Mycenaean Greece. The palace at Mycenae yielded no written documents to Schliemann and his successors; the site was badly denuded and its plan can be traced only in part. It may be significant, however, that its destruction took place at a date later than that of Pylos. It was, unlike the palaces of Knossos or Pylos, protected by massive walls. Sheltered by these defenses, life seems to have continued there long after the lower town beneath the citadel had been sacked

2. Professor Blegen in a recent article ("Minoica," in *Sundwall-Festschrift* [Berlin, 1958]) has questioned Evans' dating of the Knossos tablets to 1400. He suggests that they belong to a reoccupation of the palace at a later period, roughly contemporary with the mainland palaces. If this theory proves correct, it will simplify the historical reconstruction; but it remains true that the uniformity of spelling implies a stable tradition.

and burned. It is from buildings in this lower area that Linear B tablets have been recovered, in relatively small numbers so far but again showing great uniformity in script and in language with Pylos and Knossos. The exact dating is disputed, but these tablets may be contemporary with, and are certainly not later than, those from Pylos. It is particularly remarkable that differences of dialect seem more apparent between Mycenae and Pylos than between Pylos and Knossos. Further evidence that this script was known and used widely throughout Greece about the thirteenth century comes from a series of inscribed jars found at sites as far north as Thebes in Boeotia.

In material culture the whole of southern Greece enjoyed a surprising uniformity throughout the Mycenaean period (roughly 1650-1200 B.C.), and it is clear that, although the transition cannot be dated exactly, by the end of the fifteenth century it had become firmly established in Crete too. How far north this area extended is not yet clear; a recent discovery of an important site of this period at Iolkos in Thessaly promises part of the answer. But even if the archeologists are uncertain, Homer claims to know: the Catalogue of the Ships in the second book of the *Iliad* is a lesson in Mycenaean geography, and so far as the statements have been tested by archeology it seems to be reasonably accurate. We are probably therefore justified in thinking of the Mycenaean area as comprising Thessaly, central and southern Greece, Crete, and Rhodes. Whether Cyprus can be included, at any rate before the very end of the Mycenaean period, is still in dispute.

At all the principal sites in this Mycenaean world we find the same pattern repeated in essentials. The capital, if we may use the word, is a large palace—not all, it is true, on the scale of Knossos, but nonetheless large, bearing in mind the relatively light population. These palaces were much more than mere residences of kings. They housed the large and complex staff needed to run the whole kingdom, not only the royal family and its attendants but also palace officials of every degree and a variety of craftsmen.

As we have said, the management of such a household is in itself demanding, but there is an added complication which we are prone to overlook. In historical ages there has always been a currency of some kind, so that the organization of the economy can be controlled simply by calculations in one, or at most two, metals. If for any reason it is necessary to abandon the control of commodity movements by monetary means, as has happened frequently in modern states, then a com-

A Prehistoric Bureaucracy

plicated system of controls must be established, so that the available supplies are distributed to the users whose production needs to be encouraged. But in the absence of anything to serve as a currency, this system is inevitable if any attempt to control the economy is to be made, and a control system must be established for every important commodity. It is essential to see that the smiths are kept supplied with metal for their work; it is equally essential to see that they do not use this metal for unauthorized purposes. Thus a record of metal issued is necessary. This is a typical sample of a class of documents at Pylos: the bronzesmiths of each community are listed together with the amount of bronze issued to each, and the officials, with true zeal, recorded also the names of the smiths who had received no allotment of raw material and were therefore presumably temporarily unemployed, or at least not engaged on work for the state economy. We may presume further that when a smith sent in the product of his labors it was weighed and he had to account for any discrepancy. The system insured efficiency, but it also demanded elaborate bookkeeping.

But these same smiths must have received in return for their labor the necessities of life. Their lodging may have been assured by their being given quarters in royal palaces or other state-owned buildings. But food and clothing could not be purchased; it must have been provided by the central authority. Many of our records seem to be concerned with precisely this operation. True, we cannot follow it in detail, since many of the relevant files seem to be missing. But we can see goods and commodities being demanded of the various communities of the realm so as to provide the stores from which the artisans were supported. Again, a mountain of paper—or rather wet clay—was needed to keep a check on all these complex operations.

It is at Pylos that our records are most complete. But, even allowing for a certain amount of accidental loss due to failure to survive or to be recovered, it is evident that we have not here the whole record of the economic processes which kept a Mycenaean state alive. One very obvious deficiency is the absence of any documents relating to a time other than the "present."

It is not easy to prove this negative, but a number of clear indications point in this direction. The tablets are conspicuously undated; the only dates which we find are month names, and these infrequently, apparently always on documents recording religious offerings. The only temporal indications on the vast majority of tablets are such expressions

as "this year," "last year," or "next year," expressions which involve the reader's knowledge of the date of writing. It is by such means that we can show that the clay tablets are the temporary day-to-day records of the administration. At the end of a year or less these tablets must have been scrapped. Since they were not deliberately fired, it was possible to pulverize them and reuse the clay.

Was there then no more permanent record, so that the operations of one year could be compared with another? We cannot now imagine a civil service which did not glory in masses of statistics revealing the progress or decline of various sectors of the economy. I find it hard to conceive even a Mycenaean clerk failing to keep at least a summary of the year's work for guidance during the next year or more. But we should beware of a too facile transposition of our bureaucratic methods to a prehistoric society. The clerks may well have known the basic pattern of organization so well that it was unnecessary to keep old records, once the accounts for the year had been closed and any outstanding deficit transferred to current accounts—an item we frequently find in our surviving documents. Despite a certain amount of skepticism on this score, I still think it highly probable that accounts were also kept upon a perishable material; it is ironic that the temporary records were rendered durable by the very fire that would have destroyed any permanent archives.

A comparison of the extant Mycenaean tablets with those of a Near-Eastern site like Ugarit (Ras Shamra on the coast of Syria) reveals vividly the incompleteness of the Mycenaean record. In Greece, unlike the East, clay never became the normal writing material. This is shown most clearly by the shapes of the signs: any script which is ordinarily used on clay develops into a simplified form consisting of rectangular outlines or even mere dots and bars. Not only cuneiform but also the script of Bronze-Age Cyprus, which is of Minoan origin, shows this unmistakably. The maintenance of the curvilinear and complex Linear B forms over a considerable span of time argues strongly for its use at the same time in pen and ink. I believe, too, that some of the carelessly written clay tablets which we possess are rough drafts for a permanent record in ink. For instance, there is a famous text from Pylos of a unique type; it has been described as a "calendar of offerings,"³ and no one doubts that it is concerned with religious offerings. But there are

3. L. R. Palmer, "A Mycenaean Calendar of Offerings," *Eranos* 53 (1955), pp. 1-13.

remarkable features about it which call for comment. The scribe appears first to have used the tablet for some other purpose; then, having not completely erased the traces of the first inscription, he turned it over and began his text on what was really the back. However, after writing five lines, although he had ruled much more of the tablet, he abandoned this side and completed his text on the original obverse. His writing was careless; he left out signs in repeated formulas, which can only be accidental; and on occasion he wrote, deleted, and wrote over the top in such a way that it is now impossible to be sure what he intended the reader to see. Yet the subject matter is clearly of the highest importance: the gift of gold vessels by men and women to a variety of deities. The only reasonable explanation of this wayward behavior is that this is a rough copy intended for no one but the scribe himself, who, in making a fair copy, would have corrected the errors. Perhaps the fair copy was never made and the rough draft survived in the archive room; or was it still in course of transcription when the alarm sounded and the sword of the enemy put an end to accountancy?

The detail of the surviving records would be tedious enough if we were able to translate and comprehend it exactly. But what makes its interpretation a fascinating as well as a baffling task is the very fact that relatively little can be understood. There are various reasons for this partial failure.

The first obstacle to understanding is the fragmentary nature of the surviving documents. Most tablets are damaged, and only too often the top edge, containing the explanatory heading, has been wholly or partially lost or defaced. Tablets are usually recovered in several pieces, but careful excavation and study have succeeded in reconstituting a great many. Pylos, which has been dug only in recent years, has been better served here than Knossos. It is painful to record that the Knossos tablets were not so well preserved and that less care was taken to join the fragments. But the task was more difficult because a much higher proportion of the Knossos tablets are small ones bearing only a single line of text, so that there are often hundreds of pieces which must be examined in search of a join. The result is that out of the vast collection—some 3,500 separate pieces—few constitute complete and legible texts.

Second, the nature of the script imposes a severe obstacle. There can be no doubt that, if the Mycenaean Greek dialect had been similarly recorded, but in an alphabetic script, we should still have had much difficulty in understanding a dialect more than four centuries older

than that which is used in any other extant Greek document. The script, in fact, is not alphabetic but syllabic, and each sign represents a syllable. Certain conventions of abbreviation enabled the scribes to avoid unnecessary labor by writing a kind of shorthand—bare outlines of words which they could fill in with ease. But for us, not knowing beforehand either the dialect or its vocabulary, it is extraordinarily difficult to clothe this skeleton with the flesh and blood of real words. That we have succeeded to a substantial degree is due to the patient labor and collaboration of many scholars in many lands. Many have now added their stone to the wall which Michael Ventris founded (it was my privilege to help him with the lower courses), and the structure is now a monument to the happy co-operation of international scholarship.

Third, the nature of the entries themselves prevents us, even when we have read and translated them, from understanding fully the operations which they record. There is no question of departments having drawn up full reports for the use of the ministers of the crown; or, if they did, no trace now remains of such documents. The basic principle of accountancy was to record the barest minimum, the facts which could not be readily remembered or deduced from the mere existence of the record. Many of the tablets are in the driest and most summary form: "At Pylos: sons of the women bath-attendants, twenty-two men, eleven boys." Only the facts that this tablet falls into a series of records in similar form, and that this series can again be related to two other series, allow us even to conjecture its motivation. On the most plausible reconstruction, all three groups of tablets are the records of the palace department responsible for feeding the royal servants; the greater number of servants are women, and the only men recorded here are specifically called "the sons of the such-and-such women." Most are located at Pylos, as might be expected if they are royal servants, and they perform such domestic offices as the grinding of corn and the carrying of bath water. But others are specifically located in other places, probably country houses of the royal family. The titles by which the groups of women are described include the names of several well-known towns on the east of the Aegean, possibly trading posts through which the Mycenaean acquired slaves from the interior of Asia Minor. This, in turn, leaves us wondering what commodities Pylos exported to barter for slaves; they can hardly all have been, like one group specifically so called, captives taken by the sword.

This is the sort of imaginative deduction to which an intensive study

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of these records leads; but it must be emphasized that the bare facts presented by our tablets are all of the statistical type quoted. Where tablets cannot be grouped in series, they are far more obscure.

Virtually isolated is a well-preserved tablet from Pylos which reads as follows: "Rowers who are going to Pleuron: from A eight men; from B five men; from C four men; from D six men; from E seven men." The words rendered here by the letters A, B, C, D, and E are five place names. Not one of these can with any confidence be located on a map; only one is a recognizable Greek name, *Rhion*, the promontory. Since they are to send rowers, we may guess that they are seaports. There is nothing by which the "Pleuron" mentioned can be identified; we are driven to guess that it may be the town of that name in Aetolia, north of the Corinthian gulf, which Homer mentions. But this again is far from certain; as in all countries, Greek place names were frequently repeated in different localities; and, although, for instance, we find an almost certain mention of Corinth on the tablets, it is almost equally certain that this is not the famous city on the Isthmus but a humble village of the same name. The total number of rowers amounts to thirty; we may speculate on the significance of this, too. The number is clearly too small for more than one ship; but is it the full complement or not? Or, to proceed a stage further, what was the purpose of this operation order? Why was a ship—or was it merely a crew—being sent to Pleuron?

Some scholars have enjoyed themselves at this game of conjecturing a background against which the isolated scraps of information can be made intelligible. Within limits it is an essential exercise if we are to make anything of our scanty and abbreviated material. But it is regrettable that only too often such reconstructions are being presented and treated as established fact. There is hardly a single generalization or deduction from the tablets which cannot be impugned successfully. The temptation to publish exciting deductions has to be kept strictly in check.

It is for this reason that I have chosen to describe Mycenaean society in terms of bureaucratic organization. It would also be possible to present a picture of the social organization: a king, a second-in-command, with various classes of barons, knights, and retainers owing feudal service to the king and rewarded by grants of land. This picture is an imaginative reconstruction based on evidence of differing value. But the evidence for the administrative machinery of the palace exists

in the tablets themselves. Here we are studying not the events recorded but the physical records themselves.

One of the odd features about Mycenaean tablets, from any site, is the absence of any mention of the scribe himself. If we compare the records of Ugarit or any other contemporary site in the Near East, we shall find that the scribes take a delight in signing their names and are proud of their handiwork; at the lowest estimate, the presence of their names is a guarantee of the reliability of the record. Their absence in Greece must be regarded in the light of another fact. Although they did not leave us their names, we do have specimens of their handwriting. Professor E. L. Bennett has made a careful study of Mycenaean hands, and he can assure us that as many as forty hands wrote the archives of Pylos and as many again those of Knossos. The number at Mycenae is eight, which is even higher in proportion to the number of tablets known to date.

Thus it is clear that the making of records was not the full-time task of a few specialist scribes. A competent clerk could have written all the Pylos archives in a couple of weeks or less if he had kept ordinary office hours and had someone to prepare the raw material for him. Rather, we must imagine a large band of officials keeping their own records and only taking stylus in hand when their administrative duties required it of them. Moreover, the distribution of tablets between the identified hands shows that each official had a fairly limited area of the economy to oversee. Even a list of servant-women referred to above is split between two writers, one of whom seems to have dealt with Pylos and the home counties, while the other controlled the outlying districts.⁴ Thus the strongly centralized system—for no records have yet been found in any but capital towns—seems to have been divided into a large number of separate departments.

Thus, to sum up, we may with full justification picture to ourselves the administrative machinery of these prehistoric kingdoms as a band of some forty to fifty officials working in the royal palace or associated offices, each in charge of one small sector of the economy. If we go on to ask how these officials co-ordinated their operations, we enter at once the realm of conjecture. While the king was no doubt the ultimate arbiter and maker of policy, there must have been senior officials in charge of the principal departments. It may be significant that we meet in the

4. See my article "The Mycenaean Filing System," *Bulletin of the London Institute of Classical Studies*, No. 5, pp. 1-5.

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Pylos tablets four names which are clearly of special importance. One is that of a man who is recorded as taking part in operations of such diverse kinds as inspecting plowland and issuing spices to perfume-makers; all four seem to have some special function with regard to the levy of sheep and goats which made up an important part of the tribute paid to the palace. But it would not be surprising if four or more senior officials had the general task of supervising the complicated operations involved in this moneyless economy.

It is curious to reflect that centralized administration has so long a history and that there once existed in Greece a society which, so far as we know, used the powerful art of writing for one purpose only—that of recording on countless slips of clay the day-to-day functioning of a bureaucratic state. If accounts could be written, why not literature? Here we can answer only that not a single scrap has survived. Even if the script could be used for such a purpose, there is no evidence to suggest that a written literature existed. On the other hand, research on the Homeric poems does imply a long tradition of oral poetry, transmitted from one reciter to another and performed from memory alone. Highly probable as it is that such poetry existed in the Mycenaean age, nothing in the tablets confirms this.⁵

This military aristocracy was therefore not fully literate in our sense of the term. Appreciative of visual beauty we know them to have been, and we may conjecture their taste for poetic recitation, perhaps even song. But writing seems to have been a middle-class accomplishment, and it is conceivable that the highest as well as the lowest were incapable of writing their names.

Literacy was indissolubly linked with centralized administration, and when, at the end of the thirteenth century B.C., the palaces were destroyed, the art of writing perished. Four centuries of darkness lay ahead before the introduction and adaptation of a Semitic alphabet from Phoenicia gave Greece a far superior notation for her language. Thus began a train of development and borrowing which has supplied the greater part of mankind with the means of recording speech easily and unambiguously. The oblivion into which Linear B fell was no loss to the world; it meant only that its secret had to be rediscovered for us by the work of Michael Ventris.

5. T. B. L. Webster in a recent book, *From Mycenae to Homer* (London, 1958), has pressed the evidence to its limits; but, although his hypothesis is plausible, the tablets cannot be made to substantiate it.

ON INVESTMENT

FOREWORD

The laying-aside of resources, or saving, is a basic phenomenon among men, as it is among bees. It is a basis of material civilization.

Toynbee has demonstrated the existence of twenty-nine human civilizations. He has studied these in a monumental masterwork.

We believe that on the material level this effort can be expressed in one sentence: There is a close correlation between the rate of investment by a group or community and the expansion of its civilization.

This conviction is the starting point of our short analytical essay on the phenomena of investment. The essay is far from exhaustive. The reader will judge whether it is nonetheless useful.

SAVINGS

Income (or Production) = Consumption + Saving (or Investment). Since the time of Keynes it has been through this equation that an economic study has been approached. For Keynes and his school the principal motive power of the economy is the "propensity to consume."

Translated by James H. Labadie.

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It is the desire of one who receives income to satisfy his needs by means of this income, by an act of free will. From the propensity to consume, the Keynesian school deduces, in a perfectly free economy of stable currency, other economic parameters: preference for liquidity, marginal effectiveness of capital, and interest on money. According to this school, these are the factors which, through the intermediary of saving, govern investment in a perfectly free economy.

Reality does not correspond to this schema. Consumption is not entirely determined by psychological factors, acts of will. It would be so if the irrepressible, imperative, or, if you will, animal needs of the community, of all its members, were satisfied. Now, how is the minimum level of needs to be defined? It cannot be.

Saving is not only due to the fact that an increase in income does not correspond, by an act of free will on the part of the recipient of the income, to an equivalent increase in consumption, the difference being free savings.

The free savings in poor societies is very small. There, consumption would match income very closely if the social structure did not limit consumption *against the will* of a great number of economic agents—against the desire of these agents to consume. Total savings, equivalent to investment, is due to social constraint. It is exercised by all regimes: in the “capitalist” system by the plus-value of Marx and by the treasury, in the Communist system by arbitrary fixing of prices, obligatory loans to the government, and also by the Treasury. Only the methods differ.

This statement might tempt one to return to marginalist reasonings. Unfortunately, these reasonings operate on a “model” free society corresponding to no observed reality.

In the societies called “free,” decisions concerning investment are governed in part by the economic self-interest of entrepreneurs, in part by considerations of the general interest, and in part by the powerful will of elites. Only the first motive fits into the marginalist reasoning.

In Communist societies or people’s democracies decisions to invest are in principle the attribute of a technocracy acting as a function of an economic plan. This plan takes into account to some extent the needs of consumption and should therefore be based on a certain degree of marginalism. But it also prides itself on being rational. As a matter of fact, all plans include a large dose of the arbitrary and the motives of powerful will.

These same facts can be described in another way.

A given collective income represents a production value to be distributed among the members of the group. Each of them receives his share. In the monetary economy—and this is the only kind we know—the distribution is made by means of income and prices. Certain members of the group receive (for any reason, which may or may not result from bartering—this in no way alters the reasoning) more than their minimum irreducible needs.

The marginalist theory reasons very subtly on the behavior of these economic agents. Suffice it to say here that in these circumstances a part of income is saved and forms the monetary counterpart of a fraction of investments. This is free saving and is due to a voluntary limitation on consumption. This fraction is relatively small, at least if the precise definitions given below are adopted. The rest of investment is covered by forced saving, raised by taxes and by contributions from business enterprises which may or may not be state owned. In every known society there are also individuals who do not receive an income sufficient to meet their minimum needs. Their consumption is inferior to their needs. This limitation of consumption is the counterpart, to a small degree, of free savings, hence of the "excess" of income of another segment of the group of economic agents, and, for the more important part, of forced savings.

Consequently, if one considers social justice to consist in satisfying first of all the needs of all, the existence of investments, in the presence of unsatisfied needs, is possible only because of the limiting of consumption because of social injustice. It is not the reduction of the consumption of the "rich" which would effectively permit satisfaction of the needs of the poor.

The definitions and conventions which make this reasoning valid, and which we are adopting, are those of modern macroeconomics.

The members of the economic group are the state, represented by central and local administrations; business enterprises considered as individual or physical entities or persons; families; and, finally, individuals.

Certain individuals (by this term we here mean individual persons) play a double role in society. In one of these roles the individual is consumer or, rather, citizen, the final receiver of the income distributed for the satisfaction of all individual desires. He is a "private individual," in

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the usual terminology. The other role of the individual is his productive activity. Only the active population possesses this characteristic. By a false but convenient convention it is admitted that those active individuals who receive as income only wages and salaries, and government payments, play but a single role—that of consumer. The individuals who play a double role are then the members of the liberal professions and individual entrepreneurs (engaged for the most part in agriculture). Theoretically they do not exist in Communist countries.

The convention of considering wage-earners as simple economic "private citizens" is justifiable. Only individual entrepreneurs, consciously or not, divide their income into two parts. One part, which in modern theory is called the "just wages of the entrepreneur" plays the same role as every other income of "private citizens," partly consumed and partly, insofar as it surpasses individual needs, saved. In his other role the individual entrepreneur acts as director or manager of a productive organism. His behavior is then identical with that of the manager of a powerful corporation or that of a Communist functionary.

There is obviously an important difference between the origin of income of entrepreneurial individual private citizens and that of wage-earning private citizens. The individual entrepreneur is himself judge of this income and himself effects its division and the exploitation of his business. The wage-earner's income formerly resulted only from the play of market mechanisms and is today discussed and defined by the state and by company and workers' unions—thus by a delegation, an alienation, of choice, analogous to the alienation of political choice.

But this difference is, in the modern world, increasingly theoretical. State intervention by direct action of the treasury, manipulation of prices, action of the great depersonalized organizations of economic power, leave this freedom of choice to only a very small number of individuals, everywhere considered as anarchical.

All enterprises, individual or not, consume and save. What they consume is called "factors of production." Their saving is the counterpart of the major part of investments. It is forced savings, whose origin is the plus-value of Marx. In addition, like private individuals, they transfer to the state taxes and social assessments and, in the capitalist regime, a part of their income to other economic agents, in the name of property rights. In the Communist regime this last transfer is made to the benefit of the state.

Thus, to summarize: Our definition of free and forced savings stems

partly from the statement of the double role of individual entrepreneurs. If, however, we follow the classical economists who call "free" all savings derived from exchanges, the picture changes. But it no longer takes the real existing world into account. The marginalism of private citizens determines the really voluntary limitation of consumption by the release of free savings, the difference between their income and their consumption. This savings is smaller as the given community is poorer.

The marginalism of producers and of the state is of another nature. It directs forced savings, due to the alienation of resources, one of the manifestations of the alienations of choices which define society.

ORIGIN OF INVESTMENT

The animal knows neither work nor leisure. He is born, eats and sleeps, procreates and dies.

Man tasted of the forbidden fruit, and God condemned him to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow. The origin of investment is there: man's hard life and his innate laziness, his reaction against effort.

The need to produce and the tendency toward laziness incited man to apply his intelligence to the creation of tools. He could do this only when he had a certain amount of leisure, when he was able to expend an amount of present work, necessary to the fabrication of the tool, without too great an increase in his hunger, too much suffering from cold, or too much loss of sleep. He decided to do it, for he could foresee that the tool would save in future work. He made the first calculation—unconscious, to be sure—of living on income. Thus a stone fastened to a piece of wood, a spear, a bow, permitted the hunter to kill game more easily. First the lever, then the wheel meant a decrease in the effort necessary to lift and transport loads.

Leisure permits investment. This leisure is the addition of the force of work beyond the effort necessary for the satisfaction of minimum needs (a level impossible to define). Leisure can be used for other things than the creation of tools. The arts may be cultivated, monuments constructed, gods adored, war waged.

On the individual level the distribution of available goods gives to each, if minimum needs are satisfied, a certain sum of leisure. The scale of needs, hence that of leisures, is of infinite variety. One powerful captain of industry works himself to death and never relaxes. Another considers politics or the direction of a newspaper as a game. Many

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activities are, in fact, games or work, according to the position of the individuals who practice them. There exist men who voluntarily or traditionally reduce their needs to a minimum in order to have to perform only a minimum amount of work. On the average, however, the majority of men work "normally." The rich among them have at their disposal greater amounts of leisure time and greater means to invest more on the individual level. The poor satisfy their needs (including their needs for amusement) by their own activity but do not have at their disposal the surplus of resources which would enable them to invest. The poorest lead an almost animal existence.

What does investing on the individual level mean? Essentially its function is to increase one's own value: on the material level by the designing of the tools of individual and family life, such as housing, furniture, clothing, automobile, telephone, home appliances, radio and television sets, and, on the spiritual level, by enrichment of the self through reading, theater and movies, travel, practice of a religion, art, conversation, and social life. It is the basic aim of each man's life, after having satisfied fundamental needs, to invest on the individual level.

Material civilization is the fruit of the utilization of leisure through the manufacture of tools. Spiritual civilization is born of other utilizations of this leisure. The total quantity of man's leisure has increased prodigiously since the revolution of abundant energy and will continue to increase. The materialist explanation of history is basically a tautology, an obvious fact.

INVESTMENT IN THE GROUP

The notions of work and leisure may be extended to a group. The equation: $\text{Income} = \text{Consumption} + \text{Investment}$ could then be written: $\text{Work} = \text{Consumption} + \text{Leisure}$. Work here is not the value of the production factor "work"—the value of the active population's present activity. It is the value of the total amount of production.

Consumption is not concerned with the active population alone. It is the act of the whole body of members of the group, including children, old people, the retired living on income, and mothers in the home. Besides these categories of persons there are also, for example, poets and priests. They consume. Do they produce? The same question should be asked for housewives. It is an incontestable fact that they perform immense and essential services. Poets and priests are also useful. One can,

by convention, catalogue the statistical manifestation of their existence only in the right-hand column of the equation, under the title of "consumption." This is the convention adopted in Marxist countries. But it is also possible, and this seems more just, to class in the left-hand column, in the category of work or production, every value to which utility is attached. One would then class, in this left part which represents the social product, the income of poets, of priests, of actors, for example, like those of other "liberal activities," the earnings of students, family allotments to mothers of young children, and so on.

As a counterpart to this, consumption, whatever the conventions adopted, may be divided into two parts. On the one hand, there is the consumption of resources necessary to the material life: food, clothing, fuel for cooking and heating, electricity for the running of household appliances and lighting, medical care, the services of social organization, such as security of wealth and of persons, regulation of lawsuits; and, on the other hand, the consumption of all the benefits of spiritual civilization: arts, religious services, politics, teaching. A similar distinction can be made for investments. They may be productive or non-productive. Productive investments correspond, on the group scale, to the first utilization of leisure: the creation of tools permitting a more effective future work. Non-productive investments correspond to the construction of palaces, churches, roads, warships, more generally to that part of the group income used by the elites to affirm on the material level the power of the group and also its social, artistic, moral—in a word, its spiritual direction.

The origin of productive investments is the laziness and the inventive spirit of men; that of non-productive investments the existence of the priest, the sorcerer, or the chief, who alienates a part of the resources, not only to satisfy his consumption needs, but also to strengthen his power and the material and spiritual power of the group he represents.

It will be seen that no value judgment should be attached to the modifiers "productive" or "non-productive." Both are manifestations of civilization, and both are necessary to its expansion. One apparent contradiction must be explained. It has been said that investment originated in social constraint, creative of forced saving; it has also been said that investment is the utilization of leisure to improve productivity and that it results from a calculation of "rentability," from a choice between consumption and savings leisure. It is, according to this reasoning, the counterpart of free savings.

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The synthesis of these two apparently contradictory theses is not difficult. Total investment has as its counterpart, in small measure, free savings, and for the rest, forced savings. Free savings is invested for the most part in productive investments. The same is true for forced savings coming from the capitalist plus-value (or from the earnings of socialized enterprises); non-productive investments, on the contrary, are especially financed by forced savings derived from the obligatory contributions of taxes. It is true that state and group loans, floated from funds of the public, therefore from resources coming partly from free savings, are often used to finance non-productive investments. It appears that the structure of developed societies, a fruit of the division of labor, leads to a centralization of leisures in the form of forced savings, to a draining of a part of free savings through the mechanisms of credit (the rest is directly invested in durable consumer goods), and then to a division of this total sum between productive and non-productive investments. Insofar as forced savings is invested in productive investments, the two definitions of the origin of investments—social constraint and utilization of leisures—are valid. For non-productive investments, the definition of the utilization of leisure is valid for that part which stems from free savings drained off by voluntary borrowings. For the other, only social constraint is found at their origin. This social constraint is basically an alienation of the choice of producers among the possible utilizations of the fruits of their labor.

PRODUCTIVE INVESTMENT: AMORTIZATION

A close examination leads to the discovery of difficulties in clearly delimiting the total of the right-hand column of the equation: $\text{Work} = \text{Consumption} + \text{Leisure}$.

At first glance consumption seems easy to define. There are the resources (goods and services) immediately destroyed by use: a loaf of bread, a gallon of gasoline, a mile of railroad travel, a medicament, the advice of a lawyer. But a shirt? No one would consider classifying this as other than consumer goods. We know, however, that the shirt is submitted to unconscious amortization and that this is an important characteristic of an investment. And a woman's stocking? In our grandmothers' time it played the same economic role as the shirt. It formed, sometimes over a period of years, part of a carefully maintained trousseau. Today, a stenographer in New York or elsewhere buys a pair of

nylons in the morning and throws them out that same evening. The stocking has become a piece of goods almost in the nature of a cup of tea. The notion of goods for immediate consumption is therefore basically contingent, a function of the moment and of the behavior of the economic agent.

It also seems easy to define clearly a productive investment: a resource which makes subsequent work easier, more productive. But here is an example which shows the weakness of this definition. To pay for the carrying of mail, stamps were invented. This improvement in productivity was for all practical purposes made without supplementary investment, by the creation of a new item of consumer goods: the postage stamp, representing the true resource, the carrying of a letter. Productivity can be increased by the replacement of an inconvenient good by another, more convenient one. Money is the best general example of this, and the postage stamp is an example of an item even more convenient than money. The condition that a resource increase productivity is necessary to define productive investment, but not sufficient.

Today, when a certain volume of mail is being handled, a postage-meter machine is substituted for the stamp. The operation of gluing stamps bought in advance and held in stock is eliminated, as is that of canceling. The cost of the postage meter is amortized through the economy it effects. It is a productive investment. These investments are generally decided upon as a result of what is called an "economic calculation." Simplified, it is presented as follows:

The unit of production without investment costs a .

The unit of production with the investment costs b , which is less than a .

The investment costs i .

If the investment is amortized over n units of production, the true production cost of a unit, in the hypothesis of straight-line amortization, each unit restoring $i + n$ of the value of the investment is $b + i:n$.

If $b + i:n$ is smaller than a , the investment is economically interesting. The decision, in reality, is taken after a study of the cost and price structure, which represents the relative usefulness and the cost rates of various resources, including monetary capital.

These may be called investments of choice, in the sense that they consist of a chosen replacement of human labor by mechanical labor. A plow can be forged by hand or by press. Its quality will not be exactly

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the same; its price may be quite different. But the two plows, the one made by hand, and the other by machine, will both be serviceable.

Optional investments may be primary ones. The first machines were of necessity made by hand; then these machines made others, with the addition of a certain quantity of work. The further one moves from primary investment, the less choice there is between the manual and the mechanical methods. It is inconceivable, today, to manufacture a cylindrical metal piece otherwise than by means of a tool called a lathe. The installation of a lathe for certain pieces of work is therefore an imperative investment. The decision to make this investment is purely technical and does not involve an economic calculation, whose results would be obvious. The same thing holds for the installation of an alternator where one wishes to use alternating current. Imperative investments make it more difficult to begin the industrializing process in new countries.

An investment, then, may be productive without having been decided upon as the result of an economic calculation. What then is the criterion of non-productive investments? One alone remains. They are not subject to amortization. This is not to say that they are not useful. It is surely necessary to construct schools, courthouses, bridges, museums—contemporary examples of investments that are non-productive from the economic point of view. But these examples show the contingent character of a productive investment: when judges were paid by the case, when a school or a museum is a commercial enterprise, when use of a bridge involves a toll, the investments are productive.

For an investment which is non-amortizable by definition, of which the best examples are prestige expenditures, military expenditures, and also, today, school construction or the building of a city hall or a museum, it can properly be said that the amortization period is zero, that it is amortized over zero units of production. This category of resources, then, plays the same role as consumption, in the equations which head our reasonings. This is also approximately true, per unit of production, of investments with a very long period of amortization, hence amortizable over a great number of production units.

It is thus seen that the division of the utilization of the social product into consumption and investment is essentially contingent and depends on the social conventions, on the "morals" of the moment. More exactly, if one calls investment the counterpart of all savings (which is a current practice), only productive investments bring the multiplier and the

various accelerators into play, which is to say that only they have a deflationary action on prices. All other investments are inflationary and play the same role as consumption from the point of view of economic balance.

THE INVESTMENT RATE

We have seen that the relationship between an investment and the number of units of production of which it is capable is an important fact of the economic calculation. This relationship obviously depends not only on the economic character of the investment but also on its technical character. A given branch of production of resources, steel production for example, requires a large investment for each unit, while that of a commercial middleman requires very little investment. We call this relationship "investment cost," broadening its definition to that of the relationship of total investment (amortizations and new installations) per unit of time to the corresponding production. In the following analyses allowance has been made for technical variations of this cost, the examination of which does not fall within our subject. But the reader is warned not to forget this simplification when attempting to compare costs in various branches of activity.

The investment cost represents the savings load supported per unit of production. This load is carried through self-financing, through borrowing, or through deduction from earnings. In the first of these methods the savings burden is placed on the purchaser of the product; in the second method this is also the case, but the burden is set off against the future repayments of the amounts borrowed. If, meanwhile, the value of money has decreased, this load is borne by the whole body of members of the group. It is evident that financing through taxes is also an imposition of the savings burden on the whole group. Obviously every case involves forced savings.

The non-productive investment rate is infinite, since there is no production corresponding to the investment. This is one of the best definitions of such investment.

The rate in an industry whose installations are under construction and not yet producing is likewise infinite. Thus is explained the intensity of the inflationary effect which accompanies the early stages of the industrialization of an economy.

In an industry whose activity is more or less stable, the investment

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rate indicates the intensity with which this industry is developed, modernized, transformed, renewed.

The scale of rates compared to the normal rate (for example rate r^0 below) is an important characteristic of a branch of the economy. Expanding activities have a high rate. A characteristic rate, r^0 , corresponds, for each activity, to the replacement of existing plant and equipment without change in productive capacity. Lower rates indicate an aging, a non-compensated using-up of equipment.

Activity with an investment rate of zero is undergoing a pillaging exploitation. Finally, a negative rate of investment may be imagined, when the exploitation includes the sale not only of products of the plant but also of the plant itself.

It is obviously possible to generalize and consider the coefficient frequently used today, that which determines the share of gross investment or of total savings in the utilization of gross national product. It is of the same nature as the investment rate of a single branch of activity. Like the individual who is able to save only when his basic needs are satisfied, poor countries (today called "underdeveloped") have a very small rate of savings. High rates are characteristic of rich communities, highly developed industrial countries. These countries, whatever may be the temporary dis-investments caused by wars, natural calamities, and cyclical crises, rapidly surge ahead.

Poor countries are able to support the high rates of investment of rapid industrialization only through rigorous political constraints. Without a highly developed civic spirit, the necessary limitation on consumption cannot be obtained except through coercive measures. The only exceptions to this rule are those countries provided by nature with riches that are very great in relation to their population and that have an important exchange value on the world market (coffee, cotton, and especially petroleum).

The difficulties of poor countries are further increased by the fact already mentioned: industrial installations under construction are marked by an infinite rate of investment. There is no solution to this problem other than the aid of foreign capital or the expansion of agriculture. Aid from outside is effective only if those who provide foreign capital are content with long-term repayment of their loans at a low interest rate and are willing to leave the income in the country receiving the aid. This income constitutes in effect the savings of enterprises founded with the loans, thus the major part of the financing of other invest-

ments. If these earnings are transferred to the lender, nothing in the situation of the poor country is changed.

The development of agriculture, on the contrary, is an effective means of general development. The savings rates in this branch of activity are almost always higher than zero (self-consumption is but rarely equal to production), and the investment rates of new installations, soon productive, are rarely infinite. The savings effected remain within the country. In addition, agricultural expansion rapidly provides an available surplus in the labor force. An economic development based on agriculture permits, in principle, a reduction to the minimum of the appeal for external aid. These problems obviously are quite different in highly developed countries.

The lowering of investment rates of various activities and of the general rate of investment indicates a lessening of the marginal effectiveness of capital, an economic expression of the slowing-down of progress relative to productivity. These phenomena are counteracted by the great technical revolutions. The steam engine, electricity, the internal combustion engine, automation, nuclear energy, and the developing revolution in management methods form and will continue to form the signposts of this development, proper to our civilization of abundant energy.

The problem is that of abundance in a relatively rigid economy. The consumption of food products fades into the background, while the accumulation of agricultural surpluses becomes a major concern of those in charge. The production and "consumption" (in reality, individual investment) of "durable consumption" goods (in reality, items of individual investment) made by assembly-line technique in powerfully machined factories become the single most significant economic fact.

Conjectural variations of investment rates lead, in free market economies, to deflationary crises due to excess productive investments. (These crises existed in the economies of the pre-energy era but were then due to natural or accidental causes—the crusades, the discovery of America, climatic changes, epidemics, and not to technical progress.) The basic industries—energy, metallurgy—are the first to suffer. The time required for construction of their installations and the impossibility of rapid amortization make risky calculations of income from them. They therefore attract little capital. The state intervenes, "nationaliza-

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tion" is witnessed in an economic action which differs from that of Communist planners only in its cloak of propaganda. This is the period which we are going through now in certain countries of western Europe.

INVESTMENT AND THE STATE: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND SOCIALISM

We have examined the case of the physical individual. His leisure has permitted him to create tools and thus to increase his productivity. Then, when the monetary-exchange economy arrived, these leisure periods were transformed into savings, the origin of investments.

We then generalized through the comparison of a productive cell—family, business, public service, nation—to an individual producer. Each producer receives an income (produces a value), consumes, and saves. In addition, all producers, except the one who represents the whole body of the economy (considered, only to simplify our reasoning, as closed—having no trade with the outside), transfer a part of the resources at their disposal. In everyday language, they give, voluntarily or not, instead of exchange, a part of their work and receive from it gratuitously. Non-producers do nothing but receive resources, gratuitously, by definition.

For all economic agents, producers or not, except for the total group itself (considered as distinct from the state and as including the state as it does every other economic agent), the fundamental equation of economic balance is therefore: $\text{Income (Product)} = \text{Consumption} + \text{Savings} + \text{Net Transfer}$.

In a given system of social relations and of prices each active individual receives the income which represents the value the group attaches to his activity. It may be guessed that in fact certain individuals receive too high an income in relation to the "real value" of their activity, others an income too low.

This is the foundation of socialism, a result of the misery of the British proletariat in the first half of the nineteenth century. This doctrine affirms that wage-earning workers (originally manual laborers) receive generally in the capitalist or liberal system an income lower than the value of their production, while the owners of the means of production, of investments, or of the monetary capital which represents them enjoy incomes higher than the "real" value of their activity.

Contemporary socialism believes that it can and must remedy this

state of affairs by transfers of income through taxes providing social insurance, family allotments, old-age pensions; by a close regulation of wages, of number of hours worked (the work week), of prices; and, in a final stage, by the socialization of the means of production. In the socialist society decisions on new investments and the management of existing investments will be undertaken in the name of criteria other than those of property and private interest. Inactive individuals, children, and the aged will enjoy income of transfer, and active individuals will receive in addition to their direct income, which depends on their activity, indirect income, granted by the group according to criteria other than that of productive activity.

Many of these measures have become reality in evolved societies, and no one can deny that these societies are more humane, more just. But the role assumed by the state and the bureaucracy in this system can be questioned.

The writer must place himself outside and above the quarrel over the relationship between income and the "real" value of its corresponding production, without denying that it (the quarrel) exists. It exists as does every other manifestation of the struggle for life. It explains unionism, an effective means of defense for the mass of workers in the face of those who have control over investments. Nevertheless, there is, to appreciate the relation between income and the corresponding value of production, no criterion other than the existing system of transfers and prices. Its injustice may be denounced, and action may be undertaken to modify it, but one cannot base his convictions on this question on the reasonings which led Marx to declare the existence of the plus-value without admitting the suppression of all forced savings. It may in fact be said that forced savings, in all its forms, is contrary to the principle of individual freedom of choice. From this can be deduced the need for an economic structure in which all revenue would be distributed to final consumers (to "individual private citizens"), in which the treasury would serve only to cover public consumption, while profit was abolished. Investment would be totally financed through free savings, by means of credit mechanisms. Such a structure is conceivable. Econometricians show that it even constitutes a state of "optimum social output." It is a perfect liberal system without private benefits, the source of forced savings due to Marx's plus-value. But these same econometricians, partisans of the theory of optimum social output, also demonstrate an obvious fact: the necessary level of investment would

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be reached in such a system only if money were constantly devalued, and this would have to be done the more rapidly, insofar as consumption would have to be limited more severely, as the community is poorer or as earlier dis-investment has been more significant. In addition, all transfers with the possible exception of those necessary to the financing of public consumption and social welfare would have to be suppressed. This applies especially to interest on money and the sale of land.

Now the alienation of resources through currency devaluation leads, as historical experience clearly shows, to the greatest possible injustice in the distribution of income. We do not see, however, through what mechanism free savings could finance non-productive investments. Perfect liberalism does not therefore resolve the problem of social justice, and forced savings is still necessary to maintain a sufficient level of investment. What Marx tried to show was that this forced savings is distributed justly if the control of investments remains in the hands of the "workers."

Today we do not see, on the economic level, how the planning or carrying-out of investments through marginal mechanisms influences the distribution of income available to individuals; that is, how it influences forced savings. In our modern terminology of stochastic science we would say that the correlation between the just distribution of income and the control of investment has a certain value on the political and psychological level of the reciprocal attitude of the elites and the masses. But experience seems to show that this correlation is a loose one. In capitalist, but rich, economies incomes seem to be better distributed than in socialist, but poor, economies. The study of the correlation ought to include among others the variable of the absolute richness of the total group, itself a function of the effectiveness of the economic system.

With consumption as a point of departure, it is possible to attempt a second theory of social justice. This consists in stating the right of each individual, independently from the value of his production, to enjoy an income sufficient to cover his consumption. On this theory is based the whole social edifice which opposes the morality of Sparta and that of the coconut tree. Had it not been applied at the earliest stages of the human species, this species would probably not have survived. It states the moral truth of the need for solidarity and charity among men. But it is totally incapable of rational application to economic science and

implies an absurdity, the suppression of free savings. It is impossible to define an individual's minimum consumption. Between the "market basket" of a Chinese coolie (a bowl of rice a day, a pair of sandals and a scrap of clothing every few months); that of the Parisian manual laborer; and that of a Pennsylvania miner in Mr. Lewis' union, the spread is wider than between the consumption of an office worker and that of the richest man in the United States.

It is, believe me, impossible to build on the fact that the income of a group does or does not permit a high level of consumption, an affirmation as to whether or not the income of a community is well or poorly distributed. Productivity of labor and absolute wealth, the size of this income, also play their roles. In an economy in which each receives according to his needs someone or something must decide these needs, even though it be the state, which is really an anonymous bureaucracy or "mandarinate." Nothing is further removed from liberty, that essential "item" of consumption. The perfect expression of this method is rationing.

The last term of the equation, $\text{Income (Product)} = \text{Consumption} + \text{Savings} + \text{Net Transfer}$, is the net transfer toward the exterior. It is an algebraic sum of positive and negative quantities. Its study is at least as important as that of trade, the object of classical political economy. Its historic role is perhaps greater. The relations between the slave and his owner, the Roman client and the patrician, the prefeudal commander and the patron, the vassal and the suzerain, the serf and the master, the absolute monarch and his courtiers and subjects, the state and its citizens, are relationships not of trade but of transfers or resources. It has been the same thing within the family since the origin of man.

Negative transfers are all the resources which the individual receives gratuitously. Their quality and their importance define in large part the economic regime. In the classical free-capitalist system, the holders of rights of property or other privileges, hereditary or not, enjoy such transfers. They represent all the varieties of "dividend" income. The "charity" on which poor inactive persons live in these regimes is also a transfer of this kind. In modern regimes, this last type of transfer is replaced by indirect income: social security payments, family allotments, old-age benefits, and so forth.

Positive transfers are direct personal taxes and transfers to families whose heads underwrite the needs of the members. Another category of transfers, positive or negative, is that of speculative profits which derive

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on occasion from an important part of the exchanges of resources in free systems: stock-exchange operations, land speculations, real estate transactions, raw materials, etc. Still another is constituted by corruption and rackets, economic phenomena which are sometimes not negligible in amount.

Private transfers seldom appear in the statistics. They are generally included in income. This is the equivalent of moving the corresponding values from the right side of the equation to the left, that of income, with, of course, a change in sign. The same operation should be made for transfers to inactive persons, as these constitute their only income.

It is obvious that total transfer is zero. What some receive, others give. But who gives and who receives? Statistics disclose that the ensemble of individuals in Western countries receives more than it gives. The corresponding resources come from taxes and contributions paid by corporations. Among individuals, peasants and the poor receive a great deal more than they give. The wealthy give more than they receive, if income from property is placed on the left side of the basic equation. If, however, incomes from property are considered as transfers, the wealthy receive more than they give.

To sum up, the state, the wealthy in free systems, the ensemble of individuals in welfare states, draw off from productive activity a sizable quantity of resources, which is then either consumed or redistributed or used to constitute forced savings. In the Communist system the state is the only entity which receives transfers. It redistributes a part of these to individuals.

Transfer to the state, the treasury, plays an important role in the economic balance and has special influence on the distribution of revenue between consumption and investment. It is difficult in this study to push the analysis of these facts very far, but a brief examination of the roles of the two principal types of taxes, direct and indirect, seems useful.

When the state collects important sums through heavily progressive income taxes and then redistributes them through social payments or non-productive investments, it seems to increase consumption and to reduce the savings which might be invested in productive installations. Then a struggle against deflation takes place. This is the remedy invented in England in the nineteenth century against crises of underconsumption due to low wages. This type of treasury procedure is in actual fact much more complicated.

It is first of all difficult to determine the effects of this action on individuals who are at the same time individual entrepreneurs, hence to determine the effects of this fiscal policy on the major part of free savings. While the state can, by fiscal policy, decide the sign and the value of the total transfer resulting from a group of individuals, it cannot act by this means on the distribution between savings and consumption within the group. And it is basically this distribution which determines the effect of a modification of fiscal policy on the economic balance.

Let us examine the influence on the economic balance of the aggravation of direct progressive taxation. We recall that only rapidly amortizable investments are deflationary. We can then establish the following catalogue of tendencies provoked by the increase of progressive direct taxation:

A. *Direct effect*: diminution of disposable income.

Secondary direct effects:

1. If the diminution of disposable income causes especially a diminution of consumption, the resulting effect is deflationary.
2. If the diminution of disposable income causes a lessening of investments habitually financed by free savings, that is, rapidly amortizable, the resulting effect is at first slightly deflationary, quickly followed by an inflationary effect.

B. *Indirect effects*:

1. If the resources gathered by income taxes serve public consumption or non-productive public investment, the resulting effect is inflationary.
2. If the resources thus collected are redistributed among individuals whose needs are not normally satisfied, the resulting effect is inflationary.
3. If the forced savings thus made is simply substituted for free savings transferred by means of the tax into the hands of the state to finance the same types of investment, there is transfer of the control of investment without visible effect on the economic balance.

We see then that the effect of progressive direct taxation on income is, as far as economic balance is concerned, much more complicated than its supporters seem to feel or at least to declare publicly.

The state may also act on economic balance by an action on prices, by means of indirect taxes, and through other measures. These methods

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are employed intensively in the collectivist economies of the Communist world.

In capitalist countries, the state intervenes relatively little in the creation of an individual's real income. On the other hand, it attempts strong intervention in the utilization of income by heavy direct taxation. In Communist countries, the state imposes a "rational" hierarchy of income, or at least attempts to do so. Intellectuals appear at the head of the list, along with workers of extremely high output, high functionaries, and not, as in some capitalist economies, businessmen. On the other hand, the pressure of direct taxation is weaker. The state governs private demand less through direct personal taxes than through manipulation, made possible by the public appropriation of the means of production, and controls prices by means of indirect taxes and (which in this case means the same thing) by the very structure of cost prices.

The differences between the two systems are then noticeable. They have to do, however, only with the methods and means employed. The aim is the same: to direct or at least to orient the utilization of income. This action may, in free regimes, be covered by the banner of currency defense; in collectivist systems, by the argument of the primacy of basic investments, an indispensable tool for future expansion. It is nonetheless true that one of the basic attributes of individual freedom, the power to enjoy freely and decide freely the use of the fruits of one's work, is breached throughout the globe. The quarrel between Marxists and liberals is, in this field, without meaning except as a quarrel over ways and means.

Can this analysis say that we are in revolt against public control of the utilization of income? Not at all. We have shown at the outset that investment is generally possible only by means of social constraint and that what is called social injustice is in fact inevitable because of the necessity of financing an important part of investment through forced savings. This declaration is but the admission in other terms of the need for control of the utilization of income. We think, simply, that it is just to reduce this control to a minimum.

Now it is possible, on the other hand, to defend the stand that the means of progressive direct taxation is more opposed to the principle of freedom than is action on prices or, in the final analysis, taxation on corporations. The injustice of this second method is offered as an objection. The tax burden should be borne by the wealthy, who will not suffer thereby. If prices are made to bear the burden, it is the poor who

pay. The argument does not bear up under analysis. On the one hand, the taxes paid by the wealthy constitute, in all countries of the world, only a small part of the fiscal burden. On the other hand, it is not prices that determine the satisfaction of needs, hence the well-being of the poor, but real income—monetary income relative to the price structure. And nothing prevents an adaptation of price and wage structure to the satisfaction of the needs of the mass of the population. Finally, do we not often face the question of limiting consumption to assure a sufficient investment rate? In this situation, action on prices is certainly more effective and more rapid.

The real reasons why direct taxation is preferred in non-Communist economies is not fiscal justice. It stems from contradictions among three orders of facts: freedom of producers to fix their prices, freedom of individuals to dispose of their income and divide it between consumption and savings, and the necessity of a total savings sufficient for the financing of investments. These contradictions are generally raised in favor of the freedom of producers, which leads to a heavy direct taxation.

Our method of analysis, applied to corporations, permits us to see what happens.

We insisted at the outset on the double role of individual entrepreneurs, as both "enterprises" and "individuals." This duality should be kept in mind when one examines the position of the corporation vis-à-vis the state. In the income of the individual entrepreneur it is necessary to distinguish between his "just earnings as an entrepreneur," by which he receives social transfers and pays taxes as an individual, and his income as a corporation which satisfies its own equation of balance: $\text{Income} = \text{Consumption} + \text{Savings} + \text{Net Transfer to the Outside}$.

Consumption refers here to that of the factors of production, including the just earnings of the entrepreneur, the raw materials, goods, and means of production, and finally the amortization of machinery. Savings is constituted by non-distributed earnings and reserves, which serve to finance investments of the corporation by the process called self-financing. Positive transfers, preponderant in the corporation, are capital of debt repayment, with its corresponding interest, direct and indirect taxes, and distributed profits. A part of these transfers is thus founded on the right of ownership of the means of production, an object of socialist attacks. In reality, the role of this right, in this form,

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is today secondary and certainly less important than the role of the state.

Negative transfers are state subsidies and loans from third parties. The investment of the corporation is financed not only by non-distributed earnings, reserves, and loans, hence the savings of third parties, but also by amortization funds, although the latter represent factors of production. Among individual entrepreneurs, amortization funds, earnings, and reserves are confused with remuneration for labor. In other words, remuneration for labor and forced savings due to the plus-value of Marx are not separate and distinct. The importance of these private transfers, in a free economy, is high; that of income distributed to other active persons, particularly to the workers, is low.

It is then perfectly logical and necessary to base taxes on income (actually only slightly on income from the labor of individuals and largely on income of corporations derived from the plus-value of Marx) and not, through prices, on individual consumption, which is too low.

We know that, in a coherent economic system which is adapted to the reality of present-day production techniques, a different method of taxation may be applied, one of superior social effectiveness. This possibility will be examined in another study.

INVESTMENT AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE

The class struggle, described by Marx, is born within the corporation. It concerns primarily the distribution of the income of the corporation among its consumption (remuneration of the factors of production and especially of labor), its savings, and its transfers. This, then, involves the opening of a wide spread in remuneration for labor.

Marx deduced from his analysis of the productive process, a work of genius in its time but rather elementary for us, that the worker produces a plus-value extorted from him by the corporation.

We say that the corporation creates an income (a net value of production in the existing price system) through the more or less judicious and effective bringing into use of the factors of production and that it distributes this income among consumption, savings, and transfers. It is evident, if only for arithmetical reasons demanded by the balanced equation, that the "consumption of the production factor labor," in other words, the remuneration of the corporation's workers (including the chairman of the board), must be much less than the value of production. It is absurd to suppose that this could be otherwise. This is

true even if past labor (amortization) is added to the present labor utilized by the corporation. The "plus-value" which obviously does exist and is necessary is in no way an "extortion." This applies to all economic regimes without any exception. But it is true that through reversal of the above order an early antagonism arose in all systems, having as its object the distribution of remuneration for the labor factor among the individual producing members of the corporation. There is a class struggle for the pieces of the existing pie. Past experience of the purely free economy (today a thing of the past everywhere) has shown that if labor is considered as merchandise bought and sold on the market, the cutting of the pie is such as to lead to misery of the masses, cyclical crises, insecurity, and wars—all economic absurdities. Even without considering the inhuman injustice of these scourges, Marx was right in demonstrating this fact.

There exists in this field another antagonism which Marx did not discuss: The forced savings created by the plus-value is imposed, according to the view that is taken of it, either on the workers of the corporation or on the buyers of its product. The latter may also claim their piece of the pie by asking for lower prices.

This second antagonism is born of the workers' desire (including that of the managers) to consume more, to think of themselves more and of their children less. For it is in fact the generation following that of the investor which particularly profits from his economizing action. In addition to other means of limiting present consumption, the "thrifty spirit" of the head of the family in free societies and the "happy tomorrows" of Communist ideologues are opposed to this selfish but quite human tendency.

The mass poverty of free economies was an extremely effective method of limiting consumption. Poor societies, in the early stages of their economic development, were thus able to invest important portions of their product, at the price of blood, hunger, and tears. When free wages were rejected in the name of social justice, other methods of limiting consumption had to be applied in poor societies. One of these methods is communism, whose simplicity, in principle, is doubtless appealing to the masses in poor countries.

Now what is the struggle carried on for years in the newspapers of the Eastern countries between those who stress the priority of heavy industry and those who wish to lighten the burden of today's consumers by an increase in the consumer goods offered them? In essence

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it differs in no way from the workers' strike in a capitalist enterprise, undertaken to secure higher wages from management. Whether Malenkovism is practiced in the U.S.S.R. or the U.A.W. emerges victorious from a strike in Detroit, in both cases the possibility of consumption and free savings by participants in productive plants increases, and the investment capacity of these plants diminishes. The only difference is in the methods of East and West. The aims are the same: for the masses, to consume more today, to be happier on the level of material needs, and to be more free; for the elite, to limit present consumption in order to prepare for a better future.

Democracy is political in the West, at the price of an economic inequality which permits this limitation. Democracy is economic in the East, but consumption is limited even more severely by the suppression of freedoms.

The class struggle also takes place on another level. The differences between opposing regimes here goes beyond the level of methods. It concerns the power struggle, unleashed on the material level by those who control investment.

CONTROL OF INVESTMENTS

The word "control" is used here in the English sense of "government," of exercising the power of decision.

When we reflect on this problem, we observe that it presents on the economic level the basic aspect of the social problem, that of the elite in its relation to the masses, of the symbiosis of the powerful and the humble. This is the problem of power and of the will to power.

There are three bases of power, successively dominant in the historical period of human society. The theological basis, supernatural, of the sovereign by the grace of God, wherein the priest, the sovereign, and the owner are blended into one; the legalistic basis of the absolute right of property, extended to include all goods; and the rational basis which, in the name of the principles of justice and efficiency, delegates power to representatives through universal suffrage, giving it to those who "know better," through the real or theoretical consent of the masses.

It is impossible, by definition, to try to analyze or to form a value judgment on the theological source of legitimacy, since it is based on an act of faith. Besides, it can today be only a screen hiding the real choice made between the other principles.

These other principles are actually in opposition in the modern world. Shall it be an owner of the Soames Forsyte type, member of a network of families, of a caste, who bases his decision essentially on profit, on the share of income which will fall to him in the distribution we have analyzed, from the fact of investment? He will estimate this future profit as a function of market forces: interest on money, the state of wages and expenditures, often in an intuitive way, but also, today, drawing on a probabilistic study of income. Or shall it be a manager, member of a professional class of "decision-makers"? This type of man will try to construct a rational representation, a "model" of infinitely complex reality, and draw the arguments for a decision from this model.

Both run the risk of deceiving themselves. The difference between them is that the first, the owner, pays in this case on his fortune and that the second, the manager, pays on the future of his career. Since the banks and even the state may be substituted for the owner in case of failure, and the manager may also find another field of activity, the difference of sanction is often not clearly marked. Often, but not always. This debate goes far beyond Marx and Marxism. In contemporary reality it is not belief or disbelief in the Marxist religion which distinguishes those who support these two methods. There is a strange blend of belief and skepticism in Western societies, as in Communist societies. In the first, socialist planning is broadly employed by public administration and also in the great depersonalized concentrations of economic power. In the second, the forces of the market impose on functionaries decisions identical to those which would have been taken by "owners."

The control of investments by market forces has shown its effectiveness in the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century. Closer to our own time, credit for the rebirth of western Germany after World War II is attributed to this system; the rebuilding took place in a highly evolved society, temporarily subjected to dis-investment of sizable proportions.

It seems however that the principle of planning, on which the economic system of the U.S.S.R. is based, today yields immediate economic results in the initial phase of development of poor societies. Best proof of this is found in the development of Russia since 1917. The suffering of the people, comparable basically to that of the English people between 1800 and 1850, is a separate matter.

The control of investment by the forces of the market succeeded in

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the initial stage of the technical revolution of abundant energy. In this stage the theological principle of legitimacy was still strong, and the economy was atomistic. Producers and directors of investment were numerous and unorganized. Neither producers nor wage-earners were dominant. The laws of the market then permitted, through the mechanisms of distribution of income described by Marx, among others, a limiting of consumption in such a way as to effect a considerable proportion of available resources—of the social product—to amortize productive investments. Under these conditions the economic balance was subject to violent swings, called crises. The deflationary effect of productive investment predominated because of small total demand. The inflationary swings which followed crises were, consciously or not, caused by wars and non-productive investments in colonies of foreign countries. The one single method to be neglected in combating deflationary crises was that which consists of raising the level of consumption by the mass of workers within the economy itself. The businessmen of the United States in the early years of the twentieth century alone applied this simple idea, with amazing and world-wide success. Nevertheless, and on a world-wide basis also, expansion was in every way important.

The class struggle on the field of distribution of income was, naturally, extremely bitter. It occasionally thrust the infinitely more important question of control of investments into the background.

From this first stage there came the philosophy of socialism as reformer and organizer of the wage-earners. Capitalism, on its side, organized powerful monopolies. Wages ceased to be the counterpart of a sale of labor and became title to a share of the social product.

The rate of improvement in the wage-earner's condition began to surpass the rate of increase in productivity. If the tendency before was in the direction of deflation, the economy suffering from underconsumption, corrected by economic imperialism, inflationary tendencies now became predominant, the more so as a great war destroyed a fabulous quantity of resources. Under these conditions only investments yielding immediate income, strongly deflationary, with a short period of amortization, in consumer goods and service industries, continued to attract capitalist savings governed by the laws of the market. The great depression of the thirties was the result.

It may be stated without paradox that, for example, underinvestment in basic heavy industries, flagrant in western Europe between the two

wars, is due to the earliest social reform laws, the establishment of reforming socialism. Economic absurdities are then seen, caused by violent swings in the production of consumer goods, such as the authoritarian destruction of huge quantities of foodstuffs while entire countries are dying of hunger, in order to "support prices." Theories of abundance are born as a reaction, fallacious theories which neglect the essential fact of investment. Planners appear. Keynes seeks new recipes for monetary manipulations to combat unemployment.

Meanwhile Lenin had already passed the stage of these first attempts at modern economic thought. Starting with the doctrine of a conscious and rational elaboration of investment rates, he built the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, essentially founded on the control of investment by the state and by the state alone, even though the supreme, but infinitely remote, end remained the withering-away of that state. Beyond the problem of cutting the existing pie, dear to reforming socialists, the more serious problem of the control of investment has passed to the front of the stage.

CONCLUSION

We live in the following situation: In Western countries the mirage of reforming socialism, which believes itself capable of distributing existing income so as to satisfy the needs of all, leads to underinvestment in basic industries, combated in turn by attempts at planning of these investments. The whole is incoherent, doubly inflationary on the side of both consumption and investment. These countries, if they are also committed to keeping external economic pledges (obligation for transfers to the outside) and heavy military expenditures, live doubly beyond their means. It is not at all astonishing that the last vestiges of liberty disappear.

In the sphere of influence of what is called communism, integral planning results in the misery of the masses. It differs from that described by Marx in its spiritual character. All social advantages, health, the satisfaction of minimum material needs, are theoretically granted to the workers of these countries. But they are deprived of two things: the ability to spend their income freely and the ability to enjoy one essential item of consumer goods, liberty. The priority of productive investments with a very long amortization period, along with low productivity and empirical planning often leading to a waste of strength,

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produces a violent inflationary push. Foreign trade is strictly regulated, demand for products is out of all proportion to supply, money fails to play its normal role, prices are arbitrarily fixed. It is impossible to maintain order in such a situation without a brutal police force, and sometimes the lid blows off.

The underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and South America may choose between the two systems. Their leading classes are attracted by the example of the successful industrial revolution in the West and in the United States. The masses believe, rather, in the possibility of escaping from the necessary limitations of consumption through the mirage of the Russian miracle and forget the suffering of that people in arriving at its present level of development.

Perhaps the best solution to avoid catastrophe would be to explain the truth to them. From the outside it would seem that a solution exists through truth, which is the aim of this essay. Here we may attempt but a short description of its general contours.

The end is to increase indefinitely the productivity of man's action and the richness of his life, all the while safeguarding liberty. This end will be attained by the indefinite increase of individual investment, on both the material and the spiritual levels, and of useful non-productive investment, investments which have been defined in this article.

The means is the increase, also indefinite, of disposable income. This increase must be obtained not so much through the most "just" distribution of slices from the pie, which is an illusion, as through efficiency leading to an enlarging of the pie to be cut. For this, useless non-productive investments must be reduced to a minimum and the factors of production utilized in the most effective manner; that is, we must tend toward the maximum of productivity by a balanced level of productive investments.

Progress in this direction will lead to a progressive reduction of the relative importance of transfers, particularly of private transfers. Statisticians have in fact noticed this reduction in the most recent historical period: income from property diminishes as economic development proceeds. Certain economists call this phenomenon of the weakening of economic privilege the "ruin of the property owner."

Decisions to invest will thus be more and more subject to socially objective criteria. Planning of the great basic investments, financed by an international organization for transfers of resources of rich groups,

threatened with deflation, toward poorer groups, threatened with inflation, will be the first requirement.

It will be necessary to abandon the illusion, dear to certain economists, that we live in a transitional, unbalanced period between the blessed age-old period of the balanced economy that preceded the abundance of energy, and a future epoch of balance among primary activities, of little importance, secondary activities declining in importance, and tertiary activities highly developed. The human revolution unleashed by rational science about two hundred years ago is only beginning. Each new day brings proof of this. The conquest of outer space commences before our eyes. Nearer to our daily preoccupations, automation and the application of scientific methods of mathematical tools to the science of management and, in fact, to all of sociology—applications unknown ten years ago and made possible by progress in electronics—seem destined in the near future to upset the organization of society more profoundly than did the revolution of the nineteenth century. With this prospect before us, today's bitter quarrel over the ownership of the means of production and the control of investments will become, like the other, a mere formal discussion. In the final analysis, the state, like the entrepreneurs, is made up of men. What they should be concerned with is the ability to handle the data permitting them a reasonable hope that the decisions they make are good ones. That is the difficulty, the only real difficulty of our complex civilization of abundant energy, different from all preceding civilizations.

The operational revolution whose debut we are experiencing, however, permits us to hope, to glimpse the possibility of resolving this difficulty.

The observation, by means of a power of which our predecessors had no idea, of facts whose very mass rendered their interpretation inaccessible through statistical science, the manipulation of these facts by the new logical disciplines—all these intellectual possibilities lead us to hope that, without suppressing liberty and without concentrating power in the hands of a narrow circle of supermen, the world will avoid the alternative of total destruction which, thanks to nuclear science, it is possible to choose today.

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At the conference on scientific psychology held in Strasbourg in the autumn of 1956, Professor Leontiev of the U.S.S.R. gave a highly anticipated report on the present trends of Russian psychology. He emphasized the now recognized necessity of going beyond the simplistic schemas of Pavlov and of studying complex systems of adaptation, which are the constitutive elements of the mental life in its richness and which are expressed particularly on the speech level. The elite of the French scientific psychologists listened to him in a kind of anguished confusion, mixed with admiration. One of them, expressing the general feeling, exclaimed: "You tell us that we must not hesitate to approach that formidable domain, before which we shrink back—the conscious . . ." And one knew not whether to laugh or to cry at the sight of psychologists thus confronted with a subject so unusual for them as to be quite out of the question.

In Italy in the spring of 1958, another conference was held, this one

Translated by Wells Chamberlin.

on social psychology. An American leader in this field, Professor Viteles, declared, taking into account his long personal studies, that the time of "human relations" had passed and that we were about to enter the time of the "humanities." This scholar had perfected a new method for improving businessmen, managers, and directors of all kinds. Until then these men, already mature and having reached important posts, had been offered technical training periods intended to put them in touch with new developments in their professional areas. Now the eminent expert from overseas advocated training periods of a completely different nature. Businessmen were to be relieved of their tasks and put out to pasture in a quiet spot for a period of ten months. This time was to be devoted to directed studies whose essential character was to have no connection with the technical, industrial, or commercial activities of the trainees. They would, for example, study Shakespeare, Greek tragedy, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, or Napoleon, German Romanticism, abstract painting, and so on. The experiment proves that, after ten months have been devoted to the close study of one or another of these topics, the behavior of the individuals is modified; they do not react in the same way to series of tests which are given them at the beginning and at the end of the period under consideration. Although it is obviously not certain that the modification has as its direct result an increase in productivity, it does nevertheless seem to imply a new understanding of human relationships, and, in the American view, the idea of change tends to be confused with the idea of progress.

Here again the unprejudiced observer remains perplexed. And, if this experiment were not presented with authority by one of the recognized masters of an eminently serious discipline, we might fear that it is a friendly hoax. Quite the contrary; we are dealing here with a characteristic aspect of American civilization. Indeed it requires the perspicacity of a great scholar already well along in years to discover that American businessmen, armed with financial, commercial, and industrial techniques and long subjected to an intensive professional activity, are suffering from an initial deficiency: they have never known the leisure of general culture. And the rudiments of culture from which they belatedly benefit can have a considerable influence on the very foundations of their personalities. This is an unexpected revenge reaped by the most unselfish literary studies, which thus impose a recognition of their value in a system in which they are considered in principle as null and void.

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These two examples give significant indications concerning the spiritual situation of our era. They reveal the absurdity of the scientific and technical inflation from which Western culture is suffering. In France, especially, with the blessing of those in public office, an intensive propaganda campaign is being spread practically everywhere, in favor of scientific training. We lack mathematicians; we lack engineers. We must produce them at all costs, in massive quantities, and immediately. The champions of this crusade preach that we must give up Greek, an exotic and useless language, reserve Latin for a few retrograde minds, and even limit the study of the national tongue to the vital minimum of Basic French. A good citizen, today, must live to add and subtract, to cultivate the electron, or to manipulate a transistor. *Noblesse oblige*: the most gifted young people must be, willy-nilly, oriented toward the sciences. As for the ungifted, it is equally necessary to orient them toward mathematics. For we are given to understand that there is no need to be intelligent to do mathematics, at least to absorb it in a sufficient quantity. This is in the country's interest: the powers of the day, the Americans and the Russians, owe their superiority to their astounding density of engineers per square mile.

This transcendent illiteracy represents one of the most pernicious forms of contemporary nihilism. The most magnificent illustration of it might be found in the case of the atomic scientists, those heroes of scientific and technological obscurantism. The most distinguished of these specialists oscillate with a significant regularity between mental depression and high treason. Stuffed with equations, hallucinated by figures and construction diagrams, they quite literally no longer know what they are doing. And when the least perverted of them, those who have not definitively lost all presence of mind, eventually discover the implications and the ends of their researches, they demonstrate their good faith by escaping by the only avenues which remain open to them. It would have been better for everyone if they had reflected a little beforehand. But the progress of scientific conquests does not favor general culture. And, in the same way, the famous scientist Robert Oppenheimer, one of the godfathers of the atomic cataclysms, while still continuing his calculations, has finally discovered the road to peace of mind in the wisdom of India, which teaches precisely the vanity of calculations and the ontological nullity of the technical adventure. If he were not so respectable a personality, and one whose genius is a symbol of our time, one might wonder if an attitude which consists in playing

both camps at once gives evidence of a solid intellectual and moral equilibrium.

I recently visited Sweden. A happy country, and a prosperous one; the country, no doubt, in Europe and perhaps in the world, where the general level of life is the highest. A country without misery and without poverty; a country which has been officially deproletarized. All this is admirable, assuredly. Bathrooms, refrigerators, television sets, electric razors, automobiles, comfortable housing for all—it's like a dream. But here's the rub: these fortunate Swedes are not happy. Champions of comfort and productivity, they are also champions in suicide and divorce, in mental illness, in alcoholism, and in juvenile delinquency. They have solved all the problems—the economic problem, the technical problem, the social problem. Yet there is one problem which they forgot, so eager were they to rush to the laboratories and to the factories: the problem of human existence, the problem of values. Or, rather, they had imagined that questions of this order were somehow understood but not expressed and that one could solve them without asking them, by being content with straightening out the technical, economic, and social difficulties. The rest was supposed to follow automatically. Experience has given the lie to their expectation, and the Swedes have discovered a new wretchedness, which cannot be cured by the very means which have engendered it. One cannot build a civilization by ignoring human reality; the problem of civilization is essentially a human problem. It is permissible to think that all those who, by system or by absence of system, by dialectic or by naïveté, refuse to admit this to themselves, will someday, whether they are Russians or Americans, come up against the same insurmountable contradictions, if they are not doing so already.

Man is not a question which can be resolved. The human condition cannot be reduced to a problem which a few calculations would allow us to treat once and for all, after it has been set up in a sufficiently clever equation, facilitated by a cybernetic installation in the style of the times. These assertions, which are commonplace enough in appearance, sum up the failure of scientist endeavors to formalize human experience according to the schemas which are in force in the area of the sciences of matter. In fact, the already age-old evidence of the history of the sciences of man, of his trials and errors, as well as of his successes, brings us to analogous conclusions. And the serene ignorance, the complete indifference of today's specialists in reference to the attempts of

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their predecessors is not the smallest paradoxical element in the present situation. It is the same obscurantism, ostensibly defending the rights of pure science or of pure philosophy, which prevails almost everywhere.

For all that, we need only to consider the present state of the human sciences to ascertain that they are in complete confusion. They are developing, most certainly, and they are multiplying their works, but the technicians of the various disciplines usually do not know precisely what they want nor what they are doing.

Psychology, for example, despite its ambitions—and even despite its successes—has not succeeded in understanding itself and in defining itself in a precise way. The very careers of the founders of experimental psychology leave at times a curious impression of failure. William James, for example, became discouraged; he gave up psychology, which had disappointed him, and devoted himself to philosophy. In France, Théodule Ribot, founder and defender of an “experimental” psychology which he himself never practiced, came finally to a kind of eclecticism. And in 1914, two years before his death, he wrote a preface for the *Treatise on Psychology* which his pupil Georges Dumas was preparing. He claimed then that “psychology is . . . a part of the science of life or of biology. . . . The experimental psychologist is a naturalist of a certain kind. . . . If psychology is only a part of biology, it cannot continue to be, it cannot be, a part of philosophy.”¹ However, the *Treatise*, in two thick volumes, which Georges Dumas was supervising, grouped together a certain number of collaborators whose extremely varied contributions were in no way comprised within the limits set by Ribot: some were pure physiologists, and it was difficult to see by what right they assumed the title of psychologists; others were sociologists, even philosophers, so that the unity of this *Treatise on Psychology* seemed to lie primarily in the existence of a common cover. And consequently Georges Dumas was soon to widen the scope of a project which had no doubt been found inadequate; he assumed the direction of a *New Treatise on Psychology*, more complete than the first, and running to ten volumes. Naturally, the composite and heteroclitic character of the first work is again accentuated in the second. We find a curious indication of this in the definition of psychology proposed by Georges Dumas himself:

1. Georges Dumas (ed.), *Traité de psychologie* (Paris: Alcan, 1923), I, ix.

If we had to formulate a definition of psychology which might win the approval of almost all, if not all, of the contributors to this *Treatise*, we should say that it is a science in which introspection plays an essential and preliminary role, in the description of facts and in the analysis of mental mechanisms, in which biology and sociology study the biological roots and the social evolution of the psychic functions, and in which pathological psychology, mental pathology, and nerve pathology bring us the most valuable contribution, through the analysis of sensory-motor and mental disturbances, which are elementary or complex, and through the analysis of psychoses, of nervous disorders, and of their cerebro-organic conditions.²

The reading of such a "definition" leaves the reader perplexed, since the unity of psychology is presented as one might explain the unity of a certain number of people talking together but saying things which do not agree and which are often contradictory. The existence of psychologists is perhaps one proof of the existence of psychology, but it does not allow us to characterize the latter or to give any idea, even a remote one, of its unity. The importance which has been assumed, over several decades, by psychoanalysis, by the various depth psychologies, by social psychology, and by the therapeutic techniques derived from these doctrines has incontestably increased the effective importance of psychology in contemporary civilization. Moreover, the various forms of psychotechnique and the batteries of tests advocated by the different methodological schools also exert no small influence. The reality of psychology is a fact both of an epistemological order and of a social order; we cannot help but believe it. But the nature of psychology and the sense of its unity are not at all assured, and we can only be astonished at the serene indifference of most of the specialists—with a few honorable exceptions³—in respect to the fundamental questions about the status of their subject.

We could make analogous remarks about the present state of anthropology. A recent American summary offers, under the title *Anthropology Today*,⁴ the present status of anthropological studies. This massive anthology assembles the contributions of a hundred world-wide specialists, arranged in divisions and subdivisions according to the questions which concern them, from prehistory to climatology. And,

2. Georges Dumas, *Nouveau traité de psychologie* (Paris: Alcan, 1930), I, 339.

3. Cf. particularly Politzer, *Critique des fondements de la psychologie* (Rieder, 1929), and D. Lagache, *L'Unité de la psychologie* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949).

4. A. L. Kroeber (ed.), *Anthropology Today* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), extended by a volume of discussions: Sol Tax et al. (eds.), *An Appraisal of Anthropology Today* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

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moreover, neither philologists nor historians nor doctors were invited to participate. We cannot avoid remarking that these eminent scientists do not understand one another because they do not have a common language. In addition, we can ask ourselves, not without some concern, if they have anything to say to one another. Each one pursues his inquiry in the area of his specialty without worrying about the others, aside from the few colleagues who are concerned with the same problems but who profess generally conflicting opinions. We get the impression from these accumulated statements that the editors might just as well have invited everyone to give evidence. We wonder who, up to a certain point, is not working in anthropology; without too much exaggeration, it seems that anthropologists are people whose common characteristic is that they all talk on different subjects. Anthropology, their common denominator, appears much more to be a common divisor. As the expeditor of the project, A. L. Kroeber, says, "the subject of anthropology is limited only by man,"⁵ with the result that anthropology constitutes a "coordinating science," which retains participation in all sorts of enterprises of knowledge.⁶ This opinion is confirmed by that of another eminent American specialist, Ralph Linton, according to whom "anthropology is a focal point for other sciences."⁷ One of his colleagues goes him one better: "I do not think that anthropology exists as a distinct entity as physics does. It exists merely as a meeting ground of people interested in man."⁸

The unfortunate thing is that these "definitions" here again strongly resemble an admission of epistemological impotence. They say much too much and not enough, because, once it has been admitted that anthropology is a science of man, one wonders what really can distinguish it from all the other human sciences. The same epistemological mishap befalls the most intelligent of the historians, who see the object of their research losing all consistency. There is no historical reality, observes Raymond Aron: "Historical reality, because it is human, is ambiguous and inexhaustible. Its ambiguous aspect is the plurality of the intellectual universes through which human existence unfolds, the

5. *Anthropology Today*, p. xiii.

6. *Ibid.*, p. xiv.

7. *An Appraisal of Anthropology Today*, p. 154.

8. William Straus, *ibid.*, p. 153; cf. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *ibid.*, p. 154: "We all agree that anthropology has a close relationship with the humanites, the social sciences, and the natural sciences."

diversity of the wholes in which elementary ideas and actions take place. Its inexhaustible aspect is the meaning of man for man, of the work for the interpreters, of the past for the successive presents."⁹

This dissolving of the historical object appears under the clearest light in the methodological reflection of a man like Lucien Febvre, according to whom history, once a science of facts, is no longer anything but a "study, scientifically conducted, of the diverse activities and of the diverse creations of the men of former times, selected at their dates, in the framework of extremely varied societies, and nevertheless comparable to each other . . . with which they have filled the surface of the earth and the succession of the ages. . . ." In this view, it appears that men are the "only objects of history—of a history which takes its place in the group of human disciplines of all orders and all degrees, beside anthropology, psychology, linguistics, etc." The historian's task will therefore be to study these "men endowed with multiple functions, with diverse activities, with varied concerns and aptitudes—which are all mingled together, which collide with each other, oppose each other, and finally conclude among themselves a compromise peace, a *modus vivendi* which is called life. . . ."¹⁰ And, in the first lesson of his course at the Collège de France, the distinguished historian developed these views in the following terms:

History, Science of Man . . . Science of the perpetual changing of human societies, of their perpetual and necessary readjustments to new conditions of material, political, ethical, religious, intellectual existence. Science of that agreement which is negotiated, of that harmony which is established, perpetually and spontaneously in all ages, between the diverse and synchronic conditions of the existence of men: material conditions, technical conditions, spiritual conditions. . . .¹¹

Moreover, Febvre advises the artisans of living history not to let themselves be spellbound by the prestige of a superseded past: "in order to study history, turn your back resolutely on the past, and start living."¹²

To put it differently, history, like the other human sciences, appears to have its center everywhere and its circumference nowhere. It is impossible to fix precise limits for it in the direction of sociology, of psychology, of philosophy, of cultural anthropology, or even of geography.

9. Raymond Aron, *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France), p. 120.

10. Lucien Febvre, "Vivre l'histoire," in *Mélanges d'histoire sociale*, 1943, p. 6.

11. *Combats pour l'histoire* (Paris: Colin, 1953), p. 31.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

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Upon reflection, moreover, there is nothing so surprising in that: since the human sciences all have the same object, which is living man, the constitutive unity of the human being must show through when we strive to isolate, to determine separately, any given one of its expressions. The plurality of epistemological perspectives has reality only in the first analysis: it fades out as soon as research comes close to the individual himself as a seat of intentions, of representations, and as action centers: the psychologist's man, the sociologist's man, the historian's man, the philologist's man, and so on, represent as many aspects of a concrete personality which asserts itself as quite whole in each of its manifestations.

It is quite evident that the researches and published results of any science, whatever it is, will remain subject to caution as long as that discipline is not clearly fixed in reference to its object and its methods. The crisis of the human sciences stems from this basic indetermination of the conditions and of the meaning of the undertaking. Mathematics, physics, and chemistry explore well delimited intellectual areas, for which the interferences, if there are any, can be precisely defined. The human sciences, however, appeared much more tardily. More than two centuries separate Galileo from Dilthey, who saw the first years of the twentieth century. Mathematicians and physicists live upon traditions, upon mental habits, which go back to Euclid and to Archimedes. The psychologists, sociologists, and historians have at their disposal only a defective intellectual equipment, which is approximative and, above all, inconsistent.

Here the essential difficulty arises from the fact that the working-out of the epistemology cannot precede the development of knowledge but accompanies its acquisition. It is not possible to fix in advance the frame into which the mass of learning will eventually fit. The rules of the method stand out, little by little, from the acquired experience. All periods of beginning are periods of groping in which one does not really know what one seeks or what one finds. It is in this way that the idea of science emerged, in the West, beginning with the works of the mathematicians and the scholars of the mechanist school early in the seventeenth century. A progressive consciousness of the intelligibility schemas operating in the interpretation of the exterior world allowed men, from Galileo to Newton, to perfect an epistemological pattern which corresponded to the obtained results and which condensed the

records of the validly conducted experiments, the precedent of which could constitute an authority for the experiments to come.

The model of learning thus codified, however, imposed itself so thoroughly upon the intelligence and the imagination of men that they saw in it the prototype of all certainty. Why should that which has proved itself in a certain field not succeed equally well in all the others? When the curiosity of scientists is shifted from Nature to man, the positivist ideal finds itself transferred from its native soil to a new intellectual area which must now be explored. Positivism, freed *ex post facto* from physical knowledge, is supposed to constitute authority for the knowledge of human reality which is yet to come. This is counting one's chickens before they hatch. From this there arises a kind of false initial meaning, all the more dangerous because the prefabricated methodology prevents the establishing of a methodology built to measure. And what is still more important is the fact that as a result of this bad orientation of thought the very essence of the phenomena under study is ignored.

The right of seniority of the sciences which are already established, and which are considered as models for the sciences to come, corresponds to a kind of inertia of thought, which allows itself to be carried along by the acquired speed, as if the results already obtained in one order of things could constitute a system of laws for the areas still to be explored. This creates a kind of oversimplification, because the subjects which are developed first are the most simple, and learning progresses in an order of increasing complexity. Thus the prestige of mathematics comes from its primogeniture as well as from its intelligibility. And no doubt this privilege of intelligibility, already recognized by the Pythagoreans, favors the development of knowledge and alienates in advance its non-concordant possibilities. An unexpected pliability, an arbitrary gratuitousness, thus intervene in the working-out of the structures of what is apparently the most rigorous learning: the terminology, the precise formulae borrowed by the youngest disciplines from the oldest, no longer have any value other than a symbolic one, which is illusory to the extent that these disciplines turn research away from its authentic vocation.

And so, contrary to what we might think, the history of knowledge does not by itself constitute a logic of knowledge. The chronological spread in the acquisition of learning is not without importance in what concerns the structure of learning. But time does not work of absolute

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necessity in the service of reason. It can very well work against it. Scientist-positivism seems to be the false interpretation of a reason which is deceived about itself because it is deceived about the implication of the results which were obtained earlier. For example, the Belgian psychologist Delboeuf, professor at the University of Liège, wrote at the end of the last century: "For my part, I think, and I affirm, that as long as a phenomenon, whatever it may be, physical or mental, has not been translated into numbers, it always leaves something mysterious in the mind." The American Titchener quotes this statement as an epigraph to the fourth volume of his treatise *Experimental Psychology: A Manual of Laboratory Practice*, published in New York in 1915. As a matter of fact, such a formula expresses perfectly the ambition of a certain experimental psychology, naïvely convinced that, once the life of the mind has been evaporated into a cloud of equations, there will be no more problems. Now the remark we have quoted means nothing: the mystery of human reality is not at all dissipated because, in one way or another, figures have been set in correlation with certain aspects of the mental life. As if a figure, all by itself, meant anything! This superstition of the figure, invested with a radical explicative privilege, represents one of the modern forms of magic. It is unfortunately not certain that all the contemporary technicians of the various human sciences are truly free of it.

No doubt we should analyze in depth this naïve faith in the power of numbers, which are supposed to offer a sure refuge to certainty, outside of any metaphysical option. Scientism believes it is approaching the real when it writes a mathematical relationship, and all that which does not allow itself to be reduced to formulae of this order is considered null and void. Such is still today the assertion of the "physicalists" of the Vienna school who, having emigrated into the Anglo-Saxon world, have to a great extent made their doctrines dominant in it. According to them, the only expressions worthy of interest are logical propositions—which are reduced moreover to tautologies—and the propositions of the sciences of reality, corresponding to the records of experiments done according to rigorous laboratory procedures. Everything that men can think, outside of the area so defined, has its source in nonsense or in fantasy and could not claim to pass as a truth properly so called. Human reality cannot be recognized except to the extent that it lets itself be projected according to the order of the physical determinations. Man, the creator of science, is caught in the trap of his creation, is the

dupe of the idol he has built. For the old adage according to which the man is the measure of the thing, there has been substituted the new rule, by virtue of which the thing is the measure of the man.

In fact we find nonsense among the physicalists themselves; while claiming to eliminate metaphysics forever, they have granted an ontological validity to physical experiment, endowed, by an exorbitant privilege, with an absolute validity. As if the figures stood all alone! As if man were made for physics, and not physics made by and for man! Nothing is more natural than for the methodology resulting from physical researches to act as authority in the area of physical reality. That is a self-evident truth. But to claim that this same methodology shall impose itself in the study of the human world is a senseless assertion, for it reduces the human being to the elements and to the physicochemical or other forces of which his organism is constituted. It is as absurd to talk about a man in the way one would talk about a stone as it is to talk about a stone in the way one would talk about a man. If, as Louis Rougier points out, scientific optics is the whole truth about the human field of vision, then each color is nothing more than a wave length in reference to the others. However, "the scientist knows of colors only what a blind man can know of them,"¹³ and the physicalist philosopher who follows his lead acts like someone who would put out his eyes in order to see in a perfectly objective manner.

Moreover, the assertions of the Vienna school, for all their ignoring of the specific nature of the human domain, do not seem to express more fully the real nature of scientific learning. When physicalists grant to physical propositions the privilege of absolute validity, they forget the hypothetical and precarious character of scientific theorems and theories. Their epistemology seems to perpetuate that resolute optimism which could dominate nineteenth-century scientists, before the adventures of non-Euclidean geometries, of relativity, of atomic physics, and of the axiomatical. "The exigencies of reason," Rougier writes, "result in most part from former theories which have petrified."¹⁴ The formula applies perfectly to today's scientists, who remain true to an already fossilized conception of knowledge. In what concerns mathematical logic itself, that is to say, the area in which the requirement of a perfectly rigorous learning reaches its highest point, the axiomatic effort has become aware

13. Louis Rougier, *Traité de la connaissance* (Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1955), p. 298.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 369.

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of its limitations with the theorem of Gödel, who established in 1929 the impossibility of achieving a perfect formal system. Rougier observes:

Metamathematical demonstrations put off the problem without solving it, for, to the extent to which they are successful, they open the way to a process of infinite regression. Once the non-contradiction of mathematics has been demonstrated by means of metamathematics, it will be necessary to formalize metamathematics, as was done for arithmetic, and to demonstrate its non-contradiction by resorting to a meta-metamathematics, and so on indefinitely.¹⁵

The axiomatic method represents the masterpiece of rigorous science, the most perfect explanation to which a reducing intelligibility can lay claim. But it suffers itself from a radical organic defect: "Any use of the axiomatic method," writes Piaget, "supposes logic, and to assure the foundation of logic axiomatically consists in founding logic upon itself in an inexorably vicious circle."¹⁶ And so the absolute of logical truth is also only a false absolute, and the Vienna school finds itself beaten on the very ground where it thought itself the strongest: "On properly so-called axiomatic ground itself, one could no longer speak legitimately about the tautological nature of logicomathematical connections."¹⁷ Not only is the logicomathematical schema of rigorous truth unable to claim to reduce the human domain to obedience, but also it appears itself, under analysis, as a dependent of that domain from which it must borrow its points of departure and its points of arrival. The logical universe is open to extrinsic influences: "Axiomatization," Cavaillès writes, "refers doubly to one datum: exteriorly, datum of the system from which it borrows its concepts; interiorly, datum of an operative unit which it merely characterizes."¹⁸ The mirage of immaculate cognition goes up in smoke. Instead of drawing man to fit a ready-made truth, which would be foreign to him, it will be necessary to define truth itself in reference to man and to the human rule which it sanctions.

Scientist-positivism entertains the curious ambition of establishing a science of man without man. A deceived ambition, since, as we might have expected, it appeared that the science of knowledge itself led back to man. The attempt, so often repeated, to make the determinisms of

15. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

16. Jean Piaget, *Traité de logique* (Paris: Colin, 1949), p. 292.

17. Piaget, *Introduction à l'épistémologie génétique*, Vol. 1, *La Pensée mathématique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950), p. 316.

18. Jean Cavaillès, *Méthode axiomatique et formalisme* (Paris: Hermann, 1938), p. 88.

physics, of chemistry, or of biology prevail in the human area, under the control of mathematical formulae, obeys this unnatural desire to deny the specific quality of the human being by referring him to norms which are not his. The triumph of knowledge would be the equivalent of intellectual and spiritual suicide, the scientist feeling a masochistic satisfaction in denying himself as a man at the very moment when he asserts the highest success of the human genius. Such an attitude in thinkers who, moreover, believe themselves to be the intrepid champions of reason remind us rather of the exploits of Simple Simon or the Little King.

The intellectual area of a science, of no matter what science, is still a human area, dependent upon human intentions and expressions. All facts, of whatever order they may be, are created in it by mental structures, by laws of associations which often project themes and images which have come from elsewhere into the epistemological field of rigorous knowledge. Leibniz' principle of continuity and the Newtonian theory of gravitation furnished the eighteenth century with directing ideas which led to all sorts of disciplines quite far removed from the metaphysics of Leibniz or the physics of Newton. Darwin the naturalist borrowed from the amateur economist Malthus the myth of the increasing insufficiency of food and the "law" of population, out of which he fashioned a guideline to natural history. In the same way, the concepts of "determinism," of "progress," of "evolution," and of "dialectic" correspond much more closely to myths than to explicative principles worthy of the name. And this is precisely why they are so widely used. Each epistemological area thus effects a compromise, in variable proportions, between an explicative axiomatic method, put into logical form and more or less mathematized—and figurative elements, meanings borrowed from fundamental human reality. The sciences of man are no exception. They also seek axiomatization, they use the instrument of mathematics, and they attempt to perfect epistemological models. Operational research, in sociology and elsewhere, is able to utilize complex mathematical elements. These procedures are perfectly justified, provided the mathematical technique is always considered as a means and not as an end.

A recent, highly official report takes into account the failure of American attempts to study the whole of vast social fields:

Admirably supported by an army of sociologists, of specialists in "political sci-

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ence," with every material and human means for conducting excellent researches at their disposal, the American researchers are disappointed by the results of this effort which, from the outside, appears to be so magnificent. What has been lacking, what will be lacking for a long time in their experiments which are concentrated upon the study of what appears only momentarily, is the help of geographers, historians, and accredited philosophers. There has been a neglect of three essential points of view: philosophy, bringing in the conditions which are indispensable for a logical construction; history (in its new tendencies, which are not much liked in the United States), introducing the notion of deep movements of long duration, which are elements of any social explanation; geography, substituting a living notion for the too schematized notion of the ecological envelope. Now in our case, these additions are within easy reach. . . .¹⁹

A sign of the times, perhaps—the philosopher, all too often considered a useless voice, now sees his place recognized in the organization of the sciences of man. And the technicians of the various specialties are accepting their mutual dependency: "anthropology, history, psychology, sociology," writes Charles Morazé, "could not be, from our point of view, distinct disciplines, but are all required together for setting in motion a logic of the sciences of man. . . . All the sciences work both for their own progress and for the progress of the sciences of man. The sciences of man include not only anthropology, history, psychology, sociology, but all sciences. . . ."²⁰ Perhaps these remarks herald a new state of mind, characterized by the concern for synthesis, by the recognition of the mutuality of the human sciences, and by the idea that this synthesis presupposes a total conception of the human condition. Here it is not a question of again imposing a philosophic imperialism, under the form of some doctrine or other. Scientists and technicians must continue to work in their own fields and according to their particular methodologies. All that is asked of them is that they become aware of the horizon to which their researches are being pursued, and that they accept the thought that they are not the masters of an autonomous intellectual space. The density and the plurality of human reality are accessible only to a widened and comprehensive intelligence, for which technical questions and technical solutions, instead of closing upon themselves, are but the instants of an immense inquiry on man, whatever intellectual tools may be employed. And the mathematical proto-

19. *La Recherche scientifique et le progrès technique* (Report to the President of the Council of Ministers and to the General Planning Commission, June, 1957), p. 117.

20. Charles Morazé, "La Synthèse dans les sciences humaines," in *Travail et méthodes* (Paris: Editions Science et Industrie, 1958), p. 191.

type of knowledge which is adopted, consciously or unconsciously, by the researchers must give way before the prototype of human intelligibility, according to which concrete man represents the fundamental counting unit.

The renewal of epistemological intelligence, through the rejection of prejudices which are henceforth outdated, is, moreover, already appearing in contemporary thought, where certain thinkers are repudiating a separatism which is disastrous for both philosophers and scientists. Merleau-Ponty, for example, asserts the necessity of cross-fertilizing sociology and philosophy instead of setting them against each other; philosophy would then have the task of enlightening and fecundating positive investigation: "Philosophy is indispensable because it reveals to us the movement by which lives become truths, and the circular situation of this singular being who, in a certain sense, is already all that he happens to think about."²¹ From this derives the necessary complementary nature of science and philosophy. Merleau-Ponty writes:

Learning will be founded upon this irrecusable fact that we are not in the situation as an object is in objective space, and that the situation is for us a principle of curiosity, of investigation, of interest for the other situations, as variants of ours. It is then of interest to our own life, enlightened by the others, and considered this time as a variant of the others, and considered finally as that which links us to the totality of human experience, no less than that which separates us from it. . . .²²

We must rejoice when we see certain philosophers finally abandoning the splendid isolation to which an abusive tradition used to confine them. But it is particularly among the technicians that the new state of mind can have happy consequences. Since we are not able to review all the disciplines here, we shall be content to select a few examples of this widening of the intellectual field. Biology and medicine became sciences of man at the moment when we gave up opposing, inside man, the physical and the mental as two autonomous systems. The negation of the determinism of the physical to the physical, of the mental to the

21. M. Merleau-Ponty, "La Philosophie et la sociologie," *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie*, X (1951), 69. Cf. A. de Waelhens, "Sciences humaines, horizon ontologique et rencontre," in *Rencontre* (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1957), p. 496: "All the sciences of man refer originally to an experience, actual at least implicitly, the explanation of which they will furnish on a certain plane. The mode of being which, in this attempted explanation, they will be likely to attribute to man is the same as that which would be revealed by a phenomenological analysis of the actual experience, undertaken with the purpose of showing this mode of existence."

22. Merleau-Ponty, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

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mental, has allowed us to define a new intelligibility, founded upon the mutuality of psychology and physiology. The discoveries of Freud contributed greatly, as we know, to impose the new schema of psychosomatic medicine, whose principle is found in the recognition of the human unit as the principle which imposes upon causal series a kind of superdetermination.

At the same time, the practitioner's attitude must itself be modified. The anatomoclinical method, perfected in the nineteenth century, strove to trace symptoms and to group them in precise semeiological charts so as to permit the application of the appropriate technique. These gains are not useless, but today we will strive to reach a total grasp of the malady, or rather of the patient, in a concrete situation: the psychological or physiological disturbance appears then as an unsuccessful effort at adaptation. It shows the deficiency of the subject faced with the task of assuming his own life. The neurobiology of Monakov and of Goldstein and the physiology of Selye have permitted us in this direction an important enlargement of the medical interpretation. In the same way, in the field of psychiatry, Paul Guiraud insists upon the necessity of deepening our individual knowledge of the patient. The practitioner reaches this only "after a slow and patient task of analysis, followed by a synthetical reconstruction, which requires not only intellectual knowledge, but above all a kind of liaison, of psychic fusion with the subject, which permits one to 'co-live' his illness."²³

The neologism "co-live" illustrates quite well the renewal of intelligence in this science of man which is called "psychopathology." The practitioner is not neutral; he himself belongs to the epistemological field and uses his own experience as he would use a means of knowledge. In other words, the human sciences are rediscovering that ancient truth that, to know another person, one must know himself. "The sciences of man," Mannoni writes, "constitute a field of research in which, no doubt more than in other fields, one is always doing more than one knows. That really means that most progress consists particularly in making clear the attitudes which the researcher had first adopted for obscure reasons. One always learns something, and not only about oneself, but also about the object of research, by becoming aware of these attitudes and by analysing their reasons."²⁴

23. Paul Guiraud, *Psychiatrie générale* (Le François, 1950), p. 514.

24. O. Mannoni, "La Psychanalyse et la notion d'objectivité dans les sciences de l'homme," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 1957, p. 210.

Sociology, as well, must find a renewal of its meanings in a new epistemological spirit. One might find examples of this new orientation in functional sociology, in the structural anthology of the Anglo-Saxons, or again in the therapy of the psychodrama developed by Moreno. In France, Mauss had shown the way and Levi-Strauss's *Structural Anthropology* furnished an instrument of analysis appropriate to an elucidation of the concrete situations in which human reality is asserted. Georges Gurvitch has strongly insisted upon the necessity of a good understanding between philosophy and sociology. He writes:

Sociology, and more comprehensively, the sciences of man, find themselves in closer contact with philosophic knowledge than to the sciences of nature, including the biological sciences. . . . Sociology is the science of human freedom and of all the obstacles which the latter encounters and partially overcomes. The other human sciences (whether we call them economics, law, science of behavior, anthropology, human geography, demography, etc.) are distinguished from sociology only by the limitation of the direction of effort and by the corresponding choice of the obstacle to overcome. The reality which all these sciences study is the same: the human condition, considered under a particular light and constructed into a particular object by a specific method.²⁵

It is consequently no longer a matter of perfecting systems a priori, by speculating in the abstract. The human condition serves as a condensing pattern for all the orders of knowledge, the investigation of which must obey the norms of a critical empiricism which alone is fertile because it is respectful of the human datum.

Finally, the present situation of political economy offers another illustration of the humanistic restoration or of the metaphysical renewal in the sciences of man. For economics is still a human science, in spite of the inevitable illusions born of the application of quantitative methodology. The temptations of scientism finally produced the mathematized schemas of the *homo economicus* or the pitiless time measurements of the Taylor method. The real man found himself caught here in the trap of numerical relationships and laws which were all the more rigorous because they asserted themselves in an intellectual area from which human presence had been excluded. Now monetary value is a fiduciary value—which means a human value—and technical activity has been revealed to the astonished investigators as human activity, or work,

25. Georges Gurvitch, "Réflexions sur les rapports entre philosophie et sociologie," *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie*, XXII (1957), 10.

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which cannot be reduced to purely quantitative determinisms. The study of the evolution of needs, of standards of living; the development of research in industrial psychosociology; and the more precise knowledge of human relations and of their multiple modalities have shown that the economic life cannot be understood except as a function of the whole human reality. In the final analysis, money exchanges, like technical operations, bring us back to a comprehension of man by man which bases all intelligibility in the human domain.

The human sciences are the "sciences of freedom." Gurvitch's formula, in its apparent paradox, can serve us as a conclusion. Indeed, science was formerly the negation of freedom, and it took a somewhat masochistic sort of pleasure in denying freedom. Today it appears that science can and must come to terms with freedom. The sciences of man constitute present humanity's best instrument of liberation, to the extent that they themselves designate the limitations of the conditionings which they impose.

In each human life there is, indeed, at the same time more and less than in the science of man, the interpreting schemas of which are always approximative. No life can exhaust all the possible schemas, but each in its decisions enriches the schemas it utilizes. All the anthropological disciplines thus furnish means of approaching a knowledge of the personality; they contribute to a theory of human entreties by setting up backgrounds against which the reality of each one of us is affirmed. A social and historical predetermination of the human being is thus outlined, furnishing him, in an initial approximation, materials for the knowledge he is called upon to acquire about himself. Each science of man contributes, for its part, by sketching this preintelligibility of the human form in a vital space and in a given period. It is no longer a question of denying or reducing the person, but only of situating it. For the metaphysical idea of a freedom without condition is substituted the positive idea of a freedom in condition.

That is why the sciences of man, contrary to a thesis which is too widespread, do not in any way constitute attacks upon the dignity of man. There are techniques of existence which, far from threatening existence, offer it on the contrary efficacious means of fulfilment. But the opposite attitude, which expects the definitive solution of all human problems from the human sciences, is also false, and no less dangerous. Scientific research cannot impose itself as an end in itself; a part of

man, it returns to man and remains subject to his rule. In obeying science, man obeys only himself. Here, as everywhere, knowledge permits action to be enlightened. Man, who institutes research, situates himself by that very fact beyond the research which concerns him, and it would be absurd for him to abdicate before the results which are obtained. Research is a function of man; man is not a function of research.

This locating of the epistemological perspectives offers the best answer to naïve protests against the violation of personality in the manipulation of the masses by techniques inspired by the human sciences. For example, people denounce the abusive practice of the psychotherapies, the abuses of advertising and propaganda, the establishment of a rational organization of labor, which might facilitate technical and social alienation. Behind these virtuous, indignant expressions is being asserted the nostalgia for an inviolate integrity of the person, who should float in a pure heaven of values, foreign to any compromising, in the perpetual miracle of a rational freedom. The unfortunate thing is that this virginity which we would preserve at all cost does not exist and never has existed. And besides, should the case occur, it would have been, or it would be, like the virgins devoted to the Lord, perfectly sterile. There have always been techniques of the spiritual. Those same good souls who deplore today's violation of the personality, admit without further consideration the activities of directors of the conscience, admire the *Spiritual Exercises* of Ignatius of Loyola, or even go into ecstasies over the crusade preachers who skilfully manipulated the throngs of mediaeval Christianity. Labor was not better protected—in fact, it wasn't protected at all—before the rationalization of labor. All religions, from primitive shamanism on, from the religion of the Chinese to that of Philip II or of Louis XIV, have defined their liturgies and rituals, a ceremonial which in practice corresponded to an awareness of the techniques of the spiritual which was sometimes very penetrating.

The human sciences and the techniques they inspire permit us in fact to protect the personality efficaciously as well as to alienate it. It is necessary, moreover, that the personality be known and recognized for what it truly is. It is not an abstract entity, closed upon its own intact purity; it is not a principle of negation and escape. It is the concrete structure of that presence in the world which shows itself to be capable of resisting the world. The human sciences permit us to be done with a false and metaphysical idea of freedom, which has haunted the dreams of philosophers from the Christian theologians to Sartre—the man who

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wants to become God, like the frog who wanted to be as big as the ox—and even to the Marxists themselves, with their prophetic and puerile dreams of a total man, totally reconciled in the paradise of classless society. Just as worthless, moreover, is the inverse reduction, which claims that it denies all freedom and dissolves it in an automatism directing human reality according to the model of the material order. Freedom is not everything, and it is not nothing; it is situated precisely between zero and infinity.

A truly positive, experimental attitude allows us to conceive of freedom not as an absolute or as a gracious gift but as an art of the possible. We always get the freedom we deserve and of which we are capable. For freedom is at stake for each of us in this daily transaction, at the cost of which each man tries to show what he is, by using as best he can circumstances which may be favorable or unfavorable. Each one is called upon to gain his life or to lose it, according to the use he makes of the world and of himself. In this labor of liberation which we must undertake anew each day, the human sciences can play an important role in the service of lucidity. They do not at all impose the paralysis of a stereotyped determinism; quite to the contrary, they propose for human decisions theoretical models of a necessity which is merely conditional. If there is one type of obscurantism which refuses to recognize the social sciences and techniques, there is another, no less dangerous, which is to hold steadfastly to sciences and techniques as if they must solve all human problems by themselves.

Recently I presided over a meeting of examiners charged with correcting the philosophy examinations for the baccalaureate degree in the Academy of Strasbourg. What one must do, in such a case, is to give the readers some points of reference before they get down to work. All the papers were there; we selected a few at random, read them, and discussed the respective worth of the samples. This allowed us to establish a sort of initial, provisional grading scale. For a while, the papers on certain subjects had been worthy of mention and sometimes quite good. But then the moment came when we could find nothing but obviously bad essays, some of which showed an infantilism bordering on mental backwardness. Irritated, I urged the readers to look again in their bundles of papers for at least a mediocre one, so that we might judge the possibilities which the proposed subjects offered to a mind of average ability. But with a single voice the readers pointed out to me that it would be useless to look any further. We would find no good

essay in the sets in question, for we were dealing with candidates from the elementary mathematics series. Stuffed with scientific studies, these candidates are totally incapable of personal reflection and of reasoning. Now it is precisely this class in elementary mathematics which is considered today to be the seed-bed of the elite of tomorrow. It is here that the university authorities have placed their dearest hopes, as they light-heartedly drag our society toward that barbarity of the mathematicians which, by dint of measuring everything, completely destroys all sense of measure.

Of course one can study mathematics without behaving like a congenital idiot because of it. But the danger of an education devoted to this kind of exercise is that pure science and its technical extensions do not open into the world of values. They can be infinitely developed from consequence to consequence without ever encountering the contradiction which would make them become aware of their total absurdity. The stake of existence does not lie within the scope of pure knowledge; it is not a matter of isolating in the mind a truth which would initiate the formulation of a definitive equation of the human condition. The ultimate aim of all learning is to effect an equilibrium, to assure the placing of man in the universe. The human function of the human sciences is thus affirmed; they must be the guilty conscience of the manless sciences, the inhuman sciences. The construct of the world is necessarily bound up with the edification of man. Any construct which does not serve this edification of man is deceived, and works toward non-being, if it is preparing the coming of a world which is not measured to man.

In substance, such is the epistemological reform which is asked here of each of the specialists in the various human sciences. This does not mean at all that the specialist is to abandon his own field, or that he is to practice a philosophy which will remain foreign to him. However, while remaining true to the requirements of his subject, he can modify his mental attitude; he can clarify that background of undeveloped thought which cannot be admitted, and is not admitted, which controls the development of his research and the utilization of the results he has obtained. The historian, the sociologist, the economist, the doctor, and the ethnographer remain the masters of their fields, which no one dreams of denying them. The metaphysician merely asks them, beyond the limitations of their specializations, to practice the virtues of curiosity and sympathy. Man is this being who possesses the gift of putting him-

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self under examination and of transforming ever anew meanings which have been established. The enterprise of knowledge is a vast inquiry of man into man; each of the human sciences shares in this adventure which will never end because it is linked to the very essence of the human being. Man is modified with the growth of learning in such a way that the goal slips away indefinitely when we think we have attained it. It would be the same way with a child running after its shadow.

WESTERN RULE VERSUS WESTERN
VALUES: SUGGESTIONS FOR
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ASIAN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY¹

Cross-cultural comparisons are more difficult in intellectual than in economic or social history both because patterns of belief vary even more than patterns of society and because there is no valid way to prove the relative importance of different ideas. In Asia, perhaps even more than elsewhere, the borders between intellectual history and political expediency are also often cloudy, so that it may be necessary to deal on the same terms with new ideas and with political propaganda which may not even be firmly believed by its author. The particularly close ties

1. An earlier version of this paper was read by Robert N. Bellah, William Brinner, Wolfram Eberhard, C. H. and Katherine George, H. A. R. Gibb, Wells Keddie, Joseph R. Levenson, James Liu, and Benjamin I. Schwartz, all of whom gave encouragement and helpful suggestions for revision. The addition of bibliographical footnotes was at the suggestion of some of these readers. These footnotes make no claim to completeness, and include only Western language works I have read and found useful. Responsibility for opinions and errors is of course mine.

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between intellectual, political, and social issues in modern Asia, however, mean that analytical studies of intellectual history can shed light on the whole transformation of Asian society. The very difficulty of finding valid comparisons should encourage attempts to do so in order to help explain the bewildering series of intellectual changes which have occurred in each Asian culture. A scholarly comparative study of intellectual history would require extraordinary linguistic ability and patience. The growing number of works on various aspects of modern Asian intellectual history and of translations of sources, however, enables scholars to attempt generalizations regarding the basis of material available in Western languages.² Such generalizations can illuminate specific problems of intellectual history and can indicate basic

2. Among analytical books in English which deal entirely or in part with modern Asian intellectual history are (1) ISLAM: Charles C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt* (London, 1933); George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (Philadelphia, 1939); Edward G. Browne, *The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia* (Cambridge, 1914); Richard N. Frye (ed.), *Islam and the West* ('s-Gravenhage, 1957); G. E. von Grunebaum, *Islam*, and (ed.), *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization* (both Chicago, 1955); William R. Polk et al., *Backdrop to Tragedy* (Boston, 1957); E. E. Ramsaur, *The Young Turks* (Princeton, 1957); W. C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton, 1957), and *Modern Islam in India* (London, 1946); and T. Cuyler Young (ed.), *Near Eastern Culture and Society* (Princeton, 1951). (2) INDIA: Joan V. Bondurant and Margaret W. Fisher, *Indian Approaches to a Socialist Society* (Berkeley, 1956); W. Theodore de Bary et al., *Sources of the Indian Tradition* (New York, 1958); D. Mackenzie Brown, *The White Umbrella* (Berkeley, 1958); and J. N. Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements in India* (New York, 1915). (3) FAR EAST: John K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, *China's Response to the West* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954); Hu Shih, *The Chinese Renaissance* (Chicago, 1934); Nobutaka Iko, *The Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan* (Baltimore, 1950); Joseph R. Levenson, *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate* (Berkeley, 1958) and *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953); George B. Sansom, *The Western World and Japan* (New York, 1950); Arthur Wright (ed.), *Studies in Chinese Thought* (Chicago, 1953); and Mary C. Wright, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism* (Stanford, 1957). (4) SOUTHEAST ASIA: R. Emerson et al., *Government and Nationalism in Southeast Asia* (New York, 1942); W. F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition* (The Hague, 1956) and *Eastern and Western World* (The Hague, 1953). Two useful dissertations from the University of California, Berkeley, are G. H. Razi, "Religion and Politics in Iran," and Fred R. von der Mehden, "Islam and the Rise of Nationalism in Indonesia." The works cited by Brown, Browne, de Bary, and Fairbank contain extensive original selections. Such selections are also found in the Asian country supplements to the *Atlantic Monthly* and in special issues of *Life and Letters*. Journals with frequent scholarly articles on modern Asian intellectual history include the *Journal of Asian Studies*, the *Journal of the History of Ideas*, the *Journal of World History*, the *Middle East Journal*, and *Middle Eastern Affairs*.

Translations of original material are scarce for the Middle East in English. The magazines mentioned, the American Council of Learned Societies Near Eastern series, and some poetry and fiction, particularly Persian and Egyptian, help fill the gap. Egypt is included here because of its close ties with Arab Asia. Translations for most other areas are easier to find.

similarities and differences in the Western impact on different Asian countries.

At one time it seemed to many that modern Asian intellectual history showed "traditionalism" giving way gradually to "westernization." This belief has the virtue of simplicity and can still stand as the most elementary level of generalization. Since the late nineteenth century, however, "westernization" has been complicated by the rise of communism and of right-wing irrationalism to challenge nineteenth-century middle-class beliefs. To Asians communism is partly a Western value system aiming, as did liberalism, at a thorough reorganization of traditional society; but it is special in several ways. For purposes of the following discussion, the fact that communism has not been associated with Western imperialism is most crucial. Right-wing reaction in Asia is much further away from what has been considered Western, since it is associated with a passionate defense of supposed traditional values rather than a literal adoption of new Western ideas.

Not only does the growing complexity of what may be meant by Western values challenge the picture of progressive adoption of these values by Asians, but so also does the fact that many Asian intellectuals have abandoned Western ideas in favor of what are thought to be traditional ones. In every Asian country, notably in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century India and Indonesia and more recently in the Arab countries and Pakistan, intellectuals have reasserted traditional, particularly religious, values as a better guide for their peoples than the Western liberalism espoused by many of their predecessors. Generalizations on modern Asian intellectual history must therefore go beyond the simple view of progressive westernization in order to be truly applicable.

I

Since the hypothesis to be examined in detail in this paper concerns differences between Asian countries, some common features in the intellectual contact between Asians and the West will first be noted to prevent a distorted emphasis.

The traditional value systems of Asia show certain similarities in social and political approach, for all their rich variety in metaphysics and ethics and in popular belief. These similarities reflect certain social and economic similarities in premodern Asia. Thus, most dominant Asian

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value systems before the Western impact were tradition-oriented and favored social stability and some form of social hierarchy. Progress was no more a feature of Asian thought before the nineteenth century than it was of European before the eighteenth. Defections from traditional systems were likely to be mystical or utopian-messianic, individualist or rebellious, rather than revolutionary.

Japan was exceptional in both intellectual and social development. There a transition from feudalism to capitalism was apparently well along before 1853, and intellectual similarities to Protestantism have been noted for the period before Western contact.³ Japan became the only country to modernize successfully under an ideologically neotraditional government, the relation of modernizing to traditional intellectual trends differing sharply there from the rest of Asia. Japanese intellectual life has therefore been exceptional and can be tied only tentatively to some of the generalizations to be made about Asian intellectual history.

Some have argued that other Asian countries were also moving toward capitalism. In the intellectual sphere, such things as Chinese scientific textual criticism in the early Ch'ing and Indian movements which resemble Protestantism have been noted (and denied) as evidence of basic change.⁴ Whatever the merits of such claims, it seems clear that

3. On religious similarities, see Edwin O. Reischauer, *Japan, Past and Present* (New York, 1946), especially p. 60: "It is, indeed, a curious fact that the popular Buddhism of feudal Japan had in many ways come to resemble Christianity more than historic Buddhism. Reversing the basic pessimism of the early faith, it had come to stress a real after-life and salvation through faith. And the early religious reformers, in their translations of the scriptures, their creation of lay congregations, their marriage of the clergy, their militant sectarianism, and their nascent nationalism, resembled to a surprising degree the Protestant reformers of Europe. These religious trends, coupled with the development of a feudal system which found much closer parallels in medieval Europe than in East Asia, make the early feudal period in Japan a time for startling comparisons with Europe and strong contrasts with other countries of the Far East." See also Robert N. Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion* (Glencoe, Ill., 1957). On the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Japan see E. H. Norman, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* (New York, 1940), and Thomas C. Smith, *Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan* (Stanford, 1955), which revises Norman's conclusions about the classes responsible for the Meiji restoration.

4. To a large extent the argument over Asian progressivism has become a Communist-anti-Communist one, with each side possibly having a priori commitments. The Communists stress the monolithic development of all history and, like some Asian nationalists, the negative role of the Western impact. Anti-Communists are often committed to belief in a special, stable type of Asian society and stress the progressive role of the West. It seems to me that neither side has given enough evidence to prove its point and that the truth might even lie between the two, i.e., that Asia was changing, but so slowly that capitalism would not have developed for centuries, or that some Asian countries were changing fundamentally, while for others this cannot be proved.

social and intellectual change had not gone far in most of Asia at the time of early Western contact and that the problems of social and intellectual transition involved a more serious break with the past for the rest of Asia than for Japan.

The intellectual impact of the West was due largely to the economic, social, and political changes which Western control brought to Asian society. Modern Asian intellectual history does not evidence simply traditional cultural borrowing of ideas. Rather, society was transformed with unprecedented rapidity; new social classes developed, while old groups saw their traditional status transformed, often in a cruel and bewildering way. The Western impact created the possibility and desire for fundamental social change. At the same time, however, the West was an oppressor, discouraging the very change for which it provided the prerequisites, and this complicated the role of borrowing.

The ambivalence of Asian intellectual reaction to the West is partly a response to the contradictory role of the West in Asia. On the one hand, many Asians are attracted to the values and achievements of Western society, while, on the other hand, they dislike most of what the West has done in Asia. In addition to this dichotomy in attitudes there is another basic split in Asian intellectual reactions. There must be some accommodation of traditional to modern ideas, since a complete break with the cultural past is impossible. Intellectuals often try to work out a synthesis between their own and Western value systems and even to make what is foreign appear indigenous. The propensity to deny a foreign parentage for a modern idea is strengthened by the fact that the foreigner is already disliked as an oppressor.⁵

There is a tendency, particularly in those countries which have adopted Western value systems most completely, to speak of new ideas as "modern" rather than "Western." Although this paper uses the more usual Western term, it should be noted that the use of "modern" has a scientific and not just psychological validity. Once Asian countries had

5. This and some other trends noted here are discussed in relation to China in Levenson, *Confucian China*, and in Mary Matossian, "Ideologies of Delayed Industrialization: Some Tensions and Ambiguities," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, VI (April, 1958), 217-28. As Matossian notes, one can make comparisons between modern Asia and other areas confronted with problems of westernization. Russia, in particular, seems to have an intellectual history comparable to later developments in Asia, with the Slavophiles and westernizers similar to the neotraditionalists and iconoclastic nationalists in China and elsewhere. The resemblance between Tolstoi and Gandhi is striking; Russia, like Asia, shows the appeal of Marxism not only to radicals but to liberals (i.e., the "Legal Marxists"), probably because it provides a non-insulting explanation of backwardness and a weapon against reactionary government.

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developed new internal needs and potentialities, new ideas were applicable to them, not because they were Western, but because they were valid or useful in a new situation. In fact, some of the similarities between modern Asian and Western thought are not based on borrowing but on a reaction to similar circumstances. The attempt, noted below, of Asian modernists to purify their traditions of "corrupting" accretions, for example, was usually not based on conscious analogy with Protestantism. Traditional and recent Asian contributions to scientific advance and social theory should also not be ignored, and as time goes on "modern" will increasingly be a more accurate term than "Western."

The tensions of ambivalence toward the West and toward one's own culture produced a number of similar reactions in Asia. In each country there have been those primarily concerned with defending the old tradition, those who try to alter the tradition to bring it more in line with Western values, and those who reject tradition.

Among those who are primarily defenders of tradition and who recognize the Western challenge the following common trends can be noted in different Asian countries:

✓ 1. A tendency to merge originally divergent traditions to meet the Western attack. Schools of thought which once conflicted are robbed of much positive content, and defenders of tradition often take their ideas from many unconnected sources. In part this reflects a tendency in Asia toward less intellectual or religious exclusiveness than in the West. (The Chinese idea that a man is a Confucian while in office and a Taoist when out of office, the simultaneous worship of Buddhist and Shinto deities in *The Tale of Genji*, and the latitude of Hindu belief all come to mind.) But the modern tendency is found even among the "exclusive" Shi'a and Sunni Moslems in pan-Islam, and in all Asia eclecticism seems to cover an unprecedented range of philosophic and religious traditions. There has been a similar trend in the West where Christians, in response to attack, have tended to gloss over denominational differences. Both Christians and Asians have also claimed that all religions are basically the same. In the eighteenth century this claim was an attack on positive religion, but today it is primarily a defense of religion in the face of non-religious alternatives.

✓ 2. The defense of tradition as more of a romantic attachment to the past than as a coherent set of ideas and beliefs. This goes with the merging of traditions, since the grandeur of a tradition is more important than its consistency or efficacy. As W. C. Smith has noted in *Islam in*

Modern History, traditional ideas become sources of consolation and admiration rather than a guide to positive action or consistent belief. Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Shinto also get romantic homage. And, as others have noted, romantic admiration for a tradition in itself changes the role of the tradition. What was once a practical guide of universal applicability becomes a consoling proof of a special national genius.⁶ *the romanticism of Gita*

✓3. The early idea of taking from the West only material things while retaining the spiritual and intellectual content of one's own culture. This later develops into denunciations of the West as materialistic and praise of the East as spiritual. Various degrees of East-West eclecticism with emphasis on the superiority of the Eastern contribution grow up on the basis of the spiritual-material dichotomy.

✓4. The use by some of appeals to tradition as a means of denying or suppressing class and social conflict. This is seen particularly where "neotraditionalism" is used to bolster a government, as in Japan from 1868 to 1945, Kuomintang China from 1927 to 1949, and contemporary Pakistan. In countries where peasants are strongly attached to tradition, this can be quite effective. Appeal to tradition as a means to social stability is also found in Western conservatism since Burke. *Age of consent controversy 1841 India*

Among those thinkers and trends concerned more with modernizing than simply with defending traditions, there may also be noted common trends in different Asian countries:

①. A tendency to look for the "secret of the West" in certain things which might with relative ease be adopted in one's own country. Constitutionalism was often advocated as a panacea, and such things as separation of church and state or self-rule have also been looked upon as the solution to all problems. Such simplification was necessary to build successful political movements combining people with different interests and levels of understanding. The simplifications, however, seem to have been believed by many intellectuals, who could not be expected to comprehend in a short time the bases of Western differences from Asia. *I N C*

②. A reinterpretation of dominant traditions to bring them more in line with Western ideas and new realities. This includes "purification" of the tradition of "corrupting" elements and reliance on a few original

6. The romanticism and new content of modern Confucianism is stressed in Levenson, *Confucian China*, and Mary Wright, *op. cit.*, in their discussions of its recent use by conservative nationalists. Gibb, *op. cit.*, p. 105, notes the "paralyzing romanticism" of even modernist Islam.

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figures and writings. The purification usually does bring the tradition more in line with modern ethical and social standards, since most traditions at one time were powerful reform movements. It also weakens the authority of the priesthood or other existing conservative interpreters of traditions and, since only a few writings or individuals are accepted as authorities, opens the way for wider latitude of opinion. The purification trend is seen in Confucian reformism, modern Hinduism, and Islamic modernism. In some ways it is comparable to Protestantism.

Along with purification, there is a tendency to represent one's tradition as progressive—welcoming social, intellectual, and religious change. This can be seen in K'ang Yu-wei's discussion of three stages of society in Confucianism, Iqbal's dynamic interpretation of Islam, and the insistence of many Islamic modernists on the possibility of change through a consensus of the community. There is also a tendency to read the present into the past, in maintaining that one's tradition was scientific, democratic, and, latterly, even socialist. The West has seen similar reinterpretations of tradition, but the psychological need to justify the new by the old has not been as great in the West, where the new was indigenous.

3. The modernists have shown what might be called "negative" eclecticism toward their tradition. They have, that is, rejected or often simply ignored most of their tradition but, on the other hand, have extracted ideas from the most varied sources to support the contention that their tradition is basically compatible with Western values.

Some intellectuals fall between the clearly modernist and the clearly traditionalist, and there are also certain common trends which cannot be discussed under the exclusive headings of traditionalism and modernism. Among these are:

✓1. The rise of nationalism, which may be primarily traditional, reforming, or iconoclastic, depending on the relations of the country concerned to the West and the social role of the nationalist ideology in question. All except iconoclastic nationalism make a selective use of cultural material from the past to support present demands. Within each country there is tension between iconoclastic and pro-cultural nationalism, which never seems to be resolved completely.

✓2. A change, often in the same individual, from early admiration and support of Western values to a later defense of tradition and rejection of the West. Reassertion of the superior value of one's own culture often appears after an event showing the moral and social culpability of the

West—suppression of a national movement, a world war, or an economic depression.

43. The strong impact of certain historical events of Asian social thought in nearly all countries. Among these were the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Revolution of 1905; World War I and the Russian Revolution of 1917; the world economic depression of the 1930's; and the emergence of Asia as an independent world force after World War II. Each of these has encouraged nationalism and revolutionary thought in Asia.

✓ 4. Rapid passage in Asian countries deeply affected by the West from one intellectual position to another. The answers of one generation to the Western challenge are nearly always inadequate for the next generation. Older thinkers may be admired and appealed to as authorities, but their ideas are generally altered by their admirers. That "intellectual obsolescence" has been even more rapid in Asia than in the West is largely because Asians have travelled a greater social and intellectual distance in the last hundred years. Also, Asians today are faced with problems for which both traditional Asian and traditional Western solutions are inadequate.

Any of the foregoing generalizations might have to be modified in the light of more detailed study, but such study should also indicate similarities in Asian ideas which have not been noted.⁷ Enough has been said to indicate that there existed comparable responses to comparable economic, social, and political challenges in different Asian countries, however varied the traditions of these countries may have been.

7. Among other possible similarities between several Asian countries are: (1) Popular messianic movements which may appear shortly after the first strong Western impact and incorporate either borrowed ideas or new concepts of social equality and religious universalism. Among these are the Babis in Iran, the T'ai-p'ings in China, and movements for a *ratu adil* (just prince) in Indonesia, all of which were rebellious. The Ahmadiyya movement in Muslim India shows some similarities. (2) A tendency to blame either foreigners or historic accidents for the corruption of one's own basically good culture. Cf. Sayed Kotb, *Social Justice in Islam* (Washington, 1953), p. 229: "The change which overtook the system and the development of politics . . . was the product of an unfortunate mischance. The mischance was that control should fall into the hands of the Umayyads." Iranians often blame the Arabs, the Mongols, and the West, and similar ideas are found elsewhere. (3) The appeal of Marxism and socialism to liberals as well as to radicals. Reasons for this are noted in n. 5, and the wide use of socialist slogans today is also partly opportunistic and based on a need to differentiate one's position from the capitalist West. In countries where neotraditionalism is strong, socialism is often identified with the local tradition and presented as a "third way" between the Soviet Union and the West.

II

For all the similarities to be found in intellectual developments in different parts of Asia, there remains the fact that differences seem to be as striking as resemblances. Such differences are partly due to the specific local traditions, which varied widely on such things as the importance of religious as compared to secular thought, belief in social mobility or hereditary hierarchy, individualistic or communally organized religion, the relation of church and state, and many other questions. Divergent traditions could only be expected to react differently to the Western impact, and it is this basis of different reactions which has most often been noted.

Another reason for differences in Asian reaction has been the particular history of each country. When did the Westerners first arrive, what Western ideas were spread, how close was each country geographically to a liberal or revolutionary country, how bad were economic and social conditions? Such questions bear on the divergence of intellectual trends. The time sequence of a country's relations with the West may also affect intellectual developments. Even the common features noted above occurred at different times and often with a different sequence in various countries.

This paper will be primarily devoted to a hypothesis which helps explain the divergencies in intellectual approach in different Asian countries. This hypothesis will try to point out a rational pattern in these divergencies, and may supplement consideration of the specific local tradition and the details of each country's modern history. In presenting a hypothesis, the author tries to avoid questions about the value of either particular Asian traditions or Western ideas. Those who hold on to or reshape old traditions undoubtedly believe they do so because of the value of those traditions, but we still need an explanation of why other traditions with important values have given way more completely to ideas from the West.

The hypothesis, aimed at helping to explain why intellectuals in some countries have been more westernizing and in others have turned from early Western tendencies to neotraditionalism, is:

✓ In countries without direct colonial experience but with extended contact with the West intellectual leaders have tended increasingly to drop traditional values and adopt Western values. In colonial countries, however, an early trend toward identification with the West has been re-

versed by many thinkers and met by a reaffirmation of modified traditions.

To state the basis for this hypothesis most briefly: In India, the early westernizing religion and reformism of Ram Mohan Roy and of moderates like Gokhale and Ranade was countered with increasing effectiveness, first, in the religious sphere by men like Dayananda Saraswati, Ramakrishna, and Vivekananda and, then, in the political by neotraditionalists like Tilak and Gandhi. Among Indian Moslems the development has been similar, from the pro-British westernism of Sir Seyyid Ahmad Khan and his followers to the neotraditionalism of the Khilafat movement and the later supporters of an Islamic state. Among Moslems the development took place later, largely for socioeconomic reasons, whereas among Hindus there has already been a considerable movement back toward westernization.⁸ Powerful assertions of the superiority of traditional Indian political and moral ideas are still found, however, even among professed socialists.

In another colonial area, the Arab world, one can see similar trends, occurring later than in India and Pakistan. The modernism of Muhammad Abduh and, even more, the westernism of many political and intellectual leaders in the interwar period have since been replaced by increasing appeals to the Arab-Islamic past as the source of inspiration.

It seems unnecessary to deal at length with the question of the sincerity of certain appeals to Islam or traditional Hinduism. It may be true that the average Arab or Pakistani intellectual is hardly more religious than his Turkish counterpart or that appeals for cow-protection

8. W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam*, p. 170: "Just as the Hindū middle classes, developing earlier, had earlier produced in the Brāhmo Samāj their parallel to Sir Sayyid Ahmad's universalist movement; so they now produced, again earlier, in the Āryā Samāj and its fellows, their parallel to aggressive Islamic 'liberalism.' Politically, the parallel is between the Bengal radicalism and the later Khilāfat movement."

Westerners, thinking of men like Nehru, often overestimate the westernism of Indian thought. For the extreme of rejection of Western values by Gandhi, see the several citations in Matossian, *op. cit.* Even liberal Indians are often defensive about such things as the past role of caste, reading into it such virtues as cultural autonomy, individualism, and democracy. Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought* (London, 1940), in a typical passage on the four *varnas*: "The social organism expected from each man his duties but guaranteed to each subsistence and opportunity for self-expression. The spirit of competition was unknown. Regulative control, even if coercive, is less tyrannical than blind competition. It secures for the largest number of individuals effective freedom in non-economic and cultural spheres. . . . In a real sense, the fourfold scheme is democratic. Firstly, it insists on the spiritual equality of all men. . . . Secondly, it makes for individuality in a positive sense. . . ." (pp. 367-68).

what about
Kekhya
caste
duty
Rajadhar

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by Indian neotraditionalists were based more on hope of popular support than on conviction of the sacredness of cows. The fact that colonial nationalists speak much more in neotraditional terms than do non-colonial nationalists still merits explanation.

The author is not familiar enough with other Asian colonies to state a case with certainty. In Burma, however, Buddhism has been an extremely strong element in national revival until today. In Indonesia, also, early westernism was replaced by Islamic nationalism in such organizations as the Sarekat Islam, and there is still a movement for an Islamic state.⁹ In Indonesia, as in India, the stage of domination of the national movement by neotraditionalism has already passed.

Since time differences in different colonies' reactions have been mentioned, it should be noted that neotraditionalism seems to be particularly strong at two points in the development of a colonial or recently liberated country: (1) at the beginning of a radical nationalist movement, when neotraditionalism provides an effective alternative to the Western ideology of the colonial power, and (2) when the community feels itself under attack, either by the West or by another powerful rival. Since these periods do not coincide in different colonies, both the timing and duration of neotraditionalism will vary. Differences between traditions and the details of local history may also be responsible for variations in the relative strength and duration of neotraditionalism.

In non-colonial countries with extensive contact with the West, however, traditionalism has tended to be strongest in the early period of extensive Western contact—just when Western liberalism was appealing to many colonial intellectuals. The appeal of traditionalism and neotraditionalism has gradually eroded, however, and Western values have found increasing adoption. There have been temporary or minor re-incorporations of tradition, to be sure, but these have tended to stress popular rather than dominant traditions and have not reached the extent or intensity of colonial neotraditionalism.

To take China first, defense of tradition was the leading strain among Chinese thinkers until K'ang Yu-wei, and even he is best classified as a neotraditionalist. The nineteenth-century self-strengtheners were most anxious to preserve Confucian values while only borrowing material necessities from the West. In Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Sun Yat-sen there

9. Von der Mehden, *op. cit.*, notes Buddhism as a strong feature of nationalism in Ceylon, Indo-China, and Burma and discusses at length Islamic nationalism in Indonesia (pp. 31-34 ff.).

appear more westernizing notes, while the May Fourth movement and subsequent radical nationalism and communism were primarily iconoclastic. To be sure, Chiang K'ai-shek's government stressed neotraditionalism, but this was much more a governmental than an intellectual trend.¹⁰

In Turkey, also, early traditionalism gave way first to attempts to blend Eastern and Western values and later to antitraditional secular nationalism. In the case of Ataturk, official policy went in the direction of intellectual trends. And, even though there is much talk of Islamic revival today, there is little similarity now between Turkish and Arab intellectuals. The former are nearly all convinced of the value of a secular state and devote little time to Islamic apologetics.¹¹

The cases of Japan and Iran are a bit more cloudy but seem to go along with the general non-colonial tendency. As has been mentioned, in Japan modernism and traditionalism existed in an exceptional combination. Still, if we speak primarily of "free" intellectuals rather than government propagandists, it seems that the appeal of Western values has progressively grown in Japan, though not without some contrary swings of the pendulum.

Iranian intellectual life has not been characterized by as thoroughgoing westernization as that of modern Japan, China, and Turkey; but in this century there has never been the domination of intellectual life by Islamic neotraditionalism that there has been in the Arab countries or in Pakistan, despite the temporary political strength of Kashani. On the whole, Western secular ideals, or simply cynicism which might be considered either Western or Iranian, have been stronger among intellectuals than has neotraditionalism.¹²

10. In countries which discourage dissent it is difficult to distinguish intellectual trends from government policies. In general, it can be said that Nasser, Ataturk, and Mao Tse-tung represent trends which had strength among intellectuals before becoming governmental, while this is less true of Chiang or Japan in the 1930's. Only the former group will be discussed as reflecting major intellectual trends.

11. See the discussion of Turkey in W. C. Smith, *Islam*.

12. There are differences of opinion about contemporary Iranian intellectuals. According to F. Kazemzadeh in Frye, *op. cit.*: "As far as the educated classes are concerned, it would be safe to say that they have turned their backs completely on Islam. . . . The unmitigated poverty of the masses, humiliation before the West, the loss of traditional Islamic values, all have produced among Iranian intellectuals a state of mind which is best described as *Baz-roeshchina*, a type of cultural, and sometimes moral nihilism. . . . Such an attitude rejects not only Islam but also the classical traditions of Persian culture. . . . What a part of Russia's intelligentsia experienced a hundred years ago, some Iranian intellectuals are experiencing

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It is possible to explain the slightly divergent case of Iran without much damage to the colonial-non-colonial theory. Iran has probably been closer to being a colony for a long period of time than has any other Asian non-colonial country. The Russo-British division of spheres of influence in 1907, the Russian suppression of the revolution in 1911 and continued military occupation of Iran, the presence of foreign troops and governmental control during both world wars, and the continuing dominant influence of foreign oil interests have brought Iran almost within the colonial sphere. Western interests were also strong in China but not quite so all-pervasive; nor was there the same feeling of helplessness among the six hundred million Chinese as there is among many of the twenty million Iranians. Iranian bitterness and belief in continued Western control is strong today, and dislike of the West may pass over into either anti-Western traditional revivalism or into cynicism.¹³

The point is not that a country is colonial if it "feels" colonial and hence may take on some attributes of colonial intellectual history. In most cases the feeling is based on reality, and Iran cannot be said to be free in the same sense as India or Indonesia are today.

It may be that other areas of Asia do not fit the hypothesis, but it seems to work for most countries. It remains to examine why colonialism should have the effect here attributed to it.

III

The most obvious reason why colonialism should lead to neotraditionalism and non-colonialism to Western ideas may be summarized as follows: In colonial countries the West is the main oppressor, and neotraditionalism is an alternative to the oppressive West and its ideology. In non-colonial countries traditional rulers are the main oppressors and westernization is the logical progressive alternative to traditional misrule. As a corollary to this, in the colonies it was gradualists who wanted to work with Western rulers for reform who first adopted Western

now" (pp. 196-96). L. P. Elwell-Sutton, "Nationalism and Neutralism in Iran," *MEJ*, XII (1958), p. 31, however, stresses that more intellectuals are reviving traditional Iranian values because of hostility to the West, while T. C. Young, "The Problem of Westernization in Modern Iran," *MEJ*, II (1948), 47-59, takes an intermediate position. It would seem that Islam has little influence on intellectuals and what revival there is, is either nationalist, which is always strong in non-colonial countries, or non-intellectual in its appeal.

13. On Iranian bitterness toward the West see Elwell-Sutton, *op. cit.*

ideas, and revolutionary nationalists had to provide a different ideology for national identification. In non-colonial countries gradualism was associated with traditionalism and radical nationalism was westernizing.

Thus, to start with non-colonial China, Confucianism was associated with a traditional government and way of life which proved inadequate for the modern world. True, some early twentieth-century revolutionists thought of "foreign" Manchu misrule rather than Confucian misrule, but on the whole the inability of Confucianism to reform or meet the problems of the modern world became increasingly evident. Similarly, in Turkey traditional Islam was associated with misrule by the sultan and the reactionary clergy, and the halfway measures of reforming ministers proved as ineffective as similar efforts in China. The ideas of Turkish intellectuals became increasingly westernizing and secular as the impossibility of reform within the old framework was proved. In Iran, also, radical nationalism has been associated with westernization since the Revolution of 1905-11.¹⁴ In all three cases the guardians of the main tradition were the "reactionary" classes who had to be uncompromisingly opposed by thoroughgoing nationalists and reformers. Advocacy of reforming the tradition proved impracticable and came increasingly to mean compromise with the reactionaries. It became necessary to be in sharp opposition to the old regime ideologically as well as in practice, and Western progressivism was the best expression of such ideological opposition.

In the colonies, on the other hand, the main enemy of "progressive" nationalists was the Western government. With Westerners as the chief reactionaries, nationalists had to have a non-Western ideology to support their struggle. Here again ideological compromise implied political compromise, as with the moderates and Seyyid Ahmad Khan.¹⁵ With

14. See N. Berkes, "The Historical Background of Turkish Secularism," and D. A. Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-1955," in Frye, *op. cit.*; on the secularism of Iranian revolutionaries see particularly the discussion of the Persian Revolution in Razi, *op. cit.*

15. Cf. Seyyid Jamal ed-Din al-Afghani, *Refutation of the Materialists* (in French trans.; Paris, 1942), pp. 23, 25: "But Ahmed Kahn and his companions, just as they incited others to abandon religion, despised the interests of their country and made it easier to submit souls to what foreigners wanted. . . . These materialists became for the English government a sort of army in India. . . . The English saw that this means was the most rapid to attain their goal: the weakness of Islam and the Muslims." Similar ideals were held by Tilak and Hindu groups about the Moderates and R. M. Roy. A recent extreme example of this view is Muhammad al-Ghazzali, *Our Beginning in Wisdom* (Washington, 1953), pp. xv, 54: "At last it has become clear to us that there exists a widespread conspiracy plotted by re-

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a different alternative to oppose, a different nationalist solution was found, one which stated the superiority of the traditional culture to the West. Since the traditional culture was no longer particularly associated with an oppressive ruling class, as it had been before colonial conquest, it could be accommodated to new goals more easily than it could in the non-colonial countries. Nationalist leaders could win over the population to *their* interpretation of Hinduism or Islam, whatever some brahmans or the ulema might say, and could introduce reforms into the tradition more easily than in the non-colonial countries. In the latter, not only would reinterpretation appear as compromise with oppression, but reformed traditionalists had to compete with a ruling elite which had the power of the state to back up its interpretation of tradition.¹⁶

The foregoing explanation does not ignore the fact that Western governments and traditional ruling classes were usually allied in both colonial and non-colonial countries. This fact helps account for many of the intellectual similarities in the two groups. But the primary ruler and oppressor were different in the two. In the non-colonial countries the overthrow of traditional governments which were amenable to Western control was a necessary prelude to ending that control. Here the case of Turkey, where the rejection of the sultan-caliph was needed to save the country from Western dismemberment and control, is a clear example. In the colonies the foreign government was the primary oppressor, and its overthrow had to precede attack on the old ruling classes who profited from foreign rule. [Opposition to their own government thus had priority among non-colonial nationalists, and opposition to the foreign government came first among colonial nationalists.]

ligious and cultural imperialism against Islam. The purpose of this conspiracy has been to destroy the position which Islam occupies in the hearts of the faithful and annihilate every hope in those who fight against infidelism and imperialism . . . the faction which works for the separation of Egypt from Islam is really a shameless, pernicious, and perverse group of European puppets and slaves."

16. Dr. U Kyaw Thet, "Continuity in Burma: The Survival of Historical Forces," *Atlantic* (February, 1958), 117-21, notes that Buddhism could change its nature after its alliance with the local monarchy was ended by British rule. He also notes the new use of Buddhism for national identification: "Painfully aware that their national pride—even their continued existence—was manifestly debatable, the Burmese had to produce something tangible and traditional to justify their future as a separate entity. They found what was needed in Buddhism. The assorted Europeans might be richer, stronger, better trained, but it was comforting to know that all this was as nothing because they did not possess the jewel of the true faith. Buddhism began at this stage to acquire nationalist overtones, and, at the same time, its individualism became increasingly significant" (p. 119).

In some cases the factor of national identification and differentiation from the colonial ruler was as important as the actual venerability of the ideas appealed to. In Indonesia, Islam was barely pre-Western in time and spread along with Western conquest, perhaps even largely because of it. Islam was thus more a system which differentiated Indonesians from Europeans than it was a tradition in the usual sense.¹⁷ To be sure, an anti-Western ideology had to appeal to something deeply felt by the people at the time, but this feeling did not necessarily have to go very far back in time.

In colonial countries, also, the inadequacy of traditional methods to meet modern needs was never shown up in political practice, as it was in non-colonial countries. This fact plus the tendency to glorify tradition as an alternative to Western misrule meant that some anticolonial radical movements had surprisingly reactionary ideals, as did Tilak and the Bengal extremists. An example which clearly shows up the colonial-non-colonial difference is the Khilafat movement among Indian Moslems after World War I. At the very time when Turkish nationalists were throwing off traditional rule and abolishing the caliphate, Moslem Indian nationalists took as their primary aim the restoration of the caliph to his prewar powers. In Turkey pan-Islam and the caliphate were tied to reaction and opposed by progressives. Indian Moslem radicals adopted them in opposition to British imperialism, not having experienced their practical failure to lead to any progressive goal.

Another reason for the colonial-non-colonial difference lies in attacks by missionaries and civil servants on local customs and traditions. Their attitudes, as revealed admiringly in Kipling and deprecatingly in Forster, could not but lead to defensive reactions among colonial nationalists. Seeing his tradition both defeated and disparaged, anyone who did not want to be a mere imitation Westerner without national ties would naturally try to defend that tradition. The disparagement was often so extreme and uninformed that a great part of the defense of tradition was more balanced and intelligent than were the attacks. But to lead a counterattack on Western rule, it was not enough to say "Our values are as good as those of the West." This would leave anyone free to choose among values and their advocates. Rather, it was necessary to say, "Our values are better," and furthermore, that they

17. Cf. Wertheim, *op. cit.*, chap. viii, on the role of Dutch rule in spreading Islam. Islam became first a means of self-identification and later a base for nationalism.

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can incorporate anything that is good from the West. Thus defense changed into counterattack.

Although the Western attack also existed in the non-colonial countries and called forth some of the same response, it did not have the same devastating and humiliating effect which it did in the conquered colonies. This is symbolized by the fact that in the colonies the man who came to be despised as an opportunist was the one who aped the Westerners for personal advancement, while in non-colonial countries the opportunist was more often the mullah or scholar who used *traditional* beliefs for personal advance. Those who supported the ruling ideology were suspect, and those who wanted change had to counter this ideology.

Despite disparagement of the traditional culture by many civil servants and missionaries in colonial countries, official policy was not to interfere in religion or custom in most cases. Even where missionaries and officials tried to change popular belief, they had little success, and the example of Indonesian Islam indicated that peasants, like intellectuals, may have resisted westernization because it was associated with an alien, oppressive ruler. Despite much greater contact with Westerners, colonial peasants have certainly not been more westernizing than have non-colonial; if anything, the trend seems to be the opposite. This meant that [when the middle classes arrived at neotraditionalism as a reaction against colonial insults, they were bolstered in this reaction by the continuation of peasant traditionalism, which they could then join in a large popular movement.]

A final reason for the colonial-non-colonial difference was growing disillusionment in the colonies with Western practice, which could not so easily be separated from Western theory as it could in the non-colonial countries. The Chinese might dissociate Western gunboats and Western liberalism, but the Indians, who heard liberalism preached by the same men who oppressed them, could hardly do so. It was naturally felt that there must be something wrong with theories which produced such bad practice, and the charges of immorality and materialism came to be laid against Western theory as well as against Western deeds. The Indian Mutiny and the Bengal struggles tended to disillusion Indians, while the two world wars had similar effects in all Asia. The Arabs, who saw themselves as twice betrayed by the West, were particularly embittered. Morality and higher goals were associated with the local tradition or sometimes with communism, which was equally inimical

to the ideologies of the colonial powers. Communism was also appealing in the non-colonial countries, and so it is the traditionalist revulsion from the West which is to be stressed here.

The importance of colonialism and the continuation of Western attacks in encouraging defensive anti-westernizing reaction is seen in the persistence of this reaction among the Arabs compared to the growing concern with more practical questions in India. Feeling for Arab unity is so strong that most Arab intellectuals regard French attacks on Algeria, British control of the Trucial Coast, and perhaps recent expeditions into the Suez, Jordan, and Lebanon as attacks of colonialists on their "nation." They particularly so regard Israel. In this atmosphere most Arab intellectuals are more aggressively defensive, if there can be such a phrase, than are most Indian intellectuals.¹⁸ Even those who basically approve secular and Western values are increasingly pushed to such defensiveness.

To be sure, Pakistan, which is not directly threatened, also sees persistent traditionalism. But this is in part official conservative traditionalism, not shared by the intellectuals, and in part a reflection of the fact that Pakistan's whole existence is based on an "Islamic nation" idea.

If Westerners are inclined to regret the excesses to which defense of tradition may go in Asia, they should remember that this is partly a response to Western excesses. The less humiliated and threatened a people has felt, the less defensive have been its intellectual reactions. Witness the change in Indian nationalism from the extreme defense of the past and tradition in the early twentieth century to a self-critical and reforming approach to tradition as the nationalist movement grew self-confident. The West cannot expect the assessment of traditional and Western values to be completely realistic in areas where the West still poses a strongly feared threat.

The colonial-non-colonial distinction and its causes seem to make sense out of many phenomena which are otherwise hardly explicable. Particularly, they help explain why in China, Turkey, and Iran revolutionary nationalism was associated with attacks on tradition and with

18. The role of the Palestine problem in the Arab reaction against Western liberalism is noted by Polk, *op. cit.* Just before World War II, "the growing feeling of desperation over Palestine had produced a retreat from Westernization. It was the glorious days of the Arab Empire and the hardihood of the bedouin warrior which dominated the emotions of the young men in those days. . ." (p. 281). And after the Palestine War, the "vast majority of Arabs blamed the West entirely for their defeat. . . . Arab inability to stop this process had itself been a result of trying to become Western" (p. 303).

Protest era
going back
to pre-Islamic

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Western ideas, while in India, Indonesia, and the Arab countries revolutionary nationalists have often defended tradition, as they interpret and modify it. The peculiar "revolutionary-reactionary" nature of the ideas of men like Tilak, Gandhi, and Iqbal is a logical reaction to oppressive Western government, while the iconoclastic nationalism of many modern Turks, Iranians, and Chinese is a logical reaction to oppressive traditional government. The fact that neither group can stop at pure westernism or pure antiwesternism is an indication that many of the same problems underlie the intellectual history of both.

IV

It would not be fair to conclude without stating some possible objections to the colonial-non-colonial hypothesis and an attempted response.

One objection is that traditional attitudes are the most important determinant of a country's reaction to the West. In relation to differences between India and China, the argument could be stated about as follows: India's dominant cultural tradition has been religious; religion has had strong emotional ties for the masses, making it difficult for an Indian to abandon traditional ways and still be a mass leader. Also, the "proof" of traditional Indian ideas lies outside the world of practice, and appeals to practical failures cannot discredit them. In China, on the other hand, the dominant intellectual tradition was basically secular and drew its justification from practical efficacy. Once this effectiveness was gone, it could be only a matter of time until the theory crumbled. And since religion was less universal and institutionalized in China, there could be no national appeal on a religious basis.¹⁹

This argument has some validity but also presents several difficulties. As has been noted, early intellectual response to the West in India was much more westernizing than in China. Thus what must be explained is an actual reversion from this trend among many Indian thinkers, not merely a conservative love for traditional beliefs.

Some may claim that this reversion came about in order to bring leaders in closer contact with the masses. Tilak, for example, successfully used religious beliefs and festivals to gain support for political ends and combined traditional religious ideas with advocacy of national-

19. I have not seen the argument on India and China developed elsewhere. It is suggested in B. I. Schwartz, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu and the Acceptance of the Modern West," *JHI*, XII (January, 1951), p. 67.

ism and some social reform. Most of the thinkers who restated traditions were not primarily political leaders concerned with mass appeal, however, and even those who were, such as Tilak, Gandhi, and the Ali brothers, cannot be accused of insincerity in their beliefs. And, to take an example from the other side, the liberal secularism of Nehru has not prevented him from being popular. The reversion from liberal ideas must have other roots than an opportunistic desire for popularity at the expense of truth, however much this may have operated in some cases. *Tilak ??*

Other inadequacies in the religious-non-religious contrast can be stated. Are there real historical grounds for believing that popular Chinese commitment to religious and other traditional beliefs was weaker than was popular Indian commitment to their beliefs? To say that the fact that the Chinese dropped old beliefs more quickly "proves" this is to argue in circles. Are there grounds for believing that popular Chinese beliefs were more varied, and hence less amenable to use as the basis of a nation-wide political movement, than popular Indian beliefs were? Here most of the evidence seems to be to the contrary. Not only is Hinduism divided into myriad sects and castes with differing beliefs and practices, but the general cultural unity of India has been much less than that of China. Also, the large percentage of non-Hindus in India has made appeal to Hindu tradition as much a divisive as uniting factor and from this point of view should perhaps have been avoided by those who wanted a united India. Cultural minorities who might have been offended by appeals to traditional Chinese beliefs are much smaller.

Also, modern Hinduism did appeal to this world for its justification, and hence the idea that its "otherworldliness," as contrasted to Confucian practicality, was responsible for its longer life does not hold up. What the neotraditionalists appealed to was not really traditional religion but a synthetic new set of ideas, strongly influenced by the West and by new social realities. Various Hindu revival movements tried to provide Hinduism with a new universal viewpoint, to include ideas like opposition to the existing caste system, a new missionary, social service, practical spirit, and a new nationalism. The appeal of Gandhi was based partly on traditional features such as veneration for the ascetic and truth-seeker, partly on ideas which made up a small part of the Hindu tradition and were used in a new way (i.e., non-violence), and partly on ideas outside the main Western tradition, from Thoreau, Ruskin, and Tolstoi. He also provided a new type of political leader-

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ship which was eminently practical and this-worldly. Lessons were read into the Hindu past by most of the neotraditionalists and then applied to practical new goals.

The foregoing could be illustrated with greater detail and accuracy, but the main point is this: There was no intrinsic reason why combinations of Western ideas with Confucian or popular beliefs could not have been more successful in China; the intellectual obstacles were no greater than in India. Such syntheses might even seem more feasible in China than in India. Chinese practicality, social-mindedness, and belief in social mobility might have been molded into a synthesis with modern ideas which would have both traditional and popular roots. Much greater ingenuity was required to make Indian traditions appear equalitarian and cohesive. *because of authentic Indian political traditions?*

Finally, the religious-non-religious dichotomy does not explain any of the other areas mentioned and is particularly inapplicable to the Arabs and Turks, whose past was so similar. However strongly original cultural differences may have affected Chinese and Indian reactions to the West, these differences do not seem to be an adequate explanation of modern intellectual divergencies.

In the case of the Arabs and the Turks, their differences have been seen as due to the longer contact of the Turks with the West and the peculiar identification of the Arabs with Islam. On the latter point, it is not entirely convincing to point to recent evidence, which may be explained on other grounds, to prove that the Arabs have always felt more tied to Islam than the Turks have. The Turks were also strongly identified with Islam, their pre-Islamic experience being even more prehistorical and dimly recalled than that of the Arabs. The Turks were the chief Islamic rulers for many centuries, possessing the caliphate and other Islamic institutions. Purely on the basis of pre-Western experience, the Turks might have been as defensive about Islam as the Arabs were. The Arabs, on the other hand, might equally as well as the Turks have stressed their pre-Islamic achievements, or they could have emphasized those parts of the Islamic tradition which stressed free thought, philosophical and religious innovation, and scientific discovery.²⁰ Even granting the Arabs a tendency to identify somewhat

20. Bernard Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization," in von Grunbaum, *Unity and Variety*, notes the strong traditional identity of the Turks with Islam and (p. 312) the importance of the fact that Turkey has never been colonial in explaining their westernism. Elsewhere Lewis notes long Turkish contacts with the West and Turkish character as other reasons for westernism. Arguments based on national character seem doubtful when character is assessed after an intellectual change is noted which may itself have affected "character."

more strongly with Islam, this hardly seems sufficient to account for the radical difference in intellectual output between the Arabs and the Turks since World War I.

The longer contact of the Turks with the West probably did help inculcate Western ideas, but this could only happen under non-colonial conditions. In most of the world it is the colonies, such as India and Indonesia, which have had the longer and deeper contact with the West and yet have shown strong anti-Westernizing tendencies. Also, Arab and Turkish intellectual trends were quite close in the period before World War I and have only diverged strongly since the Asian Arabs came under Western colonial domination.²¹ The Arab intellectual experience is anything but a later repetition of Turkish experience.

A second objection to the colonial-non-colonial hypothesis is that intellectuals in both colonial and non-colonial countries have appealed to past traditions. Even the westernizing Turks have claimed the glories of all Turkish-descended dynasties, such as the Moghuls, and from Zia Gökalp on have made huge claims for Turkish achievement. Here a distinction must be made between the universal phenomena of nationalism, which tends to invent or revive long-forgotten glories, and traditionalism, which appeals to living religious and intellectual traditions, however modified. It is the latter that tends to be stronger in colonial than in non-colonial countries. To be sure, there is often no clear line between the two, and both may be found in each country, often in the same individual. The difference can be seen, however, between the revival of old Iranian and Turkish achievements by nationalists and the appeal to strongly believed religious sentiments in India and the Arab countries. The former deliberately bypasses living traditions and constructs a new, artificial tradition, often with official sanction, as in Atatürk's Turkey or Japan before World War II. The latter is non-official—at least in origin—popular, and with much deeper roots. The traditionalism of India, Pakistan, and the Arab countries tends more to synthesize living traditions and nationalism than primarily to revive dead national glories.

To make the contrast between the two kinds of traditionalism clearer, take a single country, Iran, which has been noted as something of a

21. Cf. Polk, *op. cit.*, p. 260: "The Arab young men who also studied in the West felt much the same way as the 'Young Turks' and if one substituted the word 'Arab' for 'Turk' their opposition programs read almost identically." Lewis, *op. cit.*, notes that to 1918 the Turks and Arabs shared in westernization, but, he says: "Since 1918 there has been a complete divergence. In Turkey the stream has been broadened and deepened; elsewhere it has been deflected or turned back" (p. 313).

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borderline case between colonialism and non-colonialism. Nationalist traditionalism is seen in the efforts of Reza Shah and his followers to revive Achaemenian and Sassanian traditions. What might be called "traditional traditionalism" or simply neotraditionalism is seen in the Islamic nationalism of Kashani. In Iran, as elsewhere, neotraditionalism tends to speak of the spiritual superiority of the local tradition rather than to emphasize past imperial achievements. Appeals to past national glories support neotraditionalism, but moral and spiritual superiority to the West is a more important feature.

Another possible objection to the hypothesis is that traditional and westernizing trends exist in all Asian countries. In fact, Western values now seem dominant in India and Indonesia, while non-colonial Turkey is seeing a new stress on Islam. In response to this, first, the hypothesis applies to trends, not to absolutes. China has had intellectuals like Liang Ch'i-ch'ao who have become disillusioned with Western values, but it has nothing like India's century-long record of appeals to tradition against Western values. The Indian reaction extends from the Arya Samaj through Ghose, the Extremists, and Gandhi, and is still alive in men like Radhakrishnan and Bhave. The difference between trends in China and India is symbolized by the hostile reception given Tagore by Chinese students after World War I and the subsequent insistence by many Chinese that Western industrial civilization was more "spiritual" than an Eastern tradition which forced most men into a life of unremitting toil and poverty. Those who bitterly attacked tradition in China included both intellectual-political figures like Ch'en Tu-hsiu and fiction writers like Lu Hsun and Pa Chin. In India authors have been more sympathetic to tradition; witness Tagore and R. K. Narayan. Bitterness toward Indian tradition is rare, M. N. Roy being the only example that comes immediately to mind.²²

As for Islamic revival in Turkey, it seems to have few of the passionate traditionalist overtones, particularly among intellectuals, found in Pakistan and the Arab countries. The effort is rather to find a form of Islam which will not conflict with nationalism, modernization, and a secular state.

22. On Ch'en see Schwartz, *op. cit.*, and *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951). Lu Hsun's "Ah W," "Diary of a Madman," and other stories available in English show great bitterness to the Chinese past, while Pa Chin's *The Family* is equally bitter. The stories of Tagore, the novels of Narayan, and the voluminous writings of M. N. Roy are easily available in English.

Lastly, in regard to this objection, it has been noted that colonial or ex-colonial countries are likely to see strong neotraditionalism in periods of early nationalism or in response to a Western threat. When these conditions are gone, particularly after colonial rule has ended, neotraditionalism may well lose strength. The hypothesis does not imply any prediction that differences between colonial and non-colonial intellectual trends will remain of the same nature long after colonial or traditional rule has ended.

A final objection is that it is not colonialism but internal threats, particularly communal rivalry, which have strengthened appeals to tradition. Thus, the argument would run, in India the Hindu-Moslem conflict, in the Middle East the long dispute over Palestine, and in Southeast Asia hostility to economically favored Chinese or Indians have bolstered appeal to communal tradition. Here it should be stressed that bitter communalism has itself been largely a colonial phenomenon, and so this point in a way strengthens the colonial-non-colonial hypothesis. The encouragement of foreign immigrants or specific local communities as middle-class middlemen has been a feature of colonial policy, as have divide-and-rule tactics of other sorts. Vying for favors—which were never sufficient to go round—by different communities has also fostered colonial communalism.²³ Communalism has recently been a factor in traditionalism, but it has hardly been an independent or sufficient cause of traditionalist revival. good show!

Also, communal causation does not hold up in some areas where communalism was strong. Hindu revival was not originally or primarily a response to a Moslem threat, and, insofar as most Hindus wanted a united India, Hindu traditionalism tended to frustrate its achievement. And even for Moslem revival the case is cloudy. The early westernizers among the Moslems were more zealous about protecting Moslem rights and more worried about the Hindu threat than were the neotraditionalists who led the Khilafat movement while co-operating with Gandhi.

The Arab-Israeli example tends to support rather than contradict the hypothesis, since the Arabs see Israel as an outpost of Western colonialism. The Arab intellectual response has been about the same as if a Western power had permanently occupied and colonized part of a

23. On imperialism as a cause of communalism see W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam*, Part II, chap. i.

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small Arab country. Attacks on Western values and defense of Islam have risen along with the rise of Israel.

To forestall other possible objections, it should be noted that the hypothesis speaks only of non-colonial countries with extended contact with the West, so that those whose contacts are either weak or mainly recent are excluded as unlikely to show especially strong intellectual trends toward westernization. Some other small countries not mentioned may not fit the pattern, although it is likely that special reasons could be found for exceptions. Finally, the hypothesis does not deal with political practice or forms of government, which may often be most westernizing in the ex-colonies, even though political theory has been largely neotraditionalist.

V Conclusion

If the hypothesis presented here is correct, the impact of Western rule is shown to be contradictory not only in its social and economic effects but also in cultural and intellectual life. Those countries with the longest and closest contact with the West have often shown the greatest reversion from Western values. The shock of having to adapt rapidly to new strains and new potentialities has produced different responses depending upon whether traditional or foreign rulers were the primary bar to effective progress. In the latter case, even a desire to emulate some features of Western life was often clothed in anti-westernizing terms. Political institutions may be as Western in the ex-colonies as in the non-colonies, or even more so, but political and social theory usually is not. Among the paradoxes of imperialism, its intellectual effect is surely not the least.

Comments on the foregoing hypothesis or on the details of this article will be welcomed. The paper necessarily involves oversimplification, but it is to be hoped that this does not vitiate its main points.

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

Jaakko Ahokas

THE LAND OF COMPETITION: OBSERVATIONS ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF GAMES IN FINLAND

Although I am by no means a specialist in this field, I was struck with the ideas presented in Roger Caillois's work, *Les Jeux et les hommes*.¹ In it he has attempted to classify games according to their basic character and the principles from which they stem. He has also tried to demonstrate that a certain kind of society corresponds to a certain category of games. In chapter viii of his book we encounter the transition from primitive societies, where games that Caillois classifies as *mimicry* and *ilinx* ("mimicry" and "vertigo") are the rule, to highly developed societies characterized by *agôn* ("regulated competition")

Translated by Elaine P. Halperin.

1. Paris, 1958.

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and *alea* ("chance"). The ideal toward which all modern, democratic societies aspire is total achievement of the requisite conditions for the proper evolution of *agón*, not only in the realm of games, but in all of life, by guaranteeing equal opportunities to all citizens in their competition for wealth and power. However, as we can readily understand, this ideal can never be truly achieved, even in societies that are, theoretically, the most egalitarian. To this fact the author attributes the extraordinary passion for all forms of *alea*, which we witness today almost everywhere in the Western world. Chance offers compensation for the disappointments inherent in *agón*, for the inevitable inequalities among members of any human group. Caillouis provides a penetrating analysis of all the forms that *alea* assumes in our times (games of "double or quits," betting, lotteries, beauty contests, infatuation with movie stars), and he cites examples to illustrate the passions they arouse. I was all the more impressed because they are practically non-existent in Finland. This is due, in my opinion, to the fact that in Finnish society opportunities for *agón* are equally distributed among its members; thus they do not feel the need to seek compensation in the whims of *alea*.

Finland is certainly not the only country where such civil equality has been achieved. Other analogous societies can be cited; for example, those composed of European elements in new continents (the United States, the British Dominions) where social differences were almost entirely leveled by the need to work for a livelihood with one's own hands. This need existed for every member of the group, and any ambitious individual could escape into a practically unlimited hinterland in order to seek his fortune. But these societies already belong to the past. In the United States, for example, the glaring inequalities of fortune, protected and guaranteed by powerful interest groups, have given rise to an inordinate passion for all forms of *alea*. In Finland, on the other hand, the predominance of *agón* and the absence of *alea* are still clearly discernible. I shall cite a few illustrations that help to demonstrate the interdependence of these two circumstances.

First of all, it should be noted that Finland has generally been forgotten or overlooked in discussions of Europe or of European civilization. This is not the place to inquire whether the neglect is justifiable; the paucity of the country's human and material resources might lead one to assume that it is. I would merely like to point out that Finland possesses certain distinctive features that might be interesting from the point of view of a general study of modern European society.

Before the advent of modern technology, the geographical position of Finland isolated it from the great centers of civilization. Its harsh climate and its sterile land, with poor subsoil, obstructed the development of its economy. Moreover, its social structure was very simple; the population was almost exclusively agricultural, consisting of independent peasants (serfdom had never been known in Finland or in any other part of Scandinavia), farmers, and country squires whose scale of living was relatively modest. Businessmen, industrialists, members of the liberal professions, bureaucrats, and clergymen were few; however, as early as the pre-industrial epoch, it was fairly easy to gain access to these social groups. The country was Protestant; a single university provided educational facilities for those interested in an ecclesiastical career. And, since the clergy did not have to be celibate, many a peasant's daughter, after passing her theological examinations and thus rising to the level of the educated classes, became the progenitor of a family which could subsequently attain the highest positions in the social hierarchy. The same was true of the bourgeoisie, which was too small to constitute a closed group and also underwent Russian as well as Swedish rule. The monarch conferred patents of nobility rather liberally as a reward for civic service, just as the crown does in present-day England. This replenished the ranks of the aristocracy regularly and thereby prevented it from becoming an isolated, inaccessible, and envied caste. Thus the country traditionally afforded good opportunities for social advancement, even for individuals of modest origin; but these opportunities increased infinitely with the advent of the industrial era, which was accompanied by important political changes. The country's forests, which previously had been poorly exploited, became the basis of an important industry. Agriculture profited by the adoption of modern technology and by the creation of a widespread co-operative movement. This movement included associations of buyers and sellers, savings banks, and consumers' co-operatives that multiplied throughout the country. Even the weakest economic groups could guarantee their share of production in this technological evolution.

On the political level, this economic evolution resulted in the right to vote as early as 1906. All citizens, men and women, were enfranchised regardless of wealth or social position. This naturally resulted in the creation of mass parties representing peasants and workers and led by men who themselves came from these classes. There were, in addition, the syndicalist movement and, following the acquisition of political in-

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dependence in 1918, the program of agrarian reform, which made every peasant an independent landowner and completely eliminated tenant farming.

Nor should we forget that education has always been widespread among the people. The Protestant church, at least in theory, required that all its faithful should know how to read and write; it encouraged them specifically to read the Bible. Moreover, all the typical agencies of free instruction in Scandinavia—night classes, institutes for popular education, youth groups, etc.—spread throughout the country. They supplemented obligatory schooling by enabling those who were obliged to terminate their studies at the primary level to complete their education subsequently. The university, which trains people for positions in education, the civil service, law, and the other liberal professions, has always been accessible to the members of every social level. One can truly say that in Finland personal merit has had every chance to assert itself. The ruling classes of the preceding era were too few in number to resist the rise of the "new wave"² on either a *de facto* or a *de jure* basis, by means of an intangible material or moral obstruction.

To all the areas open to ambition and talent another must be added—that of sports, which is typical of the country. This is an entirely different thing from the state of affairs one is exposed to in western European countries, where all the celebrated champions are professionals and where the promoters of athletic contests calculate their profits on the basis of the size of the attendance. In Finland a quasi-sacred atmosphere permeates sports. This is perhaps best illustrated by an analogy with the great contests in ancient Greece, whereas present-day professional sports irresistibly bring to mind the Roman arenas.³ This is due, in part, to certain special factors—first among them the fact that the country discovered sports before it acquired its independence. National pride as well as the need to affirm its own individuality, long repressed on the political level, could achieve expression in important international contests. Sports had great fascination for the people. In contrast to Anglo-

2. In 1918 a partial setback occurred when a Communist revolutionary movement was stamped out with bloodshed after a fierce civil war. But, because the triumphant party sought the support of imperial Germany, the fall of the latter first brought to power the liberals, then the moderate socialists, backed by the Peasant party.

3. I say this merely to stress the difference in points of view, not wishing in any way to extol Greece or Finland or to depreciate Rome or countries where professional athletics are the rule today.

Saxon countries, for example, where athletic games were especially and primarily played by young people from the aristocratic universities, Finland recruited its athletes almost entirely from the peasants and workers. Because the other countries of the world did not have such a passion for sports, the Finnish people lived for a quarter of a century in a transport of extraordinary triumph as their champions won Olympic medals and established dozens of world records. Since then other countries have tried harder, and the Finns have had to yield a good deal, although sports continue to occupy an important place in the life of the country. This has insured, above all, that men from the lower classes, to whom other avenues were closed, were able as before to rise in the social hierarchy, not only during the short period of their athletic ascendancy, but subsequently as well. To be sure, although the champions were strictly amateurs and could not grow rich as a consequence of their skill, their contacts with sports enthusiasts made it possible for them to open athletic-goods stores, for example, or to hold offices in athletic organizations. Thus they might get to preside over local clubs or regional or national federations, which would rank them among the important personalities of the country.

We see, then, a country where every opportunity is truly available to men of talent and ambition, where *agón* is achieved in the purest sense of the word, where the effects of inequalities in fortune and birth are neutralized, not by legal devices but by the very nature of the society. All members of the nation benefit fully by this equality.⁴ Needless to say, self-made men abound in both business and industry; for example, an ordinary sailor has become one of our greatest shipping magnates, and a former cobbler heads the largest shoe-manufacturing company in the country. Among scholars, educators, members of the liberal profes-

4. I quote the following remark from *Les Jeux et les hommes*, p. 178: "Even the talented son of a farmer in a poor and remote province cannot readily compete with the son of an important official in the capital, though the latter might be of mediocre intelligence." In Finland we feel that he could compete. It just happens that the president of the Republic is a good case in point and can serve to illustrate the many opportunities available to a Finnish citizen of humble origin. He is the son of a modest agriculturalist from one of the poorest and most remote provinces in our country. He studied at the university and received his doctorate in law. He then embarked upon an athletic career and became the high-jump champion of Finland and subsequently the president of the National Federation of Sports. Thereupon he decided to go into politics; he was first elected deputy, then a member of the cabinet, then president of the parliament, and finally president of the Republic. Yet, in biographies, his humble origin is given no special emphasis because, in actuality, hundreds and even thousands of Finns of similar circumstances have also attained the highest positions during the course of their careers.

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sions, civil servants, and army officers⁵ one also encounters people of the humblest birth. With no false pride, although they have attained the highest rungs of society, the leaders of proletarian and peasant parties give their original occupation in the country's *Who's Who*—mechanics, train engineers, typists, or hairdressers. And just as freely academicians, famous doctors, the heads of central administrative agencies, and army generals will indicate that their fathers were workingmen, chimney sweeps, or shop salesmen. This concern for making equality of opportunity available to all exists in a certain measure in athletics as well. As we have already pointed out, it is athleticism which is especially in favor, from leapfrog to the high jump to weight-lifting or hammer-throwing. And even in this domain, therefore, the most fortuitous personal inequalities—those that are due to the kind of physique one is born with—are equalized to a certain extent: a man who is sinewy and agile but not very powerful can, like the strong but slow Herculean type, enjoy his moment of glory.

One may object that sports, which are played with such enthusiasm in Finland, arouse excessive enthusiasm for the star performer. Roger Caillois uses the term "proxy" in alluding to this worship of the star. He considers it, quite correctly in my opinion, one of the atavisms of *alea*. It is quite true that there is some adulation for athletic champions in our country,⁶ but its manifestations are relatively limited. Actually, the great variety of sports and the large number of young people who appear in the stadium each year make it difficult for the public to single out any individual. And, given the very keen competition that prevails in every branch of athletics, the champions must be constantly on the alert to maintain the standing they have attained through merit and persistent effort exclusively. Moreover, the rules for amateurs are rigidly enforced in our country. The public regards professional athletics almost as a disgraceful vice. Consequently, its athletic idols derive nothing save glory from their prowess; in their private lives they cannot display any suddenly acquired and dazzling luxuries. However, interest in their private lives is rather slight. To be sure, photographs of champions at home with their families are published, along with articles explaining

5. I do not mention artists because in every country and at all times they have been thought of as living on the margin of normal society.

6. The champion Finnish sprinter even had a statue erected in his honor, but, and this is typical, the pedestal of the statue does not bear his name. It is known officially as "The Runner"—the work of a certain sculptor.

how they live. But the object is merely to emphasize that they are like everyone else; that they, like modest workers and peasants, live in houses or apartments with unassuming wives and children; that they go to work every day exactly like all the people of their milieu.

The same modesty is apparent in other areas. Beauty queens, even a "Miss Europe" or a "Miss Universe," are quickly forgotten after their single day of triumph. If they are photographed subsequently, it is only to show that they have become fine mothers of a family, although one proved an exception by committing the relative folly of marrying a well-to-do Filipino. There are also successful authors and movie stars in Finland, but again it is not their professional accomplishments that are admired; their private lives are in no way affected by their achievements. Jewelry, furs, luxurious wardrobes, large sport cars, or trips to de luxe hotels in fashionable vacation resorts are no part of the picture. They might well indulge themselves in this fashion, admittedly on a more modest scale than in France, Great Britain, or the United States but sufficiently, nevertheless, to make a sharp contrast with the lives of their fellow-citizens. This refusal to enjoy luxuries may be attributed to an innate modesty, to fear of censure by people of their own kind, or to the existing social structure; but the existence of this simplicity cannot be denied. The author of a war novel that sold more than 400,000 copies within the space of two years⁷ has claimed that he wished to keep his job as a factory worker and has actually done so. Another writer, whose historical novels have been translated into all the major European languages and have been made into movies in the United States, has not moved from his small apartment in a middle-class neighborhood; this is likewise true of a leading man in the movies, the idol of the young girls and a charming singer. He does not own a car and either walks to work or takes the streetcar, and his presence causes no stir among the other commuters, who may not even recognize him.

If we proceed from the question of "proxy" to domains in which *alea* is more plainly manifest, the same lack of interest on the part of the public is apparent. There are lotteries,⁸ and one can win a large sum of

7. In a country with a population of four million; the equivalent sale in France would be four million copies.

8. Furthermore, the lottery was combined with an economic activity planned after a fashion reminiscent of the network of savings banks in the U.S.S.R. and described on page 251 of Caillois's book: certain state debentures which are payable with interest and are valid as lottery tickets as well; thus it is possible to win relatively large sums in the lottery.

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money. The drawing is not publicized,⁹ however, so that nobody actually knows where or how it takes place. The lucky winners are practically ignored by the press. Again, this does not involve a deliberately formulated or tacitly accepted principle, because occasionally the fact that the big prize went to someone of modest means is mentioned. Rather, the explanation is simply that the public lacks curiosity. This same lack of curiosity prevails in regard to horse racing and betting on the results of football matches (the Italians' "totocalcio"), both of which are legal.

Finally, the Finns' indifference to the dazzling and unpredictable results of matches or games of "Double or Quits" is perhaps more patent than anything else; this contrasts markedly with the excitement about such games in other countries.¹⁰ It is characteristic of Finland that these games were initially played, and still are, in a form that is much more akin to *agón* than to *alea*—as a contest between two people rather than as an attempt to answer a series of increasingly difficult questions. Another and perhaps even more typical trait of the country is that the names of the two champions are always withheld and no prize is awarded the winner, the sole satisfaction derived resting in participation and perhaps winning. One of the regular contestants represents the radio. He is called "Mr. X"—a kind of walking dictionary who supposedly knows by heart the answers to ever imaginable question. The other contestant is an amateur challenger who, for the occasion, assumes some fanciful title like "Good in Composition" or "The Scholarly Woman." In the presence of the judges they answer the same questions and are prevented by technical devices from hearing each other's replies. For the correct answers they receive points which are totaled at the close of the game, when the winner is announced. But, we repeat, his name remains unknown. Moreover, the press shows little interest in these activities, despite the fact that the radio does all it can to play up its "Double or Quits" program by distributing expensive prizes, by publicizing the game, and even, in one instance, by revealing the identity of the contestants.

9. The description of a public drawing of the National Lottery of France which I once gave in Finland elicited the kind of astonishment that a tale about the oddities of an exotic tribe might arouse.

10. We must add that television has not been very widespread in our country, mainly for economic reasons. It will be interesting to see whether "Double or Quits" will be followed with greater enthusiasm when there are more television sets.

It would be a mistake to suppose that the public's moral sense, which tends to be strict and puritanical in regard to some things, disapproves of this kind of competition. On the contrary, success in such contests is regarded as proof of intelligence and of the nation's high educational level. Far from being associated in the public's mind with the dissipation of time in frivolous diversions, the prizes are looked upon as just rewards for merit, for work and study undertaken to improve the mind and acquire knowledge. If "Double or Quits" has no real following in our country, the explanation lies in its failure to arouse interest. A characteristic incident which illustrates this indifference occurred several years ago. The radio station had organized an important contest in which specialists in various fields competed. The questions became progressively more difficult. There were large prizes and a maximum of publicity. The show took place out of doors in an amusement park, and the participants were identified by name. The contest was staged in the traditional manner, and one of the participants won a large sum. But a little later a jovial and joking workingman offered to try his luck. He deliberately gave idiotic answers, then laughingly confessed that his good wife had advised him not to compete, that he had wanted to take a chance anyway, and that there was no denying that he was completely ignorant. The absence of such incidents in other countries is probably due to a prior and more rigid screening of candidates. If they did occur, they would doubtless create a good deal of embarrassment. The spoilsport would probably be turned away promptly and firmly out of deference to a disapproving public, whose quasi-religious fervor was being trifled with. But, in Finland, this ignorant workingman had amused many sympathizers, the public acclaimed him, and the master of ceremonies had to go along by awarding him a nominal "prize for effort." Thereupon the contest continued without further incident but in the face of general indifference. This type of elaborate spectacle was dropped, and thereafter the radio staged such contests on a much more modest scale. The participants remained anonymous and the press displayed a total lack of interest. Today the newspapers of Finland give one the impression that "Double or Quits" is unknown there.

It is interesting to compare these observations with the data assembled in *Les Jeux et les hommes* and with what we know in general about the enthusiasm with which "Double or Quits" is followed in other countries.

In this connection Caillouis's book alludes, for example, to Sweden. It

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cites an example of the feverish excitement which "Double or Quits" aroused there (p. 189). Yet Sweden has many features in common with Finland: identical public institutions, the consequence of a protracted union during the course of their respective histories; the long established *de facto* and *de jure* liberty and equality of all citizens; workers' trade-union and political organizations, notably the highly developed co-operative movement; obligatory and free public instruction, and consequently relatively ready access to the highest positions in society for individuals from all classes. But, in spite of these common traits, the two countries do differ palpably. Sweden, which has more natural resources and a better geographical position than Finland, has always been an independent state. Its kingdom has been very respectful of monarchist traditions; it has an old judicial and military aristocracy as well as a rich and powerful middle class, both of which are permeated with time-honored traditions. Accordingly, Swedes of modest circumstances have far less opportunity than their Finnish counterparts to improve their economic status. There is therefore much more enthusiasm in Sweden for all the forms of *alea*. Occasionally we witness frantic outbursts of admiration for individuals whom chance has raised to stardom. For instance, a few years ago an obscure ice-hockey player was briefly acclaimed all over the country because he had composed and launched a song. Paradoxically enough, the song was all the more admired because the lyrics were awkward, the melody very ordinary, and the promotion deficient. Obviously, however, that paradox was more apparent than real. The public was naturally and unconsciously exacting revenge for all the existing inequalities; it was attempting to prove to itself that even the most mediocre man could achieve fame. There is hardly need to add that the idol's second song was a dismal failure and that he is totally forgotten today.

In his book Caillois attempted to demonstrate the interdependence of *agôn* and *alea*. To support his thesis, he used arguments drawn from his own observations of contemporary European society. These tended to show that the impossibility of insuring an impartial distribution of *agôn* inclined the masses to seek consolation in *alea*, which today assumes the most varied forms. It seemed to me rather interesting to apply this thesis to a society that is markedly different from those he describes—a society whose interest in *alea* has kept itself at a minimum because all the prerequisites for a fair distribution of *agôn* have been achieved with a maximum of equity.

A SCIENCE OF AMERICAN HISTORY

The prospect of a science of history that would chart the past and enable the future to be projected has invariably intrigued the historian. Technically, this would leave history unencumbered by its mass and the historian concerned only with lines of development delineated by historical science. With the road map of the future before him, the status of the historian would grow as indispensable counselor of politicians and statesmen, bringing the science of human development to bear upon their deliberations. Henry Adams imagined a situation in which state and church, capital and labor, and all other important social groupings and institutions would ask anxiously of the historian: Am I justified in history and will I live on?

The movement toward a science of history, which had its most significant development toward the last two decades of the nineteenth century, coincided with the professionalization of historical study. Throughout most of the nineteenth century and before, history had been the province of those who regarded it as primarily a branch of literature. The best of the literary historians did no injustice to the muse, since they were as discriminate in their use of sources as they were careful in their stylistic presentation. The last quarter of the century witnessed the development of professionally trained American historians, many of whom attended German graduate schools. These historians were in-

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clined to associate the development of a science of history with the growth of professional prestige and aspired to a utilitarian history in an increasingly practical era. They were less interested in attracting and entertaining a relatively large reading public than were their predecessors, such as Francis Parkman and William Hickling Prescott. Indeed, the strain of romanticism which had attracted the public to early nineteenth-century historiography was considered by the professional historian to be superfluous, if not unsuited, to a scientific era.

Scientific historiography had broader ambitions than narrative pace, dramatic presentation, or a large readership—goals considered somewhat unimportant compared to the discovery of a law, such as Darwin's in biology, that would unify all human history.

Although the heyday of scientific history was the late nineteenth century, the belief that there was law in history, even if not necessarily scientific law, existed earlier. George Bancroft wrote of God as manifest in American history, and national destiny as controlled by his law. "The movements of humanity are governed by law," Bancroft said, and "the character of science attaches to our pursuits." Even in the literary histories of Parkman and John Lothrop Motley, the triumph of the Anglo-Saxon, the Protestant, and democracy over the non-Anglo-Saxon, the Catholic, and monarchism was, if not exactly determined by historical law, inherent in the unfolding of events.

Toward the middle of the century, the ideas of Jeremy Bentham and Auguste Comte began to influence American historiography and made themselves apparent, particularly in the work of Richard Hildreth, John W. Draper, and, somewhat later, Henry Adams. Hildreth's *History of the United States, 1497-1789*, which was published around 1851, was background for a more comprehensive effort to create "an Inductive Science of Man" in accordance with the principles of Benthamite utilitarianism. Comte's positivism and Henry T. Buckle's theory of the relation between environment and human evolution had important influence upon John W. Draper's *Intellectual Development of Europe* as well as on Draper's work in American history.

The scientific historiography of the late nineteenth century reflected these earlier patterns. John W. Burgess, with a doctorate from Göttingen and an interest in scientific history, wrote of God's will in history manifest in the victory of the North in the Civil War. The Newtonian universe of John Fiske, who was a popularizer of scientific history, if somewhat more complex than the world which "the Lord's Remem-

brancers" described for Puritan readers, was nonetheless "Providentially" determined. Fiske's God was a master mechanic governing through natural law rather than by direct, personal intervention, as did the God of the Puritan historians. The Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, and democrat were no less triumphant in the deterministic sequences of these writers than in the more leisurely teleology of Parkman and Motley. Certain hypotheses which were applied to American history by scientific historians during the twentieth century—regionalism, sectionalism, and geographic determinism; the frontier theory; economic determinism—were at least anticipated by earlier nineteenth-century historians. Finally, fact-finding and the intelligent, accurate, and discriminate use of sources, essentials of scientific historiography, were not altogether wanting in earlier American historiography.

But there were also important differences between the older historiography and the newer scientific pattern which grew out of the cumulative impact of developments in nineteenth-century science. Lyell's *Principles of Geology*, Lamarck's theory of development, and Von Baer's law in embryology were preliminary to Darwin's *Origin of Species* (1859), which rooted man in nature and biological evolution and encouraged the study of mankind along naturalistic lines. Equally revolutionary discoveries were made in physics, particularly in thermodynamics, which resulted in the integration of biology and physics, the organic and inorganic, in a common energy system representing the primal force of an interrelated universe.

Thought, too, was a form of energy, as Henry Adams pointed out. Gustav Fechner, a year after the publication of Darwin's epic work, announced that man's mind could be studied scientifically and measured quantitatively, establishing in effect the science of psychology. In 1874 Ernest Brücke in his *Lectures on Physiology* developed the theory of the living organism as a dynamic system governed by the laws of chemistry and physics. Brücke exerted an important influence on Freud, who in the 1890's began to evolve a dynamic psychology which, according to Calvin Hall, "studies the transformations and exchanges of energy within the personality." The aspiration of late nineteenth-century scientific history was to create a physiobiological synthesis embracing mankind and the stars. The mechanistic world systems evolved by European scholars like Edward Buchner, Jacob Moleschott, Wilhelm Ostwald, Ernst Haeckel, and Herbert Spencer had their counterparts among American historians in the work of John Fiske and Henry

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Adams. To these men, history represented a continuum with the universe of nature and, like nature, was supposedly governed by law.

It is understandable, therefore, that Charles McLean Andrews wrote retrospectively of this era as a time when the historian pursued "his experiments just as does the investigator in the scientific laboratory."

As a preliminary methodological step, the historian, like the scientist, had to assemble the facts. In gathering data, the scientific historian made a particular point of deriving facts from original sources, a technique which was stressed by their German mentors, Bluntschli and Erdmannsdorffer among others, in whose seminars they studied. As has been pointed out before, this was by no means an original development, since earlier American historians like Bancroft and Hildreth were not inclined to play fast and loose with historical data. What scientific methodology contributed at this time was less the kind of factual accuracy which the best of the earlier historians took for granted than a mystique about historical data in which the facts would yield meaning to the impartial historian, provided that his researches were sufficiently painstaking. As monograph succeeded monograph, it was half expected that as a result of so much diligent research into narrow segments of the past a historical law inherent in the data of history would emerge as a result of the additive process alone.

Second, the scientific historians had implicit faith in the comparative method enabling them to classify data "to the fullest extent possible." The comparative method had been used by Cuvier in zoölogy, Lyell in geology, Muller in philology, and was now being applied to history. In 1874, Sir Henry Maine predicted that this method would open a new world to the historical investigator "and that not an isolated world, a world shut up within itself, but a world in which times and tongues and nations which seemed parted poles asunder, now find each one its own place, its own relation to each other, as members of one common *primaeva* brotherhood."

Employing the comparative method, scientific historians discovered seeming similarities among American, German, and English institutions, leading to the conclusion that these institutions had a common origin among prehistoric Aryan peoples whose very existence the scientific historians postulated rather than proved. American institutions were derived supposedly from this original race as a consequence of Aryo-Teutonic migrations from an original Aryan homeland to Germany; thence to England by Anglo, Saxon, and Jute invaders in the

seventh century; and ultimately to New England by the Puritans in the seventeenth century. The United States therefore was regarded as the latest homeland of the Aryo-Teutonic peoples who deposited the Aryan institutional seed upon New England's shores. History, concluded Herbert Baxter Adams, most ardent proponent of the Teutonic hypotheses, "should not be content with describing effects when it can explain causes. It is just as improbable that free local institutions should spring up without a germ along American shores as that English wheat should have grown here without planting."

As Adams' statement indicates, analogies borrowed from biology were crucial to the theory of the Aryo-Teutonic theory of the origin of American nationality. Racial continuity among the Aryo-Teutonic peoples insured the recapitulation of the original Aryan political heritage in each new homeland. The first generation of American scientific historians, committed to the theory of the Aryo-Teutonic origins of American nationality, wrote in terms of the biological evolution of the Aryan institutional "seed": its being "transplanted" to Germany, England, and the United States; "germinating" into the institutions of the New England town and the New England states; and, finally, into the Constitution of the United States. More than one scientific historian saw the American Constitution as the culmination of Aryan political evolution.

The stronghold of this theory was Herbert Baxter Adams' seminar at Johns Hopkins. It was also taught by Moses Colt Tyler and Andrew D. White at Cornell and by Albert Bushnell Hart at Harvard. Through the widely read histories of John Fiske, the Teutonic theory became familiar to general readers. So wide has been the acceptance of Teutonism, wrote Charles McLean Andrews, "and so strongly installed is it in the minds of both students and readers that it might seem more bold than discreet to raise the question regarding the soundness of the theory."

Scientific history in the late nineteenth century was also influenced by discoveries in the field of physics. "If the historian," wrote Henry Adams in 1876, "will only consent to shut his eyes for a moment to the microscopic analyses of personal motives and idiosyncracies, he cannot but become conscious of a silent pulsation that commands his respect, a steady movement that resembles in its mode of operation the mechanical operation of nature herself." One of the aims of Adams' *History of the United States during the Jefferson and Madison Administrations*

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was to grasp this "silent pulsation," to ascertain the natural laws underlying the development of the American nation between 1800 and 1817, and to predict lines of future national evolution. Adams assumed that there was linear progress in history that was not only measurable in the past but predictable in the future. "With almost the certainty of a mathematical formula, knowing the rate of increase of population and of wealth [the American people] could read in advance their economical history for at least a hundred years." The "movement of thought," continued Adams "was equally well defined"; "the character of people and government was formed; the lines of their activity were fixed."

Despite the great expectations of those who tried to make a science of history, the late nineteenth-century attempt to apply the laws of the physical and biological universe to history yielded no impressive results. Critics soon pointed out that there was no necessary continuum between nature and society and that, even if there were, the laws applicable to one field are not necessarily applicable to the other. In addition, the comparative method, a mainstay of scientific history, began to be recognized as a device of dubious value to the historian. Analogies, wrote Edward Channing, between American institutions and the institutions of the primitive Germanic tribes were not identities, nor were analogous institutions descended from one another. "The argument," said Channing, "that because a New England town and a German village were each surrounded by a defensive wall, the one is descended from the other, proves too much. A similar line of argument would prove the origin of New England towns to be the Massai enclosure of Central Africa." Slowly but surely, critical scholarship undermined the main props of the Teutonic theory of the origins of American institutions. Within a very few years, the Teutonic hypothesis survived mainly as a historical archaism, cropping up occasionally, and as late as 1921, in unexpected places like James Truslow Adams' *History of Southampton*.

Henry Adams' attempt to apply the laws of physics to history was equally unproductive. It is true that Adams' history has been much read and much admired, but mainly for reasons other than its scientific pretensions. Nevertheless, Adams persisted in the effort to discover law in history. In 1909, by substituting devolution for Darwinian and Spencerian evolution, Adams premised a theory of history upon the second law of thermodynamics that Lord Kelvin had propounded in the middle of the nineteenth century. According to Kelvin, the universe was declining progressively in energy, and Adams, who considered thought a form

of energy, concluded that mankind was becoming increasingly incapable of responding creatively to environmental challenge. Despite the fact that, at the time of the writing of "The Rule of Phase Applied to History," the second law of thermodynamics was held invalid by most physicists, Adams made it the basis of calculations leading to the conclusion that by 1921, or at the latest 1924, thought would have reached the limit of its possibilities and mankind would descend rapidly into chaos.

Adams' application of "the rule of phase" to history represented the dying gasp of the late nineteenth-century effort to establish a science of history based on the laws of biology and physics. Adams pronounced what amounted to an epitaph on this movement when he wrote in 1910 that the idea that history was "a process of mental evolution . . . controlled, like the evolution of any series of chemical or electrical equilibria, by one general formula" left "no followers, no school, no tradition."

In the present century the effort toward a science of history continued sporadically and with the bulk of the members of the historical profession unconvinced. William M. Sloane, in 1912, comparing history and the natural sciences with respect to predictability, argued that the sciences which claimed to be the most exact achieved "at best but a more or less close approximation to prediction, a higher or lower degree of probability." History, Sloane went on to say, might match or approximate the probability of the natural sciences if research revealed enough of the factual background. A few years later, Edward Cheyney revealed six inherently moral, as distinct from mechanical or biological, historical laws: the law of the continuity of history, the law of impermanence in history, the law of the interdependence of mankind, the law of the inevitability of democracy, the law of the necessity of free consent to government, and the law of moral progress. Cheyney also believed that once the historian grasped the laws of history he could act "with the same intelligence and precision and anticipation of success as the physicist, engineer, and cattle breeder." The last important effort to establish a science of history was by the Marxists, who, mainly in the 1930's (there had been earlier efforts in this direction), attempted to hitch American development to their universal dialectic, again without success and without significant following.

Opposition to the principle of historical law by the bulk of the historical profession derives from the belief that the great diversity of factors

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entering into a given historical situation makes prediction or extensive generalization impossible. It is also argued that the data of nature are static and repeatable and may be stated in terms of law, whereas the data of history are progressive and unrepeatable and permit of no easy formulization. Finally, there are some historians, fewer in number than those taking the above positions, who view historical knowledge as inherently subjective—so subjective, in fact, as to provide insubstantial foundation for presumably objective historical law.

The foundation stone of the scientific history of the Teutonists was the fact. The latter, in addition to being immutable, allegedly possessed a natural order. Consequently, when the disciples of the so-called "New History," about 1910, challenged not only the ordering of the facts but also "the being of a fact," they mounted a two-sided attack upon the scientific concepts of their predecessors.

Writing to Frederick Jackson Turner in 1910, Carl Becker recalled that when he was Turner's student, the latter had given him to understand "that no one . . . knew 'exactly what happened,'" and Turner replied that he had wanted to accomplish just that. In questioning "the being of a fact" and by describing the fact "as not planted on the solid ground of fixed conditions" but as being "itself a part of the changing currents, the complex and interacting influences of the time, deriving its significance as a fact from its relation to the deeper-seated movements of the age," Turner was challenging the very foundation of scientific history as evolved by the Teutonists. Because, if the facts were not fixed immutably, then the superstructure that derived from them—comparative method, historical evolution, and biological basis of institutional continuity—inevitably collapsed. To Becker, the "facts of history whatever they once were" were "only mental images or pictures which the historian makes in order to comprehend it." The continuity of history, Becker concluded, was largely subjective with the historian.

Such extreme historical relativism, however, ruled out the possibility not only of historical law but also of true historical knowledge. Neither Becker nor Turner pushed this position to its ultimate and, from the point of view of historiography, totally negative conclusion. Instead, Turner, in his presidential address to the American Historical Association in 1910, used relativism as a springboard for attacking not "the being of a fact" but those who derived historical law from *a priori* evidence and exploited history for "justificatory appendices." The pathway of history, Turner warned, "is strewn with the wrecks of 'known

and acknowledged truth' . . . due not only to defective analyses and imperfect statistics, but also to the lack of critical historical methods, of insufficient historical mindedness . . . to failure to give due attention to the relativity and transience of the conditions from which . . . laws were deduced."

Although the historian could not tell for certain what went on in the past, continued Turner, he could at least try honestly to find out. This required conscientious effort to understand the material of history and, along with such an effort, use of the hypothesis (more tentative than historical law) to guide the historian's probings. In formulating and refining the hypothesis, the historian would be aided by concepts derived from the social sciences: economics, sociology, psychology, and anthropology. The gist of Turner's statement is that, if history could not be made into a science, it might at least be infiltrated, through the formulation of hypotheses, by allied disciplines for the purpose of finding truer understanding.

The hypothesis, if less ironclad than historical law, was still more a commitment to a given point of view than simple induction from facts. It assumed that the process of inquiry in historical research began less with a problem of interpretation presented by a body of empirical data and more with theory whose validity had been established. Theoretically, then, the hypothesis committed the historian more to a point of view than the "neutralist" claim that the facts of history "speak for themselves" and that the narration of events without reference to a specific philosophy of history precluded bias. In practice, however, it is difficult to say whether the conscious use of a hypothesis made for greater or less bias. The pledges of impartiality that adorn the prefaces of historical studies are not always honored in their texts, and historians who deliberately avoid a philosophy of history do not by virtue of that fact strip off personal prejudices.

It cannot be said that the major historical hypotheses have lived up to the expectations of the disciples of the "New History." In the last fifty years or so major hypotheses in American history adopted as determinants first the frontier, then economics, geography, section, and region, and, finally, the city. These hypotheses, certainly in their more sweeping statements (substantial exegetical literature has emerged as to what Turner and Beard really meant), have not withstood the corrosion of criticism.

The frontier hypothesis, given classic expression by Turner in 1893,

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argued that to our own day "American history has been in a large degree the history of the colonization of the Great West. The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward, explains American development." Subsumed under this major hypothesis were several corollary theses: that "the sanative influences of the free spaces of the West were destined to ameliorate labor's condition, to afford new hopes and new faith to a pioneer democracy and to postpone the problem" of the class struggle; that "the most important effect of the frontier has been in the promotion of democracy here and in Europe"; that "the frontier is productive of individualism . . . [which] from the beginning promoted democracy."

Not until the late 1920's did the frontier hypothesis come under heavy attack. At that time, Charles A. Beard and Louis M. Hacker criticized it for minimizing such factors as urbanization and industrialization, class and economic forces. Carter Goodrich, Sol Davison, Murray Kane, and Fred Shannon demonstrated during the next decade that the frontier was not the "safety valve" for eastern workers in periods of depression, as Turner had implied. Also, in this period, Benjamin Wright, Jr., argued that democratic development in America was less the result of the impact of the frontier than the consequence of an over-all nineteenth-century democratic trend that embraced western Europe as well as the United States. In 1941 Turner's terminology and concepts were examined vigorously by G. W. Pierson and were found to be most imprecise. "In what it proposes," concluded Pierson, "the frontier hypothesis needs painstaking revision. By what it fails to mention, the theory today disqualified itself as an adequate guide to American development."

The classic application of the economic hypothesis to a major historical event is Charles A. Beard's *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution*, which was published in 1913. Until very recently this volume appeared to have withstood time and historical criticism a great deal better than did the frontier hypothesis. Not that historians failed to recognize weaknesses of detail in the thesis and in its monistic view of human motivation. Indeed, Beard himself in the 1935 edition of his work, as well as in his other writings, attempted to meet and reconcile some of the criticisms that had been made. But for many, Robert E. Brown's line-by-line analysis of Beard's work—concluding with the indictment that "if historians accept the Beard thesis . . . they must do so with the full knowledge that their acceptance is founded on an 'act of faith' not

an analysis of historical method, or that they are indulging in a 'noble dream' not history"—was something of a revelation.

To Beard, the economic interpretation of history was "as nearly axiomatic as any proposition can be." If, said Beard, you were to find that "men owning substantially the same amounts of the same kind of property were equally divided on the matter of adoption or rejection—it would then become apparent that the Constitution had no ascertainable relation to economic groups or classes, but was the product of some abstract causes remote from the chief business of life—gaining a livelihood." But on the other hand, if you discovered "that substantially all of merchants, money lenders, security holders, manufacturers, shippers, capitalists, and financiers and their professional associates are to be found on one side in support of the Constitution and that substantially all or a major part of the opposition came from the non-slaveholding farmers and the debtors—would it not be pretty conclusively demonstrated that our fundamental law was not the product of an abstraction known as 'the whole people' but of a group of economic interests which must have expected beneficial results from its adoption?"

Brown's criticism of Beard is significant not only in its detail but also because of its implication of the dangers of shaping history by hypothesis: the tendency to claim too much and, in the excitement of developing a point, to lapse into grievous historiographic fault. Beard, alleged Brown, on occasion quoted out of context and excluded quotations that would not sustain his thesis, relied too much upon secondary works, substituted innuendo for fact, used evidence from one period of history to justify conclusions about another, and used emotion-laden words like "coup d'état" imprecisely. Brown's critique of Beard has amounted to the demolition of a historiographic style. And yet it was in the pattern of the declining popularity of the economic hypothesis since the early 1930's, another of the results of which was to reduce Vernon L. Parrington's economically determined *Main Currents in American Thought* to pretty much of a shambles.

The geographical, sectional, and regional hypotheses, like other hypotheses, were anticipated to some extent before their more definitive statement. As early as 1793 Jedidiah Morse, "father of American geography," indicated the geographic boundaries of the "Grand Divisions of the United States." In 1891 Nathaniel S. Shaler's *Nature and Man in America* stressed the role of geographic influences as determining factors in American history, a point of view which also found expression

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in the work of Ellen C. Semple, disciple of the anthrogeographer, Ratzel. By 1900 the sectional and regional interpretations, which embraced a complex of factors generally within a geographic framework, was, according to Fulmer Mood, "well established at the University of Wisconsin."

Despite the impetus to sectional and regional studies through the publication of Turner's *The Significance of Sections in American History* and the usefulness of the regional and sectional concepts in history, the social sciences, and government, regionalism, as a hypothesis in historiography, suffers from the historian's inability to define the region and from the fact that there is no unanimity of lay or scholarly opinion on a single scheme of regional classification. Thus, one of the criticisms of Walter P. Webb's significant regional study, *The Great Plains*, was its alleged failure to delimit properly the Great Plains region. Like the frontier hypothesis, the sectional and regional concepts are considered too all-embracing, too inclusive of other factors, too vague in what they embrace, to enable the historian to use them as precise tools of historical interpretation.

The latest of the major historical hypotheses is A. M. Schlesinger's urban interpretation of American history, which was advanced in 1940 and urged "reconsideration of American history from the urban point of view." According to Schlesinger, Turner in his zeal to correct older notions like the Teutonic theory of American institutional origins "overlooked another order of society which, rivalling the frontier even in the earliest days, eventually became the major force. The city marched westward with the outposts of settlement, always injecting exacting elements into pioneer existence, while in the older sections it steadily extended its domain over politics, economics, and all the other interests of life. The time came when Turner himself confessed the need of 'an urban reinterpretation of our history.' A true understanding of America's past demands this balanced view—an appreciation of the significance of both frontier and city."

The urban interpretation of history is open to the same kind of challenge as the other hypotheses which we have considered, insofar as it offers a partial and incomplete picture of the American past. According to Schlesinger, "the city no less than the frontier has been a major factor in American civilization. Without an appreciation of the role of both the story is only half told." Contrary to the implications of this statement, however, there are other possibilities of interpretation besides

the frontier and urban hypotheses. And when Schlesinger writes that "the underlying strife between city and country led . . . to the formation of the first national parties under the constitution," we can see some justifiable basis for William Diamond's criticism of the urban interpretation on the ground that city and urban, like region and section, are too broad in their connotation to be useful as historical determinants.

Disenchantment alike with historical law and sweeping historical hypothesis has caused a few American historians to adopt an extreme antiscientist position and others to lean in that direction. This is reinforced by the current political climate, wherein historical determinism is looked upon almost suspiciously as a denial of free will and free choice in human affairs and, if not actually antidemocratic, as at least having the potential of being so.

There has been emphasis, almost prideful emphasis, upon the uniqueness of the subject matter of history and its emancipation from the positivistic philosophy that gave rise not only to historical law but to the social sciences as well. Distinctiveness, unrepeatability, and radical individuality are considered the very essence of historiographical data. Dr. Lloyd Sorenson, writing in the *American Quarterly*, has ventured to predict that the revolution in American historiography brought about by the late nineteenth-century impetus toward historical science will be repeated in the current era with the development of the antiscientific historiographical tradition of *Historismus* "and an unnamed development beyond *Historismus*" that is rooted in the work of Wilhelm Dilthey, Heinrich Rickert, Ernst Troeltsch, and Frederick Meinecke. *Historismus* is regarded by Sorenson as the antithesis of "the futile attempt of historical scientists since the enlightenment to force historical reality into the alien forms of natural reality. . . ."

In addition to individualizing tendencies that may be inherent in historicism, (I use the word *may* advisedly because I believe that Sorenson has underestimated the element of synthesis in Meinecke's statement of the theory of historicism)¹ antiscientism is strengthened by historical relativism, which, as we have seen, places the facts of history at the mercy of perception, with the result that all interpretations of history became equally valid or invalid.

Fortunately, neither extreme individualizing tendencies nor extreme relativism are much manifest in American historiography. Charles A.

1. Selection from Meinecke's *Values and Causalities in History* in Fritz Stern (ed.), *The Varieties of History from Voltaire to the Present* (New York, 1957), p. 272.

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Beard made it plain that he was not the relativist he was accused of being as a result of publication of "That Noble Dream." Indeed, Beard attacked relativist extremism, including aspects of the New Deal philosophy. Although Beard once pushed anti-semitism to the point of rejecting the concept of cause in history, he never attempted to write history without introducing causal concepts. Beard never lost faith in scientific method insofar as it enabled the historian to seek out the facts of history. "The inquiring spirit of history," he wrote, "using the scientific method, is the chief safeguard against the tyranny of authority, bureaucracy, and brute power."

American historians are far from resolving the objectivist-relativist argument. They have evolved, however, an eminently practical compromise by learning, as Oscar Handlin said in 1953, to live with relativism. "Historians once disturbed by the discovery that history could not achieve scientific objectivity or finality have learned to work with materials which entail subjective involvement on the part of the historian and to accept the fact that completely objective truth is unobtainable." Regardless of the ultimate validity of such a reconciliation, it has apparently enabled the American historian to manage his materials so that relativism has not had anything like the disintegrating effect upon the American historical tradition that, according to Hannah Arendt,² it has had upon European historiography and the European historical tradition.

Although impressed by the uniqueness of historical phenomena and skeptical of historical law and hypothesis, the American historian has not surrendered his faith in generalization. Louis Gottschalk has said that "no honest scholar need feel ashamed because his generalizations are not golden or may not even glitter; even a common-sense truth or a 'law' so modified and conditioned as to be a truism is better than an untruth or an unexamined platitude." The historian's process of generalizing is aided by his borrowing from the social sciences. Applying social science methodology to history is as old, if not older, than the so-called "New History" of 1910. The subject has been treated most fully in 1954 in *The Social Sciences in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee on Historiography of the Social Science Research Council*. This is an effective summary of the treatment of social science concepts that the historian might draw upon. But as to how he might draw—that is, concerning the technique of integration—the report is vague. "There

2. "History and Immortality," *Partisan Review* (Winter, 1957), pp. 11-35.

are no neat, well-formulated social science methods that can be learned and applied [to history] without scrutiny and no social science concept either implies or involves any deviation from the strict rules of procedure that are the hallmark of sound historical research." This conclusion would seem to be in keeping with David Riesman's contention that, compared "to the new specialities that have emerged at the juncture of physics and chemistry or of physics and biology, the social sciences have been curiously static in the relations they engendered among each other." And, one might add, the relationship between history and the social sciences has been more static still.

The barriers to effective integration between history and the behavioral and social sciences are essentially these. The social science approach is essentially microcosmic and centers in the relationship frequently lending itself to quantitative expression, between a relatively few phenomena in a very limited and, for the most part, contemporary time sequence. The historian's approach, on the other hand, is macrocosmic, embracing a great number of variables distributed rather widely in space and time, whose interaction can rarely be precisely determined and, as a rule, cannot be measured quantitatively. In addition, certain of the methods of the social and behavioral sciences—such as interviewing, polling, and other aspects of sociological inquiry that require the presence of the subject—are useless to the historian, who, concerned with mankind's past, cannot ask questions of the dead. In addition, the historian has certain reservations about the methodology and technique of the social sciences. The historian tends to be more skeptical than the behavioral scientist of the values of psychological and psychoanalytical techniques in investigation, of the superiority of the quantitative measurements of the social scientist to his own informed guesses. The pollsters, Henry David asserts, rightly or wrongly, had they been around in 1800, could not have done a better job of estimating public opinion in the United States than did Henry Adams by using the historian's traditional sources.

On the other hand, insights contributed by the social sciences, not all of which were unanticipated by historians, have prompted increased awareness of hitherto neglected materials and new types of data, of new problems and new generalizations in historical investigation. "Prompted by the social sciences," writes Richard Hofstadter, whose work is an outstanding example of the integration of historiography with behavioral and social science method, "the historian begins to

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realize that matters of central concern to other disciplines force him to enlarge his conception of his own task—to place the results of social science research in much broader context.”

To the extent that American history resists being categorized as a science, its public prestige has been diminished. The demand by a practical society that its experience be analyzed—so that essential tasks like predicting election returns, measuring opinion, and selling deodorants might be performed—has been met by others than the historians. Government and industry make use of sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists while, apart from a few areas of government service and an occasional business history, the historian can only teach and write books that, for the most part, do not sell at all well. The social scientists seem to have captured the public imagination. When Louis Gottschalk asserts that one of the historian's most important functions is to “check the looseness of others' generalizations about human experiences,” he is describing a very necessary function. But it is not likely to impress even the informed public, which has been conditioned by a certain amount of vulgarization of the social sciences to think in terms of formula explanations of diverse social phenomena.

The historian, for the most part, does not appear to be too much concerned over what many fear is the declining status of the guild. The best of contemporary historiography is synthetic and macrocosmic, with more than a little attention paid to literary form. The historian will integrate social science research within the context of a sweeping historical narrative rather than advance such research by subjecting another small area to minute examination. The historian will shy away from group research and the problem-solving technique of the social sciences. At the same time, he upholds the non-utilitarian and individual character of historical inquiry as an “adornment of the free mind,” an expression of the historian's inner creative urge rather than an attempt to fill consciously a specific social need.

In evaluating the idea of a science of American history, it should be remembered that the heritage of historiography is an ancient one with its own inner development. It would be ridiculous to deny the impact of scientific and social science development upon American historiography. There have been significant changes in American historiographic patterns from the prescientific era, but in other respects the changes have been surprisingly small.

Notes on the Contributors

ROGER CAILLOIS, editor-in-chief of *Diogenes*, suggests in this issue a theory of "diagonal sciences" as promising further progress toward clarifying the problems of man in his environment. Caillois, critic, novelist, sociologist, has written on the concept of play and on the analysis of games in *Diogenes*, Nos. 12 and 19, in which his bibliography appears.

JOHN CHADWICK was born in 1920 and educated at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. During the war he served in the Royal Navy, then completed his degree, worked on the staff of the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, and returned to Cambridge as lecturer in classics. A collaborator with Michael Ventris in the progressive decipherment of Linear B, he was part author of *Documents in Mycenaean Greek* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), in which their solution is formally and fully set out. His arti-

cles have appeared in various journals and newspapers, and he has participated frequently in radio broadcasts.

GEORGES BERNARD, who has devoted himself to operational research since 1955, is economic adviser to the Institut Français du Pétrole and engineering counsel to the Bureau des Études et Contrôles Industriels. He served as economics officer in Germany with the Administration Française on the control of heavy industries and was a member of the Allied High Commission's economic committee there in 1945-55. His writings include studies on the political economy of Professor Ehrhard and on various European industries, such as coal, petroleum, steel, and, in this issue, "On Investment."

GEORGES GUSDORF, whose article, "For a History of the Sciences of Man,"

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appeared in *Diogenes*, No. 17, here pursues his theme with a plea to specialists in the various human sciences to share also in the vast inquiry of man into man. To his considerable list of published works he has recently added *Traité de métaphysique* (Paris: Colin, 1956) and *La Vertu de force* (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1957).

A Ph.D. in history from the University of California, NIKKI R. KEDDIE, born in New York City in 1930, discusses the factors which have influenced various Eastern countries in their reaction to Western values. Now an instructor in history at Scripps College, Claremont, California, Mrs. Keddies chief interests are in social, economic, intellectual, and comparative history. In addition to a chapter, "Historical Obstacles to Agrarian Reform in Iran," to appear in *Asian-Western Encounters*, ed. Merrill R. Goodall (The Hague, 1959), she has contributed to various journals on East-West historical studies and will spend the summer in Great Britain, Iran, and the Soviet Union on a Social Science Research Council grant, studying Iranian intellectual history of the period from 1890 to 1914.

JAAKKO AHOKAS was born in Finland in 1923, studied in Geneva and Helsinki, and, after the war, discovered and developed his interest in philology and the Romance languages. His doctoral thesis was due to be published last April. A charter member and president of the Society of Finnish Translators since 1955, he has participated as Finland's representative in various inter-Nordic conferences. His essays and critical articles on the theater, poetry, contemporary fiction, and the cinema appear regularly in Helsinki reviews, and he lectures on contemporary figures in these fields, such as Camus, Pasternak, and Jules Renard.

EDWARD N. SAVETH, of Columbia University, formerly visiting professor at the New Mexico Highlands University, is at present enjoying a research grant from the Carnegie Foundation. He is author of *American Historians and European Immigrants* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948) and *Understanding the American Past* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1954), and he contributes to a wide variety of publications, such as *Fortune*, the *Nation*, the *Saturday Review*, the *New York Times*, and the *Political Science Quarterly*.

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